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Introduction 
Advances in most areas of specialization within the broad discipline of psychology occur 
incrementally – sometimes in larger increments, sometimes in smaller increments. One often-noted 
disadvantage of such specialized research progress is that connections between different areas can 
be overlooked or neglected.  
Three areas within psychology that have been making rapid theoretical and empirical progress over 
the past few decades have been: (i) understandings of well-being; (ii) evolutionary and related 
biological approaches to human psychology; and, (iii) theories of the development of personhood (or 
the ‘self’). 
There is reason to believe that these areas have strong conceptual inter-relationships. In psychology, 
work on well-being is usually cast at the individual level (e.g., through the notion of ‘subjective well-
being’ (SWB) - Diener & Lucas, 1999). That casting implicates the indexing of well-being to a person 
or ‘self’ as subject or agent of well-being. 
Similarly, the evolutionary distinctiveness of many human psychological traits connects to the 
sociality of the species and, in particular, to how that sociality has influenced the evolution of 
personal consciousness and social individuation. Work on the evolution of emotions such as envy 
(Hill and Buss, 2006), jealousy (Buss et al. 1992) and shame (Glibert, 2003), for example, has 
highlighted the social and moral networks within which persons are located, perceived and held 
accountable as individual persons. 
Finally, analyses of well-being frequently make reference to some notion of human nature, most 
obviously in eudaimonic approaches that emphasise ‘nature fulfillment’ as central to the experience 
of well-being (e.g., see Haybron, 2008).  While there is general acknowledgment that evolutionary 
processes are not specifically targeted at maximizing individual well-being, it is also true that there is 
enough congruence between evolutionary selective processes and the evolved physical and 
psychological ‘design’ of humans to suggest considerable overlap between adaptive function and 
organismic and psychological well-being. Simply, we tend to feel better at various levels when we 
operate in a manner suited to our evolved physical and psychological architecture. 
Given significant advances in all three of these areas it therefore makes sense to draw together 
threads from each in order to take stock of what is known about the convergence and 
interdependence of these streams of research activity.  
In practical terms, there has been considerable public interest in well-being research to the extent of 
increasing consideration of ways in which policy settings might incorporate human well-being (e.g., 
as policy goals and as measures of policy success). Grounding such policy and practice in relation to 
well-being within broader understandings of evolutionary influences and social and developmental 
processes involved in the generation of persons seems timely.  
Such grounding should also provide more fundamental understandings of well-being that indicate 
how different policy areas (e.g., social development, education, the economy, health, environmental 
management, etc.) potentially interact, reinforce, moderate or combine to produce well-being 
outcomes at the population level. 
The aim of this annotated bibliography is to provide a ‘first cut’ at characterising this multiple 
interface. It cannot hope to be comprehensive and apologies are made in advance to any authors of 
work that might be omitted from this collection.  
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In particular, the bibliography, with a few exceptions, is restricted to journal articles accessed via the 
targeted databases. The omission of many books and book chapters is a definite limitation of the 
bibliography. The assumption, however, was that most books in the area are based upon published 
articles. Also, in most cases, book or book chapter authors are themselves article authors. Should 
someone wish to pursue the work of particular authors featured in this bibliography they will be able 
to locate books, book chapters and other omitted reference material by those authors. The aim of 
this bibliography is to assist with rather than substitute for comprehensive literature searches. 
Many bibliographies are designed to provide useful source material for particular areas of research 
specialization or the development of particular theoretical frameworks (e.g., see Axelrod and 
D’Ambrosio’s (1994) “Annotated Bibliography on the Evolution of Cooperation” for an example of 
the latter). This bibliography differs from many others in that, as just noted, it seeks to target a set of 
interfaces between three distinct bodies of literature: 
 Human well-being; 
 Evolutionary (and related biological) perspectives on human behaviour; 
 Personhood (including the ‘self’). 
Each of these bodies of literature is extensive in its own right. Importantly, this bibliography does not 
aim to include all the literature in each area. Instead, its focus is on the overlap between these areas.  
As will be explained in the ‘Methods’ section, this has involved a necessarily subjective, but 
principled, process of selection of those published works (captured in the search process) that 
provide clear insight into the connections between two or more of these areas of research.  
Within those bounds, the selection process has been deliberately ‘permissive’. While major, well-
cited works are included so too are some quite focused and specific studies. The selection criterion 
in this respect is a work’s ‘fit’ with the purpose of the bibliography, rather than its renown. 
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Methods 
The initial stage of the project involved extensive database searches on the overlap between the 
areas of evolutionary psychology, personhood and well-being.  In order to achieve the objectives of 
the study, the following databases were chosen as being appropriate to locate articles linking the 
three subject areas: 
Web of Science; Science Direct; Proquest-Social Science; Google Scholar; General One File; Web of 
Knowledge.  
In addition, the Evolution and Human Behavior journal website and General LIU Library searches 
were performed. 
Words were identified that would target the connections between evolutionary psychology, 
personhood and well-being. On that basis, literature searches were undertaken using combinations 
of the following keywords:  
evolutionary psychology; evolution*; behavio* ecology; personhood; self; selfhood; social 
construct*; well-being; human; happiness; flourish*; neurodevelopment; play.  
As the search progressed, keywords were added if they were being used in a way related to the 
focus of this study, or to follow themes that seemed to be particularly relevant and fruitful. For 
example, the keyword ‘play’ was added to follow a developmental theme that emphasised 
development of cognitive and social skills necessary for personhood and, potentially, well-being.  
Children have always engaged in play, play has evolved with the developing person, and play leads 
to well-being, joy and happiness. 
Citations were selected primarily from reviewing the abstracts, and the relevant citations were saved 
in an Endnote file (Version X4), with the PDF’s attached (if they were available to download). Extra 
citations were located and added from appropriate references cited in the located articles, and also 
by searching for key authors identified (e.g., Martin, J., for articles relating to selfhood/personhood; 
Grinde, B., for articles relating to evolutionary well-being; and, Pellegrini, A., for articles relating to 
play). 
In the development of any bibliography there is a process of selection and filtering. As well as the 
limitations inherent in the databases searched and in the choice of keywords and combinations of 
keywords to search, there is also a necessarily subjective process of making judgments about 
relevance to the objective of the bibliography. Relevance was judged either on the basis of explicit 
mention of two or more of the areas of interest (i.e., well-being, evolutionary psychology or 
personhood) or, when only one them was focused on, when the focus on one area of interest was 
detailed and/or provided a model or distinctive theoretical framework. 
The second stage of the project was a process of confirmation of citations and a final check for 
relevance and completeness. From this final set of entries, an annotated bibliography on the 
connections between evolutionary psychology, personhood and well-being was produced and is 
reported here.  
The completed bibliography contains a total of 347 annotated references, presented in APA 6th style. 
All cited references are listed in aplphabetical order by surname of the first author and have been 
numbered consecutively. This numbering has been used in the production of two indexes: One 
based on the various overlaps between three subject areas; one based on authors. 
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The original abstracts have been included, either in full or abbreviated where they were extremely 
long. Most citations also include brief notes about the article that position it in relation to the three 
subject areas. If no abstract was available for the journal articles, brief notes have been included. 
References 
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 
1. Adams, G. R. & Marshall, S. (1996). A developmental social psychology of 
identity: Understanding the person-in-context. Journal of Adolescence, 
19(5), 429-442. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S014019719690041X. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jado.1996.0041 
Abstract: This essay focuses on the socialization of identity formation. It provides a theory 
about the developmental social psychology of identity. A set of propositions are derived 
from the authors' reading, research, cultural observations and clinical experience regarding 
adolescent identity formation. The essay covers the socialization process, nature of the self, 
processes of growth and development, person-in-context, and a statement on the linkage 
between macro- and micro-environmental influences on identity. The theoretical 
propositions are offered for their potential heuristic utility in the study of identity formation 
during adolescence and young adulthood. 
Notes: Relates to the development of personhood/selfhood through the process and 
socialisation and has implications for the study of well-being. 
2. Adams, K. B.; Leibbrandt, S. & Moon, H. (2011). A critical review of the 
literature on social and leisure activity and well-being in later life. Ageing 
& Society, 31(04), 683-712. doi:10.1017/S0144686X10001091 
Abstract: An engaged lifestyle is seen as an important component of successful ageing. 
Many older adults with high participation in social and leisure activities report positive well-
being, a fact that fuelled the original activity theory and that continues to influence 
researchers, theorists and practitioners. This study’s purpose is to review the 
conceptualisation and measurement of activity among older adults and the associations 
reported in the gerontological literature between specific dimensions of activity and well-
being. We searched published studies that focused on social and leisure activity and well-
being, and found 42 studies in 44 articles published between 1995 and 2009. They reported 
from one to 13 activity domains, the majority reporting two or three, such as informal, 
formal and solitary, or productive versus leisure. Domains associated with subjective well-
being, health or survival included social, leisure, productive, physical, intellectual, service 
and solitary activities. Informal social activity has accumulated the most evidence of an 
influence on well-being. Individual descriptors such as gender or physical functioning 
sometimes moderate these associations, while contextual variables such as choice, meaning 
or perceived quality play intervening roles. Differences in definitions and measurement 
make it difficult to draw inferences about this body of evidence on the associations between 
activity and well-being. Activity theory serves as shorthand for these associations, but 
gerontology must better integrate developmental and psychological constructs into a 
refined, comprehensive activity theory. 
Notes: A comprehensive review of recent studies from a number of countries and cultures 
on the activity theory of ageing. The findings report that higher levels of participation in 
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social and leisure activities leads to higher levels of well-being in older adults. An interesting 
contribution to the study of well-being and personhood, particularly relevant because of the 
growing increases in numbers of elderly people. 
3. Adams, M. (2003). The reflexive self and culture: A critique. British 
Journal of Sociology, 54(2), 221-238. Article. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://WOS:000183578200004. doi:10.1080/0007131032000080212 
Abstract: This article attempts to engage with a tendency in the theorization of social change 
and self-identity evident in the work of a number of contemporary social theorists, to place 
an extended process of reflexivity at the heart of modern identity. As symptomatic of 'neo-
modern' accounts of selfhood, critical readings of Giddens, Beck, Castells and some aspects 
of social theory more generally, and their account of modern reflexivity's relationship to 
culture, are assessed. In light of these criticisms, ways in which culture might still play an 
important part in the shaping of identity are considered. The relationship between language, 
culture and reflexivity, drawing from philosophy, sociology and G. H. Mead's own brand of 
social psychology, are all utilized in establishing a critique of the role Giddens and others 
designate for culture in the constitution of the contemporary self. By potentially 
repositioning self-identity in its connection to culture, the overall bearing of reflexivity upon 
the processes of self-identity is thus questioned. It is argued that a culturally-situated, yet 
fluid and multifarious account of self-identity is a necessary analytical and normative 
alternative. 
Notes: A critique of the development of identity through reflexive processes of modernity, 
especially as featured in the work of Anthony Giddens. Relates to personhood.  
4. Ahuvia, A. C.  (2002). Individualism/collectivism and cultures of 
happiness: A theoretical conjecture on the relationship between 
consumption, culture and subjective well-being at the national level. 
Journal of Happiness Studies, 3(1), 23-36. doi:10.1023/a:1015682121103 
Abstract: This theory paper seeks to explain an empirical puzzle presented by past research 
on the relationship between consumption and subjective well-being (SWB). Research has 
shown that people in rich countries are, on average, significantly higher in SWB than people 
in poor countries, which is consistent with a strong link between one’s overall level of 
consumption and one’s SWB. However, when individuals within the same country are 
compared, income has little relationship to SWB above the level at which basic needs can be 
met, suggesting that higher levels of consumption may not be linked to higher levels of SWB. 
This link between consumption and SWB when nations are compared to each other, but not 
when individuals within a given nation are compared to each other, presents a puzzle. As a 
solution, I propose that economic development leads to higher levels of national average 
SWB not by increasing consumption (again, with the caveat that this statement excludes 
situations where basic needs are not being met), but by creating more individualistic cultures 
which encourage their members to pursue personal happiness over honor and meeting 
social obligations. Whether or not this is seen as a socially positive development depends in 
a circular fashion on the cultural values of the person making the judgement. 
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Notes: The author argues that people who put more emphasis on 'intrinsic' goals such as 
personal growth or having rich social relationships, have higher levels of subjective well-
being than those who place more emphasis on 'extrinsic' goals such as acquiring wealth or 
social recognition. The type of motivation is the key, as intrinsic motivations come from 
within, and one wants to do something, whereas extrinsic motivations are based on what 
one ought to do. Therefore to have high subjective well-being goals must be intrinsically 
motivated. An interesting perspective on individualistic/collectivist cultures, showing that 
collectivist cultures are not necessarily the happiest, nor are individualistic cultures primarily 
motivated by consumption. Relates to both personhood (via individualistic or collectivistic 
influences) and well-being. 
5. Ahuvia, A. C.   (2005). Beyond the extended self: Loved objects and 
consumers’ identity narratives. Journal of Consumer Research, 32(1), 
171-184. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/429607. 
doi:10.1086/429607 
Abstract: This article investigates the possessions and activities that consumers love and 
their role in the construction of a coherent identity narrative. In the face of social forces 
pushing toward identity fragmentation, interviews reveal three different straegies, labeled 
“demarcating,” “compromising,” and “synthesizing” solutions, for creating a coherent self-
narrative. Findings are compared to Belk’s “Possessions and the Extended Self.” Most claims 
from Belk are supported, but the notion of a core versus extended self is critiqued as a 
potentially confusing metaphor. The roles of loved objects and activities in structuring social 
relationships and in consumer well-being are also explored. 
Notes: Explores the notion of a ‘self’ being extended into the objects and artefacts a person 
possesses. Relates to selfhood/ personhood and well-being. 
6. Alexander, G. M.   (2003). An evolutionary perspective of sex-typed toy 
preferences: Pink, blue, and the brain. Archives of Sexual Behavior, 32(1), 
7-14. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A%3A1021833110722. 
doi:10.1023/a:1021833110722 
Abstract: Large sex differences in children's toy preferences are attributed to gender group 
identification and social learning. The proposal outlined in this paper is that contemporary 
conceptual categories of “masculine” or “feminine” toys are also influenced by evolved 
perceptual categories of male-preferred and female-preferred objects. Research on children 
exposed prenatally to atypical levels of androgens and research on typically developing 
infants suggest sex-dimorphic preferences exist for object features, such as movement or 
color/form. The evolution and neurobiology of mammalian visual processing —and recent 
findings on sex-dimorphic toy preferences in nonhuman primates—suggest further that an 
innate bias for processing object movement or color/form may contribute to behaviors with 
differential adaptive significance for males and females. In this way, preferences for objects 
such as toys may indicate a biological preparedness for a “masculine” or “feminine” gender 
role—one that develops more fully as early perceptual preferences are coupled with object 
experiences imposed by contemporary gender socialization. 
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Notes: An analysis of the links between evolutionary theory and toy preferences as a 
function of gender that seeks to bridge the interface between evolved biological preferences 
and gender socialisation processes. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood. 
7. Alexander, R. D.   (1990). Epigenetic rules and Darwinian algorithms: The 
adaptive study of learning and development. Ethology and Sociobiology, 
11(4–5), 241-303. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/016230959090012U. 
doi:10.1016/0162-3095(90)90012-u 
Abbrebiated Abstract: Recent efforts toward a Darwinian psychology of human behavior will 
profit from taking account of prior investigations of proximate phenomena and adaptive 
mechanisms conducted within the science of biology, and from realizing that adaptive 
significance and underlying mechanisms must be investigated in concert. Contrary to some 
recent arguments, evidence of adaptive design is usually manifested initially and most 
prominently in the behavior (or other “ultimate” phenotypic expressions) of organisms, 
human or nonhuman, rather than in underlying psychological, physiological, or 
developmental mechanisms, which are often obscure, and in any case, as adaptive 
mechanisms, must be investigated secondarily. The reason is that selection acts most 
directly on behavior, and on its underlying mechanisms only as they influence the behavior. 
This is as true for learned and cultural behaviors as for any others. Adaptive significance of 
behavior, and evidence of its underlying design, is thus examined only by studying the 
behavior itself, its complexity, the situations in which it is expressed, and its effects in 
different situations.    ..........................   It is argued that the principal environment of natural 
selection leading to the modern human psyche was social, and that on this account the 
environment of human behavior has not changed as much since the Pleistocene as is often 
assumed. 
Notes: An early account of the relationship between evolutionary processes, human sociality 
and the human mind. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood. 
8. Allott, R.   (1992). Evolutionary aspects of love and empathy. Journal of 
Social and Evolutionary Systems, 15(4), 353-370. Article; Proceedings 
Paper. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:A1992KW12600002. 
doi:10.1016/1061-7361(92)90023-7 
Abstract: Love has always been a central preoccupation in individual human lives, but there 
has been little consideration of it by psychologists or other scientists and little attempt to 
explain it as an evolutionary phenomenon. There are various possible behavioral precursors 
of love: animal ''love,'' empathy, group feeling, sexuality, and the mother/infant bond. The 
principal candidates are sexuality and the mother/infant bond. Sexuality has been favored as 
an origin by a few writers, but has characteristics which distinguish it sharply from love. 
However, neither does the mother/infant bond alone fully account for human love. Love 
evolved as the outcome of interaction between the genetic basis for mother/infant 
attachment and other capabilities of evolving humans manifested in and made possible by 
the increase in human brain-size: enlarged cognitive capacity, improved communication, and 
the evolution of language. The capacity of language led to the emergence of the conscious 
self, and with this the capability to recognize and empathize with the selfhood of others. The 
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deepening of the mother/infant attachment into love plays, and still plays, an essential role 
in the transmission of culture from one generation to the next, and in making possible the 
cohesion of the human group. This account fits well with recent research into the process 
and significance of the mother/infant relation. 
Notes: Provides an account of how empathic abilities could have evolved in humans, given 
the social context of other selves and the presence of deep and prolonged mother-infant 
interaction. Relates to self/personhood and evolution. 
9. Anderson, K. G.  ; Kaplan, H.  , Lam, D.   & Lancaster, J.   (1999). Paternal 
care by genetic fathers and stepfathers II: Reports by Xhosa high school 
students. Evolution and Human Behavior, 20(6), 433-451. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090513899000227. 
doi:10.1016/s1090-5138(99)00022-7 
Abstract: In this article we present a biosocial model of human male parental care that 
allows relationship (mating) effort to influence male parental allocations. The model 
recognizes four classes of relationships between men and the children they parent: genetic 
offspring of current mates (combined relationship and parental effort), genetic offspring of 
previous mates (parental effort solely), step offspring of current mates (relationship effort 
solely), and stepchildren of previous mates (essentially no expected investment). We test the 
model using data on parental investment collected from 340 Xhosa high school students in 
Cape Town, South Africa. Six measures of paternal investment are examined: the amount of 
money men spent on students for school, clothing, and miscellaneous expenditures, 
respectively, and how often men spent time with children, helped them with their 
homework, or spoke English with them. The tests provide support for the roles of both 
parental and relationship effort in influencing parental care: men invest significantly more in 
their genetic offspring and in the children of their current mates. We also examine several 
proximate influences on parental care, specifically the age and sex of the child, and the 
percentage of the child's life the father figure coresided with him or her. 
Notes: The authors argue that individuals may select mates partly on the basis of their 
predicted ability or willingness to provide parental care. Parental care can improve the 
quality and or duration of the relationship. Introduces the term 'relationship effort' which 
covers economic and reciprocity issues as well as solely reproductive considerations. 
Connects evolutionary theories of male parental investment with support for the 
development of children (persons). Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood. 
10. Anderson, M. L.   (2003). Embodied cognition: A field guide. Artificial 
Intelligence, 149(1), 91-130. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0004370203000547. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0004-3702(03)00054-7 
Abstract: The nature of cognition is being re-considered. Instead of emphasizing formal 
operations on abstract symbols, the new approach foregrounds the fact that cognition is, 
rather, a situated activity, and suggests that thinking beings ought therefore be considered 
first and foremost as acting beings. The essay reviews recent work in Embodied Cognition, 
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provides a concise guide to its principles, attitudes and goals, and identifies the physical 
grounding project as its central research focus. 
Notes: An important overview of the field of embodied cognition, its philosophical bases, 
evolutionary emphasis and connections to socially situated cognition. Relates to 
evolutionary psychology and the cognitive nature of selves as embodied beings. It also 
touches on socially-situated approaches to cognition. 
11. Anderson, W. T.   (2003). Augmentation, symbiosis, transcendence: 
Technology and the future(s) of human identity. Futures, 35(5), 535-546. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328702000976. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0016-3287(02)00097-6 
Abstract: Accelerating and converging technological changes in several fields are now 
challenging fundamental assumptions about human nature in general and, more specifically, 
ideas about the sense of personal identity. Major themes in the emerging dialogue 
concerning this subject are: augmentation (creating abilities not biologically inherent in the 
phenotype), symbiosis (interaction between two organisms or between people and 
intelligent machines), and transcendence (going beyond present identity boundaries to 
become parts of a larger entity). These themes are now being explored by various futurists 
and also by science-fiction writers who create imaginative scenarios of far distant futures in 
which human identity may change in spectacular ways. Such explorations offer not only 
useful visions of possible futures, but important insights into the past and present nature of 
human evolution. 
Notes: A speculative investigation of how personal identity may be affected in the future by 
technological innovations that augment, connect and transcend current and past ways of 
constructing personhood. Relates to personhood. 
12. Andrews, P. W.   (2002). The influence of postreliance detection on the 
deceptive efficacy of dishonest signals of intent: Understanding facial 
clues to deceit as the outcome of signaling tradeoffs. Evolution and 
Human Behavior, 23(2), 103-121. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090513801000848. 
doi:10.1016/s1090-5138(01)00084-8 
Abstract: Evolutionary communication theory posits that signalers and receivers are in a 
coevolutionary arms race. Receivers attempt to predict the behavior of signalers, and 
signalers attempt to manipulate the behavior of receivers (often through the use of 
dishonest signals of intent). This has led to the perception that deceitful signalers prefer 
perfectly deceptive signals. However, it is often easy for receivers to determine that a signal 
of intent was dishonest after relying on it to their detriment. Even the best deceivers may 
then acquire a reputation for being dishonest. For instance, in Prisoner's Dilemma (PD)-like 
social situations, predictable defectors make better social partners than unpredictable 
defectors. When opportunities to engage in social interaction depend on one's reputation 
for predictability, those who are better at concealing their defecting intentions may suffer 
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the most from the reputations they acquire. Deceivers then face a tradeoff between the 
short-term benefits of successful deception and the long-term costs to their reputations. A 
mathematical model is developed and it is shown that the tradeoff often favors signalers 
who produce imperfectly deceptive signals over perfectly honest or perfectly deceptive 
ones. Implications for understanding human facial expressions and sociopathy are drawn. 
Notes: An interesting account that highlights the trade-off between short-term pay-offs that 
arise from deception/dishonesty in a social setting versus longer-term damage to one’s 
reputation. This is a central issue for the moral accounting of persons in social settings as it 
involves managing obligations to others while maintaining the interests of the individual 
person in the local moral order. Relates to evolutionary psychology and social 
selves/personhood. 
13. Babchuk, W. A.  ; Hames, R. B.   & Thompson, R. A.   (1985). Sex 
differences in the recognition of infant facial expressions of emotion: 
The primary caretaker hypothesis. Ethology and Sociobiology, 6(2), 89-
101. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0162309585900020. 
doi:10.1016/0162-3095(85)90002-0 
Abstract: Although much research has been devoted to studying sex differences in 
functioning (e.g.,Maccoby and Jacklin 1974), most efforts have been directed toward 
documenting or elucidating the proximate causes of sex differences. Few attempts have 
been made, however, to explain the ultimate causes of these differences or the selective 
pressures that have led to the development of psychological differences between males and 
females [for exceptions see Symons (1979) and Daly and Wilson (1983)]. Toward this end of 
blending psychology with evolutionary theory we develop what we call the “primary 
caretaker hypothesis,” which predicts that the sex that through evolutionary time has 
dominated infant caretaking will differentially exhibit skills that are important in caretaking 
(e.g., the ability to rapidly recognize infant emotional expressions). Evidence is advanced to 
show that females dominate childcare in nonhuman primates and humans and that a high 
level of care of infants is crucial, given universally high infant mortality rates throughout our 
evolutionary history and the number of potential hazards impairing infant development. The 
prompt and accurate recognition of infant emotional cues—especially in the face—is an 
important component of caretaking practices, and thus selective pressures should result in 
greater proficiency in this ability in the sex that caretakes most. An experimental procedure 
is described where informants were tested in their speed and accuracy of identifying infant 
facial expressions of emotion. A statistical analysis of the results revealed that females were 
significantly more accurate and rapid than males in their discrimination of facial expressions 
and that previous experience in childcare had no effect on this sex difference. Follow-up 
research concerning the “primary caretaker hypothesis” is proposed. 
Notes: An early work that links evolutionary theory on parental investment (caretaking) with 
emotional responsiveness and recognition of facial emotional expressions. Relates to 
evolutionary psychology and has implications for child development and social-emotional 
capacities/personhood. 
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14. Barbour, I. G.  (1999). Neuroscience, artificial intelligence, and human 
nature: Theological and philosophical reflections. Zygon, 34(3), 361-398. 
Article; Proceedings Paper. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://WOS:000082173800002. doi:10.1111/0591-2385.00222 
Abstract: I develop a multilevel, holistic view of persons, emphasizing embodiment, 
emotions, consciousness, and the social self. In successive sections I draw from six sources: 
1. Theology. The biblical understanding of the unitary, embodied, social self gave way in 
classical Christianity to a body-soul dualism, but it has been recovered by many recent 
theologians. 2. Neuroscience. Research has shown the localization of mental functions in 
regions of the brain, the interaction of cognition and emotion, and the importance of social 
interaction in evolutionary history and child development. 3. Artificial intelligence. Some 
forms of robotics use embodied systems that learn by interacting with their environment, 
but the possibilities for emotion, socialization, and consciousness in robots remain 
problematic. 4. Relations between levels. Concepts that can help us relate studies of neurons 
and persons include the hierarchy of levels, the communication of information, the behavior 
of dynamic systems, and epistemological and ontological emergence. 5. Philosophy of mind. 
Two-aspect theories of the mind-brain relation offer an alternative between the extremes of 
eliminative materialism and the thesis that consciousness is irreducible. 6. Process 
philosophy. I suggest that process thought provides a coherent philosophical framework in 
which these themes can be brought together. It combines dipolar monism with 
organizational pluralism, and it emphasizes embodiment, emotions, a hierarchy of levels, 
and the social character of selfhood. 
Notes: A philosophical and theoretical inquiry into selfhood that draws upon a range of 
empirical and theoretical developments, including evolutionary theory and child 
development. Relates to evolution, development and social interaction/personhood. 
15. Barker, D. J. P.   (2004). The developmental origins of well-being. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. B. , 359 1359–
1366. 
Abstract: Low birthweight is now known to be associated with increased rates of coronary 
heart disease and the related disorders, stroke, hypertension and adult-onset diabetes. 
These associations have been extensively replicated in studies in different countries and are 
not the result of confounding variables. They extend across the normal range of birthweight 
and depend on lower birthweights in relation to the duration of gestation rather than the 
effects of premature birth. The associations are thought to be consequences of 
developmental plasticity, the phenomenon by which one genotype can give rise to a range 
of different physiological or morphological states in response to different environmental 
conditions during development. Recent observations have shown that impaired growth in 
infancy and rapid childhood weight gain exacerbate the effects of impaired prenatal growth. 
A new vision of optimal early human development is emerging, which takes account of 
health and well-being throughout life. 
Notes: Relates to well-being through a developmental analysis of prenatal growth and its 
long-term effects on well-being throughout life.  
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16. Barnett, S. A.   (1983). Humanity and natural selection. Ethology and 
Sociobiology, 4(1), 35-51. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0162309583900079. 
doi:10.1016/0162-3095(83)90007-9 
Abstract: In some modern biological images of the human species human action is reduced 
to a consequence of natural selection, that is, to a tendency to maximize fitness. The precise 
nature and scope of the theory of natural selection are, however, undecided; yet in 
evolutionary interpretations of human society neodarwinism is often treated as a dogma, 
and natural selection sometimes becomes a transcendental force. There are instances of 
changes in gene frequencies, in human as well as other populations, that conform with 
neodarwinian (“socio-biological”) presumptions; but it is not known to what extent the 
evolution of the human (or other) species has been due to such changes. There is still less 
ground for explaining the diversity of human societies in this way. The image-makers also 
make illegitimate use of the comparative method: familiar features of human conduct, such 
as favoring kin and reciprocation, are used in accounts of animal behavior, and are then 
rediscovered among human beings; during this two-way transfer, the meanings of words are 
changed; altruism, egoism, and deceit lose their moral content, and the complex human idea 
of kin is reduced to a measure of genetical similarity. The intention of neodarwinists is to 
reveal a human nature determined by evolutionary processes, but one of the most 
important distinctive features of our species is the plasticity of our behavior, attitudes, and 
intentions. Moreover, if neodarwinian premises are accepted, to speak of intention is 
misleading, and there are no independent criteria by which neodarwinian (or any other) 
arguments may be judged: all one does is regulated by the need to maximise one's inclusive 
fitness. Hence much writing in this field wavers between an uncompromising reduction of 
human action to considerations of population genetics, on the one hand, and a recognition 
that there are other kinds of authentic knowledge about human beings, on the other. 
Among the latter is historical knowledge. The neodarwinian images of humanity emphasize 
human depravity. In their misanthropy they reflect the outlook of conservative pessimists 
who have influenced European thought for two and a half millennia, and whose views imply 
that most attempts to improve the human condition are against nature and so must fail. An 
alternative, which corresponds to the facts of everyday life and of history, is that human 
beings are capable of rejecting what is conventionally held to be inevitable, and of 
determining their destiny by conscious, deliberate action. 
Notes: An early argument that ‘neodarwinist’ views of human nature undervalue persons’ 
abilities to determine their actions through conscious and deliverate means. An early 
discussion that highlights the tension between common views of personhood and 
evolutionary explanations. Relates evolutionary psychology to personhood. 
17. Barresi, J.   (1999). On becoming a person. Philosophical Psychology, 
12(1), 79-98. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/217709618?accountid=27890 
Abstract: How does an entity become a person? Forty years ago Carl Rogers answered this 
question by suggesting that human beings become persons through a process of personal 
growth and self-discovery. In the present paper I provide six different answers to this 
question,which form a hierarchy of empirical projects and associated criteria that can be 
used to understand human personhood. They are (1) persons are constructed out of natural 
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but organic materials; (2) persons emerge as a form of adaptation through the process of 
evolution; (3) persons develop ontogenetically; (4) persons are created through the unifying 
activity of self-narrative; (5) persons are constituted through socio-historical and cultural 
processes; and (6) the concept of person is a normative ideal. I suggest that it is important to 
consider all of these projects and related criteria in order to appreciate fully how an entity 
becomes a human person. 
Notes: A comprehensive account of personhood that incorporates evolutionary, 
developmental and social contexts. A major theoretical framework for understanding 
personhood. Relates evolutionary psychology to personhood. 
18. Barresi, J.   (2012). On seeing our selves and others as persons. New 
Ideas in Psychology, 30(1), 120-130. 
Abstract: Human beings may be the only organisms capable of thinking of self and other in 
equivalent ways – as selves and persons. Most organisms think about their own activities 
differently than they do the activities of others. A few large-brained organisms like chimps 
and dolphins sometimes think of the activities of self and other in the same way. But, only 
humans think quite generally in this manner. In this paper I give a description of our 
commonsense notions of self and person, and a scientific framework in which it can be fit. I 
then provide a phylo- and onto-genetic account of these concepts. Finally, I argue that the 
theory of reciprocal altruism provides the best account of why the notions of self and person 
evolved to have the form and function they do with respect to human social life and moral 
capacities. 
Notes: An important discussion on evolution and personhood. 
19. Barresi, J.   & Juckes, T. J.   (1997). Personology and the narrative 
interpretation of lives. Journal of Personality, 65(3), 693-719. Retrieved 
from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/235956131?accountid=27890 
Abstract: Personology is the science of persons. In this article we show that the concept of 
person presupposes the continuity of experience and that the storylike structure of lives 
makes narrative the most promising methodology. Researchers use first-person narratives as 
source material and third-person narratives in describing and interpreting lives because the 
temporal nature of experience makes it difficult for human beings not to attribute order, 
direction, and purpose to experience. It is because lives are structured through experience in 
a storylike manner that their study takes the narrative form. Psychologists' attempts to 
understand the person are traced from James and Freud, through Murray and Erikson, to 
Tompkins, McAdams, and Hermans and Kempen. We outline each psychologist's concept of 
person and show how their case studies illustrate their use of narrative methodology. 
Notes: An important narrative-based theoretical account of selves and their production. 
Relates to personhood. 
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20. Bartlett, R.   & O'Connor, D.   (2007). From personhood to citizenship: 
Broadening the lens for dementia practice and research. Journal of Aging 
Studies, 21(2), 107-118. 
Abstract: Personhood has provided a lens for conceptualising dementia practice and 
research for over ten years. It has afforded the rationale and language for improving care 
and for raising consciousness about the status of people with dementia, as people, 
intrinsically worthy of respect. However, because personhood is essentially an apolitical 
concept concerned with psychosocial issues it may be too limiting. Citizenship provides 
another possible lens. Citizenship is used in cognate disciplines to promote the status of 
discriminated groups of people still further, to that of a person with power entitled to the 
same from life as everyone else. However, as citizenship tends to assume the self-cognizance 
to exercise rights and responsibilities, it may not be as appropriate for people with severe 
dementia. Both concepts are problematic then, taking too narrow a view of the human 
experience. For this field to develop over the next ten years it clearly needs a wider lens that 
is both inclusive of personhood and citizenship, but which also recognizes the complexities 
of human experience. This article reviews the relevance of personhood and citizenship for 
dementia practice and research, and argues for a broader lens that incorporates citizenship 
and sociological ideas about agency and structure. 
Notes: The field of dementia practice and research is constantly evolving and changing, 
demographically, linguistically, and as knowledge of effective treatments increase. This 
article reviews both the contribution and limitations of the lens of personhood in dementia 
research, and reviews conceptualizations of citizenship in relation to people with dementia. 
The author argues for a broader lens in dementia practice and research, which incorporates 
citizenship, personhood, but also includes sociological ideas about agency and structure. It 
raises questions about the social and political aspects of our accounts of persons. An 
important contribution which connects personhood and well-being in the context of the field 
of dementia. 
21. Baumeister, R. F.   (2011). Self and identity: a brief overview of what they 
are, what they do, and how they work. In D. Braaten (Ed.), Perspectives 
on the self: Conversations on identity and consciousness (Vol. 1234, pp. 
48-55). Oxford: Blackwell Science Publ. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://WOS:000299291600006. doi:10.1111/j.1749-6632.2011.06224.x 
Abstract: The human self exists at the interface between the animal body and the social 
system. Solitary beings would hardly need or have selves, but social and cultural systems 
define identities, and the human animal acquires selfhood in order to function in these 
systems. Self begins with the physical body, with acting and choosing as a unity, and as a 
point of reference distinct from others, and it acquires meaningful content by participating 
in the social system. The self is not contained in the brain, but rather the human brain learns 
to operate a self. 
Notes: A significant contribution that analyses the relationship between biological 
embodiment and the social world and the way that relationship gives rise to selves and 
selfhood. Relates to personhood and evolutionary/biological accounts of humans. 
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22. Baumeister, R. F.   (2011). The unity of self at the interface of the animal 
body and the cultural system. Psychological Studies, 56(1), 5-11. 
Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12646-011-0062-5. 
doi:10.1007/s12646-011-0062-5 
Abstract: The self is defined by unity, which must be constructed from multiple inner 
processes and representations. The unity is more a requirement of social life than of brain 
activities. The self exists at the interface between the physical body and the social system, 
which for humans includes culture. The three main aspects of the self are a network of 
information (sometimes called the self-concept), an interpersonal being (e.g., member of a 
group or relationship), and executive function (e.g., making decisions). For each of these, 
multiple inner processes and representations must be integrated to produce the unity of 
self. Conscious processing plays a key role in this integrative process, because it is a vital 
means by which different areas of brain and mind exchange information. 
Notes: Highlights the accomplishment of a unitary self via integration of multiple inner 
processes. Links to Rom Harré’s (1983) account of persons in Personal being. Relates to 
personhood. 
23. Beahrs, J. O.   (1994). Dissociative identity disorder: adaptive deception 
of self and others. The Bulletin of the American Academy of Psychiatry 
and the Law, 22(2), 223-237. Review. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://MEDLINE:7949411 
Abstract: Dissociative identity disorder (multiple personality) is increasingly diagnosed, often 
follows childhood trauma, and is characterized by rigidification of phenomena that resemble 
hypnosis. To interpret dissociated aspects of selfhood as autonomous entities is a useful 
heuristic; but when taken too literally, it leads to three kinds of anomaly: (1) legal: 
dissociators remain culpable for misdeeds carried out beyond apparent awareness or 
control; (2) clinical: legitimization sometimes leads not to relief, but to escalating cycles of 
regressive dependency; and (3) scientific: the form of dissociated entities varies with how 
they are defined, in ways that are intrinsically motivated and clinically manipulable. These 
anomalies yield to an evolutionary perspective that views dissociative identity disorder as an 
evolved strategy of adaptive deception of self and others; e.g., a beaten subordinate avoids 
further retribution by "pleading illness." Such a deceit best avoids detection when fully 
experienced; through its intensity and persistence, it becomes real at a new level. One's 
basic competencies remain intact, however, and are the source of the anomalies described. 
They can be clinically accessed and empowered, providing the key to therapeutic change 
when dissociative processes are problematic. Overall, despite clear impairment in subjective 
awareness and volition, dissociative-disordered individuals are best held fully accountable 
for the consequences of their actions. 
Notes: An evolutionary account of the adaptive nature of dissociative disorders. Has 
implications for personhood and its evolutionary adaptiveness. Relates to personhood and 
evolutionary psychology. 
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24. Becker, G. S.   (2007). Habits, peers, and happiness: An evolutionary 
perspective. The American Economic Review, 97(2), 487-491. Retrieved 
from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/872522450?accountid=27890 
No abstract. 
Notes: The authors argue that "the principal motivating factor in our lives is the pursuit of 
happiness … throughout, we presume that maximizing happiness is the fundamental goal of 
the individual when making decisions. In fact, we believe that happiness evolved precisely as 
a decisionmaking device. In this sense, we consider that maximizing happiness is closely 
linked, if not identical, to maximizing utility in the standard economic way … our goal has 
been to show that, when attempting to understand the determinants of happiness, both 
evolutionary thinking and empirical work can benefit from each other." Relates to 
evolutionary psychology and well-being. 
25. Bekoff, M.   (2002). Empathy: common sense, science sense, wolves, and 
well-being. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25(1), 26-+. Editorial Material. 
Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000183685900008 
Abstract: Empathy is likely more widely distributed among animals than many researchers 
realize or perhaps are willing to admit. Studies of social carnivores, other group-living 
animals, and communication via different modalities will help us learn more about the 
evolutionary roots and behavioral, sensory, and cognitive underpinnings of empathy, 
including what it means to have a sense of self. There are also important implications for 
debates about animal well-being. 
Notes: Focuses on the role of empathy in social behaviour and the formation of a self. 
Adopts an evolutionary perspective. Relates to evolutionary psychology, 
selfhood/personhood and well-being. 
26. Bekoff, M.   (2003). Consciousness and self in animals: Some reflections. 
Zygon, 38(2), 229-245. Article. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://WOS:000183139300003. doi:10.1111/1467-9744.00497 
Abstract: In this essay I argue that many nonhuman animal beings are conscious and have 
some sense of self. Rather than ask whether they are conscious, I adopt an evolutionary 
perspective and ask why consciousness and a sense of self evolved-what are they good for? 
Comparative studies of animal cognition, ethological investigations that explore what it is 
like to be a certain animal, are useful for answering this question. Charles Darwin argued 
that the differences in cognitive abilities and emotions among animals are differences in 
degree rather than differences in kind, and his view cautions against the unyielding claim 
that humans, and perhaps other great apes and cetaceans, are the only species in which a 
sense of self-awareness has evolved. I conclude that there are degrees of consciousness and 
self among animals and that it is likely that no animal has the same highly developed sense 
of self as that displayed by most humans. Many animals have a sense of "body-ness or 
"mine-ness". but not a sense of "I-ness." Darwin's ideas about evolutionary continuity, 
together with empirical data ("science sense") and common-sense, will help us learn more 
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about consciousness and self in animals. Answers to challenging questions about animal self-
awareness have wide-ranging significance, because they are often used as the litmus 
determining and defending the sorts of treatments to which animals can be morally 
subjected. 
Notes: A conceptual, evolutionary account of various forms of self throughout the animal 
kingdom. Relates to evolutionary psychology and selfhood/personhood. 
27. Benedikter, R.  ; Giordano, J.   & Fitzgerald, K.   (2010). The future of the 
self-image of the human being in the age of transhumanism, 
neurotechnology and global transition. Futures, 42(10), 1102-1109. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328710001801. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2010.08.010 
Abstract: In the present moment of cultural and political transition, one question seems to 
become the center of most other societal and civilizational questions: will the basic self-
perception of the human being change under the influence of the new “neurotechnologies” 
and its accompanying ideologies like “Human enhancement” and “Transhumanism”? And if 
yes, how? Applied consciousness research is currently one-sidedly understood as brain 
research, and it is carried out mainly by the Natural Sciences under the influence of the 
“Economic–Technological Complex” and its relatively narrow interests. With its paradigmatic 
materialism determining the cultural spread of its temporary findings, it is already modifying 
our imaginary about what a human being is, what its rational self-determination can be, and 
how a “good society” can work. What is at stake with the change related to the findings of 
the new “consciousness technologies” is not only the principal socio-philosophical status of 
the human “self” or “I”, but also the related concepts of humanism, open societies, 
individualism and rationality. Thus, the new neurotechnologies and their 
“neurophilosophies” are currently in the process of profoundly influencing the very basics of 
our cultural self-understanding, grown over centuries. This article discusses some of the 
implications of this development within the greater picture of the current “global mindset 
change”. 
Notes: Cautions about the possible future effects of technological and neurological/ 
neurophilosophical accounts of the ‘self’ on our understanding of human selves. Relates to 
personhood and biological accounts of humans. 
28. Bering, J. M.   (2006). The folk psychology of souls. Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences, 29(05), 453-462. Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X06009101. 
doi:doi:10.1017/S0140525X06009101 
Abstract: The present article examines how people's belief in an afterlife, as well as closely 
related supernatural beliefs, may open an empirical backdoor to our understanding of the 
evolution of human social cognition. Recent findings and logic from the cognitive sciences 
contribute to a novel theory of existential psychology, one that is grounded in the tenets of 
Darwinian natural selection. Many of the predominant questions of existential psychology 
strike at the heart of cognitive science. They involve: causal attribution (why is mortal 
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behavior represented as being causally related to one's afterlife? how are dead agents 
envisaged as communicating messages to the living?), moral judgment (why are certain 
social behaviors, i.e., transgressions, believed to have ultimate repercussions after death or 
to reap the punishment of disgruntled ancestors?), theory of mind (how can we know what 
it is “like” to be dead? what social-cognitive strategies do people use to reason about the 
minds of the dead?), concept acquisition (how does a common-sense dualism interact with a 
formalized socio-religious indoctrination in childhood? how are supernatural properties of 
the dead conceptualized by young minds?), and teleological reasoning (why do people so 
often see their lives as being designed for a purpose that must be accomplished before they 
perish? how do various life events affect people's interpretation of this purpose?), among 
others. The central thesis of the present article is that an organized cognitive “system” 
dedicated to forming illusory representations of (1) psychological immortality, (2) the 
intelligent design of the self, and (3) the symbolic meaning of natural events evolved in 
response to the unique selective pressures of the human social environment. 
Notes: Analyses the emergence of notions of the ‘soul’ and ‘self’ in an evolutionary context. 
Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood. 
29. Bickhard, M. H.   (2012). A process ontology for persons and their 
development. New Ideas in Psychology, 30(1), 107-119. 
Abstract: Persons are socio-cultural emergents—emerging progressively in the bio-
psychological development of the individual. Persons are special kinds of agents, crucially 
characterized by their abilities to participate in the constitution of emergent social 
ontologies. I will present a model of these special bio-cultural relationships, and argue that 
modeling these relationships requires revisions in conceptions about the ontology of social 
realities, the relationships between agency and cognition, and naturalism and normativity. 
Notes: "Persons are often considered to be autonomous psychological individuals who 
happen to function within social settings, and at other times as having a thorough social 
ontology, being constituted as some sort of intersection of socio-cultural processes and 
meanings". "A major focus of this paper is to provide a process ontology for persons that can 
make sense of these two fundamental characteristics of persons as inherent aspects of a 
unified underlying ontology".  The author does this by outlining "a model of the 
developmental ontology of social persons that provides an integration of both aspects". 
Relates to the development of personhood. 
30. Bird, R. B.  ; Scelza, B.  ; Bird, D. W.   & Smith, E. A.   (2012). The hierarchy 
of virtue: mutualism, altruism and signaling in Martu women's 
cooperative hunting. Evolution and Human Behavior, 33(1), 64-78. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S109051381100050X. 
doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2011.05.007 
Abstract: Cooperative hunting is often assumed to be mutualistic, maintained through 
returns to scale, where, by working together, foragers can gain higher per capita return rates 
or harvest sizes than they can by hunting alone. We test this hypothesis among Martu 
hunters and find that cooperation only provides increased returns to poorer hunters while 
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disadvantaging better hunters. Even so, better hunters still cooperate as frequently as 
poorer hunters. We ask whether better hunters are advantaged in secondary sharing 
distributions or whether they bias their partner choice to kin or household members. We 
find that better hunters are not more likely to pair up with kin and they do not gain 
consumption benefits from acquiring more. They share a greater proportion of their harvest 
than poorer hunters: no matter how much one produces — better hunter, worse hunter, 
cooperator, solitary hunter — all eat the same amount in the end. Such a result suggests the 
hypothesis that cooperation might be a costly signal of commitment to the public interest on 
the part of better hunters, which generates trust among camp members and facilitates 
strong social networks, particularly among women, who cooperate more than men. While 
some foragers may benefit through cooperation from returns to scale or risk reduction, 
others may benefit more through signaling commitment and generating trust. 
Notes: In this article, the authors ask whether or not returns to scale structure the benefits 
of cooperative hunting among Martu, Aboriginal foragers of the Western Desert in Australia. 
Results show that cooperative hunting among Martu does not predictably increase per 
capita foraging returns for any hunting or collecting activity, however other more intrinsic 
benefits such as social capital, good feelings such as being part of a family and nurturing are 
evident. Martu women "benefit more from maintaining closeness (spatial and social) to 
female kin, and better hunters reap more of the benefits from cooperative caretaking by 
virtue of the cohesive social networks they create around them"(Scelza, 2009; Scelza & 
Bliege Bird, 2008; in Bird et.al. 2012). Relates to evolutionary psychology and well-being 
31. Bjorklund, D. F.   & Smith, P. K.   (2003). Evolutionary developmental 
psychology: Introduction to the special issue. Journal of Experimental 
Child Psychology, 85(3), 195-198. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022096503000742. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0022-0965(03)00074-2 
No abstract. 
Notes: Introduction to special issue. Relates to evolutionary psychology and development of 
personhood. 
32. Blanke, O.   & Metzinger, T.   (2009). Full-body illusions and minimal 
phenomenal selfhood. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 13(1), 7-13. Review. 
Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000262898500002. 
doi:10.1016/j.tics.2008.10.003 
Abstract: We highlight the latest research on body perception and self-consciousness, but 
argue that despite these achievements, central aspects have remained unexplored, namely, 
global aspects of bodily self-consciousness. Researchers investigated central representations 
of body parts and actions involving these, but neglected the global and unitary character of 
self-consciousness, the 'l' of experience and behaviour. We ask, what are the minimally 
sufficient conditions for the appearance of a phenomenal self, that is, the fundamental 
conscious experience of being someone? What are necessary conditions for self-
consciousness in any type of system? We offer conceptual clarifications, discuss recent 
empirical evidence from neurology and cognitive science and argue that these findings offer 
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a new entry point for the systematic study of global and more fundamental aspects of self-
consciousness. 
Notes: An investigation of the phenomenal self of experience. Relates to personhood. 
33. Bock, J.   (2004). Introduction: New evolutionary perspectives on play. 
Human Nature, 15(1), 1-3. Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12110-004-1000-1. doi:10.1007/s12110-004-
1000-1 
No abstract.  
Notes: Introduction to special issue. Relates to personhood and well-being. 
34. Bock, J.  , & Johnson, S. E.   (2004). Subsistence ecology and play among 
the Okavango Delta peoples of Botswana. Human Nature, 15(1), 63-81. 
Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12110-004-1004-x. 
doi:10.1007/s12110-004-1004-x 
Abstract: Children’s play is widely believed by educators and social scientists to have a 
training function that contributes to psychosocial development as well as the acquisition of 
skills related to adult competency in task performance. In this paper we examine these 
assumptions from the perspective of life-history theory using behavioral observation and 
household economic data collected among children in a community in the Okavango Delta of 
Botswana where people engage in mixed subsistence regimes of dry farming, foraging, and 
herding. We hypothesize that if play contributes to adult competency then time allocation to 
play will decrease as children approach adult levels of competence. This hypothesis 
generates the following predictions: (1) time allocated to play activities that develop specific 
productive skills should decline in relation to the proportion of adult competency achieved; 
(2) children will spend more time in forms of play that are related to skill development in 
tasks specific to the subsistence ecology in which that child participates or expects to 
participate; and (3) children will spend more time in forms of play that are related to skill 
development in tasks clearly related to the gender-specific productive role in the subsistence 
ecology in which that child participates or expects to participate. We contrast these 
expectations with the alternative hypothesis that if play is not preparatory for adult 
competence then time allocated to each play activity should diminish at the same rate. This 
latter hypothesis generates the following two predictions: (1) time allocation to play should 
be unaffected by subsistence regime and (2) patterns of time allocation to play should track 
patterns of growth and energy balance. 
Results from multiple regression analysis support earlier research in this community showing 
that trade-offs between immediate productivity and future returns were a primary 
determinant of children’s activity patterns. Children whose labor was in greater demand 
spent significantly less time playing. In addition, controlling for age and gender, children 
spent significantly more time in play activities related to tasks specific to their household 
subsistence economy. These results are consistent with the assertion that play is an 
important factor in the development of adult competency and highlight the important 
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contributions of an evolutionary ecological perspective in understanding children’s 
developmental trajectories. 
Notes: An interesting analysis of the role of play in the production of appropriately skilled 
adults for the form of subsistence prevalent in a community. Relates to personhood 
development. 
35. Bonanno, G. A.   (2004). Loss, trauma, and human resilience - have we 
underestimated the human capacity to thrive after extremely aversive 
events? American Psychologist, 59(1), 20-28. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://WOS:000188285300003. doi:10.1037/0003-066x.59.1.20 
Abstract: Many people are exposed to loss or potentially traumatic events at some point in 
their, lives, and yet they continue to have positive emotional experiences and show only 
minor and transient disruptions in their ability to function. Unfortunately, because much of 
psychology's knowledge about how adults cope with loss or trauma has come from 
individuals who sought treatment or exhibited great distress, loss and trauma theorists have 
often viewed this type of resilience as either rare or pathological. The author challenges 
these assumptions by, reviewing evidence that resilience represents: a distinct trajectory 
from the process of recovery, that resilience in the face of loss or potential trauma is more 
common than is often believed, and that there are multiple and sometimes unexpected 
pathways to resilience. 
Notes: The author concludes that to be fully able to understand dysfunction requires a 
deeper understanding of health and resilience. There are many questions to be investigated 
about the various ways that people adapt and sometimes flourish in the face of debilitating 
events, with a crucial issue pertaining to the "commonalities and differences in resilient 
functioning across the life span". Within this context, it relates to evolutionary psychology, 
well-being and personhood. 
36. Bonnett, M.   (2009). Education and selfhood: A phenomenological 
investigation. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 43(3), 357-370. Article. 
Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000269086900004 
Abstract: Although effectively the idea of selfhood receives scant attention in much current 
educational policy, it is an idea that is central to understanding education in the Western 
tradition. This paper evaluates the implications of a growing movement in educational 
philosophy and theory to see the self as relational to the extent that it possesses little or no 
internally maintained steady identity and is constantly reconstituted by external agencies in 
a variety of ways. A well-worked-through view that draws on the work of Hannah Arendt and 
Emmanuel Levinas amongst others and that is taken to be representative of this wider 
movement is examined. It is argued that while important issues concerning the relationship 
between education and individual subjectivities are raised in ways that invite productive 
discussion, ultimately the decentred and de-nucleated conception of the self to which its 
argument leads is both phenomenologically untenable and educationally stultifying. 
Notes: A conceptual critique of the notion of a ‘decentred and de-nucleated’ self, in the 
context of educational settings. Relates to personhood. 
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37. Bortolotti, L.   & Harris, J.   (2005). Stem cell research, personhood and 
sentience. Reproductive Biomedicine Online, 10, 68-75. Article; 
Proceedings Paper. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://WOS:000227647700017 
Abstract: In this paper the permissibility of stem cell research on early human embryos is 
defended. It is argued that, in order to have moral status, an individual must have an interest 
in its own well-being. Sentience is a-prerequisite for having an interest in avoiding pain, and 
personhood is a prerequisite for having an interest in the continuation of one's own 
existence. Early human embryos are not sentient and therefore they are not recipients of 
direct moral consideration. Early human embryos do not satisfy the requirements for 
personhood, but there are arguments to the effect that they should be treated as persons 
nonetheless. These are the arguments from potentiality, symbolic value and the principle of 
human dignity. These arguments are challenged in this paper and it is claimed that they offer 
us no good reason to believe that early human embryos should be treated as persons. 
Notes: Links sentience, personhood and concerns over one’s own well-being in an attempt 
to understand the moral status of human embryos. Relates to personhood and well-being. 
38. Boyden, S.   & Millar, S.  (1978). Human ecology and the quality of life. 
Urban Ecology, 3(3), 263-287. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0304400978900177. 
doi:10.1016/0304-4009(78)90017-7 
Abbreviated Abstract. "In all human situations there is a constant interplay between 
variables of different kinds — physical, chemical, biotic, social, cultural and economic. We 
refer to the study of patterns of interaction between these different components of human 
situations as ‘human ecology’. It is suggested that human ecology, as so defined, can 
contribute significantly to the understanding of problems relating to the quality of life. It can 
do this by drawing attention to the full spectrum of aspects of experience that directly relate 
to the quality of life, and by improving understanding of the interrelationship between these 
experiential factors on the one hand, and economic, technical, environmental and societal 
conditions on the other …  
The conceptual approach must be one that assures that, whichever aspects of human 
ecosystems are under consideration, full consideration is given to their implications for the 
actual life experience of people. This paper includes a summary of some of the concepts on 
which our own approach to the ecological study of human settlements and the quality of life 
of their inhabitants is based. We suggest, for example, that knowledge of the evolutionary 
history of mankind is relevant to our interest in the effects of environmental influences on 
human health and well-being. It is emphasized that there is no relationship in human affairs 
between quantifiability and importance, and consequently any conceptual approach to the 
study of human ecosystems and of human well-being must be such that full attention is paid 
to both tangible and intangible aspects of situations and of human experience. An essential 
aspect of the conceptual approach summarized in the paper is that it recognizes two 
orientations or dimensions in the study of human ecosystems. The first orientation is 
referred to as ‘the total environment’. The study of the total environment is fundamentally 
similar to system ecology in biological science, and involves consideration of the components 
of the ‘system as a whole’ and their dynamic interrelationships. It differs from biological 
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system ecology in that the systems under investigation contain, in addition to inorganic and 
biotic components and processes, the components and processes of human culture. The 
second orientation is referred to as ‘human experience’. It is based on recognition of the fact 
that each individual human being experiences his own personal life conditions, which are 
influenced by the properties of the total environment, and which, in turn, are the main 
determinants of his level of health and well-being. Ultimately it must be the people who 
make up society who decide what is, and what is not, important to them in the quality of 
life." 
Notes: An ambitious early account of the relationships between evolutionary perspectives 
on persons and their reliance on the broader ecosystems in which they operate. Relevant to 
evolutionary psychology, personhood and well being  
39. Bracanovic, T . (2007). Utilitarian impartiality and contemporary 
Darwinism. Filozofia, 62(1), 14-25. Article; Proceedings Paper. Retrieved 
from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000243983100002 
Abstract: One important component of utilitarian ethical framework is a specific version of 
the principle of impartiality. The principle claims that one should bring about the greatest 
possible overall utility or happiness and that our moral and morally relevant actions ought to 
result from objective and neutral deliberations, with all our personal interests, likes and 
dislikes left out. Drawing on relevant insights from sociobiology and evolutionary psychology 
this paper seeks to show that utilitarian principle of impartiality is seriously endangered by 
two interconnected Darwinian facts: (1) the fact that human biologically shaped psychology 
and motivation mechanisms do not fit well with the principle requiring the indiscriminate 
promotion of general happiness, and (2) the fact that human beings are individuals with 
naturally evolved personal desires, projects and ideals, and not merely spare parts of some 
general utilitarian clockwork of happiness. 
Notes: A critique of utilitarian understandings of well-being based upon evolutionary 
considerations. Relates to evolutionary psychology and well-being. 
40. Brandtstädter, J.  & Greve, W.   (1994). The aging self: Stabilizing and 
protective processes. Developmental Review, 14(1), 52-80. Retrieved 
from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0273229784710033. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/drev.1994.1003 
Abstract: The transition from middle to later adulthood involves a multitude of changes and 
losses on physical, psychological, and social levels that impose considerable strain on the 
individual′s construction of self and personal continuity. Widespread assumptions which 
relate psychological aging to reduced well-being, loss of control, and problems of self-
esteem, however, have received astonishingly little empirical support. Recent evidence 
rather gives testimony to a considerable resourcefulness and adaptive flexibility of the aging 
self. The present article attempts to lend further substance to this emerging picture of 
psychological aging. It is argued that preservation and stabilization of a positive view of self 
and personal development in later life basically involve three functionally interdependent 
processes: (a) instrumental and compensatory activities that aim at preventing or alleviating 
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losses in domains which are relevant to self-esteem and identity; (b) accommodative 
changes and readjustments of personal goals and aspirations, which dampen or neutralize 
negative self-evaluations; (c) immunizing mechanisms, which mitigate the impact of self-
discrepant evidence. 
Notes: Analyses the process of maintenance of self-esteem and general well-being through 
the aging process. Relates to personhood and well-being. 
41. Brigg, M.   (2009). The developer's self: a non-deterministic Foucauldian 
frame. Third World Quarterly, 30(8), 1411-1426. Article. Retrieved from 
<Go to ISI>://WOS:000274296900002. doi:10.1080/01436590903279208 
Abstract: Recent development studies literature has begun to consider the developer's self. 
This welcome enlargement of the field deserves to be deepened and extended by moving 
beyond opposition to post-development critics, and by articulating an explicit theoretical 
frame for examining developers' selves. By exploring Foucault's suggestion that modern 
approaches to knowledge and selfhood may be entwined through developmentalism, this 
paper proposes a flexible and non-deterministic cultural-historical framework for 
considering developers' selves. Foucault's analyses of relations of power and subjectivity 
provide strategies for examining developers' selves, but this does not suggest that such 
selves can be read off the proposed framework. Examining developers' selves is necessarily a 
reflective ethical task, and one which requires engaging the external relations that constitute 
the self. Foucault provides valuable resources for this task, but there is also a need to extend 
upon and complement a Foucauldian approach. Pursuing our new-found interest in 
developers' selves by working through and beyond Foucault promises to open new 
professional futures and possibilities for development practice. 
Notes: Explores a Foucauldian approach to reflexively understanding developers’ (in 
developmental studies) selves. Interesting in that it leverages Foucault’s view that selfhood 
is understood through a developmentalist lens. Relates to personhood. 
42. Bukobza, G.   (2007). The epistemological basis of selfhood. New Ideas in 
Psychology, 25(1), 37-65. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0732118X06000675. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2006.11.001 
Abstract: Multiple definitions and conceptualizations of selfhood have appeared in 
psychological literature over the years. A fundamental debate that had risen as a result is 
whether the self is made of universal properties that transcend local factors or whether it is 
a construction particular to specific conditions of history, culture and individuality. This 
article begins with a review of different ways by which the self has been understood and 
construed; it then proceeds to suggest an epistemological framework that generates four 
distinct types of selves: monolithic–monoformal, relativistic–relational, dialectical–
deconstructive, and integral–inclusive. It is claimed that these basic structures consist of 
much of the cross-cultural and intra-cultural variation in the construction of selfhood. 
Notes: An attempt to distinguish the ways in which selves have been theorised in 
psychology. Relates to selfhood/personhood. 
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43. Burwood, S.  (2009). Are we our brains? Philosophical Investigations, 
32(2), 113-133. Article. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://WOS:000263705200002. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9205.2008.01366.x 
Abstract: My aim in this paper is to destabilise the brain-is-self thesis, something that is now 
regarded in some quarters as philosophical commonsense. My contention is that it is the 
epithelial body that enters into the formation of our sense of self and that largely bears the 
burden of personal identity as well as playing the key role in grounding our psychological 
ascriptions. Lacking any sensorimotor or social presence of its own, the brain by itself cannot 
"underlie" selfhood, but only as part of the whole living human being. If the minded 
individual is embodied, this must mean more than being embrained. 
Notes: A conceptual critique of the idea that selves are brains. Instead, a more thorough 
embodiment is argued as necesssary for selfhood. Relates to selfhood/personhood and its 
biological foundations. 
44. Buss, D.M.   (2000). The evolution of happiness. American Psychologist, 
55, 15-23. 
Abstract: An evolutionary perspective offers novel insights into some major obstacles to 
achieving happiness. Impediments include large discrepancies between modern and 
ancestral environments, the existence of evolved mechanisms "designed" to produce 
subjective distress, and the fact that evolution by selection has produced competitive 
mechanisms that function to benefit one person at the expense of others. On the positive 
side, people also possess evolved mechanisms that produce deep sources of happiness: 
those for mating bonds, deep friendship, close kinship, and cooperative coalitions. 
Understanding these psychological mechanisms--the selective processes that designed 
them, their evolved functions, and the contexts governing their activation--offers the best 
hope for holding some evolved mechanisms in check and selectively activating others to 
produce an overall increment in human happiness. 
Notes: A major statement about the relationships between happiness, its pursuit and an 
evolutionary understanding of the emotion. Relates to evolutionary psychology and well-
being. 
45. Byers, J. A.   (1998). The biology of human play. Child Development, 
69(3), 599-600. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
8624.1998.tb06227.x. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.1998.tb06227.x 
Abstract: Pellegrini and Smith call for the biological study of human physical activity play. 
Such study will reveal, among other things, whether physical activity play represents an 
example of performance-dependent development during a sensitive period. 
Notes: Comment on the biological role of play in physical activity. Relates to evolutionary 
psychology and well-being, via the adaptive function of play. 
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46. Carlisle, S.   & Hanlon, P.   (2007). The complex territory of well-being: 
contestable evidence, contentious theories and speculative conclusions. 
Journal of Public Mental Health, 6(2), 8-13. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/212415288?accountid=27890 
Abstract: This paper brings together evidence and theories from a number of disciplines and 
thinkers that highlight multiple, sometimes incommensurable understandings about well-
being. We identify three broad strands or themes within the literature(s) that frame both the 
nature of the problem and its potential solutions in different ways. The first strand can be 
categorised as the 'hard' science of well- being and its stagnation or decline in modern 
western society. In a second strand, social and political theory suggests that 
conceptualisations of well-being are shaped by aspects of western culture, often in line with 
the demands of a capitalist economic system. A third theme pursues the critique of 
consumer culture's influence on well-being but in the context of broader human 
problems.This approach draws on ecology, ethics, philosophy and much else to suggest that 
we urgently need to reconsider what it means to be human, if we are to survive and thrive. 
Although no uncontroversial solutions are found within any of these themes, all play a 
necessary part in contributing to knowledge of this complex territory where assumptions 
about the nature of the human condition come into question.  
Notes: Acknowledges the multiple forms of knowledge and understanding around well-
being, its complexity involving multiple disciplines and varieties of thinkers. The intention of 
the authors is to "synthesise some complex evidence, contentious theories and speculative 
conclusions" and they acknowledge that much is simplified in their deliberate framing of the 
debates into three themes- 'hard' science, cultural and social constructionism, and 
alternative views of the human condition as seen through spirituality, ecology, ethics, 
philosophy and other diverse fields. A common question between all three themes is the 
nature of what it means to be human. A general article, relating to evolutionary psychology, 
personhood and well-being. 
47. Carlisle, S.  ; Henderson, G.   & Hanlon, P.   W. (2009). ‘Well-being’: A 
collateral casualty of modernity? Social Science & Medicine, 69(10), 
1556-1560. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S027795360900567X. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2009.08.029 
Abstract: In the now vast empirical and theoretical literature on well-being knowledge of the 
subject is provided mainly by psychology and economics, where understandings of the 
concept are framed in very different ways. We briefly rehearse these, before turning to 
some important critical points which can be made about this burgeoning research industry, 
including the tight connections between the meanings of the concept with the moral value 
systems of particular ‘modern’ societies. We then argue that both the ‘science’ of well-being 
and its critique are, despite their diversity, re-connected by and subsumed within the 
emerging environmental critique of modern consumer society. This places concerns for 
individual and social well-being within the broader context of global human problems and 
planetary well-being. A growing number of thinkers now suggest that Western society and 
culture are dominated by materialistic and individualistic values, made manifest at the 
political and social levels through the unending pursuit of economic growth, and at the 
individual level by the seemingly endless quest for consumer goods, regardless of global 
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implications such as broader environmental harms. The escalating growth of such values is 
associated with a growing sense of individual alienation, social fragmentation and civic 
disengagement and with the decline of more spiritual, moral and ethical aspects of life. 
Taken together, these multiple discourses suggest that well-being can be understood as a 
collateral casualty of the economic, social and cultural changes associated with late 
modernity. However, increasing concerns for the environment have the potential to counter 
some of these trends, and in so doing could also contribute to our well-being as individuals 
and as social beings in a finite world. 
Notes: Provides an environmental context for the consideration of human well-being, 
arguing for well-being to be seen as a consequence or ‘casualty’ of broader political, 
economic and environmental changes and trends. Relates to well-being. 
48. Carroll, J.   (1999). The deep structure of literary representations. 
Evolution and Human Behavior, 20(3), 159-173. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090513899000045. 
doi:10.1016/s1090-5138(99)00004-5 
Abstract: The author argues that cognitive rhetoricians have introduced the idea of cognitive 
domains into literary theory, but they have not yet developed a model for a comprehensive, 
species-typical structure of human motives. Evolutionary psychology can provide this model. 
Elemental human motives and basic emotions provide the deep structure of literary 
representations, and this deep structure serves to organize the particularities of 
circumstance and individual identity. Personal power and reproductive success are 
governing purposes in life and in literary representations. The concept of individual identity 
is necessary to literary representation, and a theory of literature based in evolutionary 
psychology has to incorporate models of personality. Literature and its oral antecedents 
organize experience in personally meaningful ways. They provide models of behavior and 
help regulate the complex cognitive machinery through which humans negotiate their social 
and cultural environments. 
Notes: An interesting analysis of how literature can be understood from an evolutionary 
perspective as representative of species-typical motives in forming individual identities. 
Argues that evolutionary psychology can provide a model that cognitive rhetoricians can use 
for "comprehensive, species-typical structure of human motives." Relates to evolutionary 
psychology and personhood. 
49. Carver, C. S.  ; Scheier, M.F.   & Kumari Weintraub, J.   (1989). Assessing 
coping strategies: A theoretically based approach. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology 56(2 ), 267-283. 
Abstract: We developed a multidimensional coping inventory to assess the different ways in 
which people respond to stress. Five scales (of four items each) measure conceptually 
distinct aspects of problemfocused coping (active coping, planning, suppression of 
competing activities, restraint coping, seeking of instrumental social support); five scales 
measure aspects of what might be viewed as emotionfocused coping (seeking of emotional 
social support, positive reinterpretation, acceptance, denial, turning to religion); and three 
scales measure coping responses that arguably are less useful (focus on and venting of 
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emotions, behavioral disengagement, mental disengagement). Study 1 reports the 
development of scale items. Study 2 reports correlations between the various coping scales 
and several theoretically relevant personality measures in an effort to provide preliminary 
information about the inventory's convergent and discriminant validity, Study 3 uses the 
inventory to assess coping responses among a group of undergraduates who were 
attempting to cope with a specific stressful episode. This study also allowed an initial 
examination of associations between dispositional and situational coping tendencies. 
Notes: Relates to evolutionary psychology, personhood and well-being 
50. Cervone, D.   (2005). Personality architecture: Within-person structures 
and processes. Annual Review of Psychology, 56, 423-452. Retrieved 
from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/205849658?accountid=27890 
Abstract: This chapter reviews theory and research on intraindividual personality structures 
and processes. Principles for modeling the architecture of personality, that is, the overall 
design and operating characteristics of intraindividual personality systems, are addressed. 
Research demonstrates that a focus on within-person structures and processes advances the 
understanding of two aspects of personality coherence: the functional relations among 
distinct elements of personality, and cross-situational coherence in personality functioning 
that results from interactions among enduring knowledge structures and dynamic appraisal 
processes. Also reviewed are recent conceptual and empirical advances, which demonstrate 
that the interindividual personality variables that summarize variability in the population are 
wholly insufficient for modeling intraindividual personality architecture.  
Notes: Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood 
51. Chang, Y. P.  ; Lin, Y. C.   & Chen, L. H.   (2012). Pay it forward: Gratitude 
in social networks. Journal of Happiness Studies, 13(5), 761-781. Article. 
Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000308963700001. 
doi:10.1007/s10902-011-9289-z 
Abstract: Based on the framework of the broaden-and-build theory (Fredrickson in Philos 
Trans R Soc B Biol Sci 359(1449):1367, 2004a, b), we proposed that the emotion of gratitude 
generates upstream reciprocity (UR, which is helping an unrelated third party after being 
helped) by broadening the beneficiary's perspective toward others and thus making the 
beneficiary represent the benefactor and newly encountered strangers in the same social 
category. Furthermore, by inducing one UR after another, gratitude may lead to a 
chain/network of UR and strengthen the structure of organization. We named the effect the 
integration function of gratitude and demonstrated it by applying the social network analysis 
technique to eighteen small groups. Implications of the integration function are discussed in 
terms of self-identity, social exchange theory, and quality of life. 
Notes: A network analysis of the dynamics of ‘upstream’ (future) reciprocity to unrelated 
parties. An interesting piece of empirical work into the social processes of cooperative 
behaviour. Relates to evolutionary psychology and well-being. 
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52. Charlesworth, W. R.   & La Freniere, P.   (1983). Dominance, friendship, 
and resource utilization in preschool children's groups. Ethology and 
Sociobiology, 4(3), 175-186. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0162309583900286. 
doi:10.1016/0162-3095(83)90028-6 
Abstract: Field and a laboratory experiments were carried out with 58 preschool children in 
order to analyze their behavior when faced with a limited resource (a movie viewer which 
required help to operate it) and to relate variations in resource utilization to measures of 
dominance and friendship obtained earlier by observation in the pre-school setting and by 
sociometric measures. The field experiment elicited a mixture of physically assertive/ 
agonistic behaviors, commands, appeals to personal needs or rules, and cooperative 
behavior—all related to viewing the movie. Dominance rank was significantly and positively 
related to resource utilization (viewing the movie). In the laboratory experiment, the 
children varied greatly in resource utilization and cooperative behavior as a function of their 
dominance status—dominant children having much more access to the resource than their 
lower-ranked classmates. Group performance also varied greatly and appeared to be 
significantly influenced by dominance and friendship. The optimal combination for producing 
high utilization appeared to be a group of high-ranking friends. Equitability and effectiveness 
of utilization were also affected by dominance and friendship as well as by physically 
assertive/agonistic and cooperative behaviors during the episode. In both experiments, boys 
used the resource significantly more than girls. The findings are discussed briefly in terms of 
sociobiological notions of cooperation, competition, and resource utilization. 
Notes: A sociobiologically interpreted experiment on resource utilisation by children. The 
study reports the effects of different levels of dominance and friendship/cooperation on 
resource utilisation. An early study of social behaviour analysed from a sociobiological 
perspective. Relates to evolutionary psychology and has implications for personhood and 
well-being. 
53. Chaudhary, N.   (2003). Speaking the self into becoming? Culture & 
Psychology, 9(4), 471-486. Article. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://WOS:000189244000008. doi:10.1177/1354067x0394009 
Abstract: The self is an alluring topic for debate, and Boesch's (2003) article creates ample 
space for playing with ideas and positions on personhood. I have chosen specific portions of 
the article to lead towards discussions of self and 'I', the notion of an inner self, multiplicity 
of the self, and the cultural configuration and language of selfhood. This commentary has 
been sprinkled with examples of self-related experiences from Indian communities in order 
to demonstrate the important ways in which cultures can diverge in the organization of 
activity around being a person. Hopefully, these examples will help to distract readers from 
aspects of their own cultural and personal lives while entering into different perspectives on 
sociality and individual existence. I end by questioning whether, despite its attractions, the 
self has become somewhat overexposed to academic attention in the recent past. 
Notes: Useful for its cautionary approach to ‘over-focusing’ on the notion of the self. 
Remarks on various examples of how cultures differentially organise the processes of being a 
person. Relates to personhood. 
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54. Cheng, J. T.  ; Tracy, J. L.   & Henrich, J. . (2010). Pride, personality, and 
the evolutionary foundations of human social status. Evolution and 
Human Behavior, 31(5), 334-347. Retrieved from 
http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1090513810000267?showal
l=true 
Abstract: Based on evolutionary logic, Henrich and Gil-White [Evolution and Human 
Behavior, 22(3), 165–196] distinguished between two routes to attaining social status in 
human societies: dominance, based on intimidation, and prestige, based on the possession 
of skills or expertise. Independently, emotion researchers Tracy and Robins [Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 92(3), 506–525] demonstrated two distinct forms of 
pride: hubristic and authentic. Bridging these two lines of research, this paper examines 
whether hubristic and authentic pride, respectively, may be part of the affective-
motivational suite of psychological adaptations underpinning the status-obtaining strategies 
of dominance and prestige. Support for this hypothesis emerged from two studies employing 
self-reports (Study 1), and self-and peer-reports of group members on collegiate athletic 
teams (Study 2). Results from both studies showed that hubristic pride is associated with 
dominance, whereas authentic pride is associated with prestige. Moreover, the two facets of 
pride are part of a larger suite of distinctive psychological traits uniquely associated with 
dominance or prestige. Specifically, dominance is positively associated with traits such as 
narcissism, aggression, and disagreeableness, whereas prestige is positively associated with 
traits such as genuine self-esteem, agreeableness, conscientiousness, achievement, advice-
giving, and prosociality. Discussion focuses on the implications of these findings for our 
understanding of the evolutionary origins of pride and social status, and the interrelations 
among emotion, personality, and status attainment. 
Notes: Aspects of pride are studied in relation to two strategies for gaining status: 
Dominance and prestige. An interesting link between the emotional experience of an 
important aspect of well-being (other regard) and evolutionary strategies to gain status. 
Relates to evolutionary psychology and well-being. 
55. Choi, B.   & Han, G.   (2009). Psychology of selfhood in China: Where is 
the collective? Culture & Psychology, 15(1), 73-82. Article. Retrieved 
from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000263912600003. 
doi:10.1177/1354067x08099616 
Abstract: The analysis of Chinese maxims shows strong Confucian norms of filial piety 
operating in the family (Wang & Dai, 2009). Admitting that the norm is also strong in Korea, 
we explore the difference in selfhood between Korea and China. Taking a sociolinguistic 
approach, we characterize Chinese collectivism as relational collectivism and pose the 
question of how the collective works in Chinese selfhood. For comparative purposes, we 
describe the working of the collective in Korean selfhood and invite efforts to examine 
linguistic practice. 
Notes: A rare comparison of how selfhood is understood in two collectivist cultures. Relates 
to personhood. 
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56. Christiansen, M. H.   & Chater, N.   (2008). Language as shaped by the 
brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 31(05), 489-509. Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X08004998. 
doi:doi:10.1017/S0140525X08004998 
Abstract: It is widely assumed that human learning and the structure of human languages 
are intimately related. This relationship is frequently suggested to derive from a language-
specific biological endowment, which encodes universal, but communicatively arbitrary, 
principles of language structure (a Universal Grammar or UG). How might such a UG have 
evolved? We argue that UG could not have arisen either by biological adaptation or non-
adaptationist genetic processes, resulting in a logical problem of language evolution. 
Specifically, as the processes of language change are much more rapid than processes of 
genetic change, language constitutes a “moving target” both over time and across different 
human populations, and, hence, cannot provide a stable environment to which language 
genes could have adapted. We conclude that a biologically determined UG is not 
evolutionarily viable. Instead, the original motivation for UG – the mesh between learners 
and languages – arises because language has been shaped to fit the human brain, rather 
than vice versa. Following Darwin, we view language itself as a complex and interdependent 
“organism,” which evolves under selectional pressures from human learning and processing 
mechanisms. That is, languages themselves are shaped by severe selectional pressure from 
each generation of language users and learners. This suggests that apparently arbitrary 
aspects of linguistic structure may result from general learning and processing biases 
deriving from the structure of thought processes, perceptuo-motor factors, cognitive 
limitations, and pragmatics. 
Notes: An intriguing account of the evolution of language that argues that language evolved 
in order to ‘fit’ the brain and, hence, a universal grammar, is a product of that fitting rather 
than of the complex variety of functional tasks to which it could be said to ‘fit’. An 
interesting biological and evolutionary account of the reasons for the structure of language. 
Especially interesting given the centrality of language and language use to personhood. 
Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood. 
57. Christopher, J. C.   & Hickinbottom, S.   (2008). Positive psychology, 
ethnocentrism, and the disguised ideology of individualism. Theory & 
Psychology, 18(5), 563-589. Retrieved from 
http://tap.sagepub.com/content/18/5/563.abstract. 
doi:10.1177/0959354308093396 
Abstract: This article aims to examine critically the attempts by positive psychologists to 
develop a science of happiness and positive human functioning that transcends temporal 
and cultural boundaries. Current efforts in positive psychology are deconstructed to reveal 
an adherence to the dominant Western conception of self and its accompanying vision of 
the good life as personal fulfillment. It is argued that in failing to recognize the tacit cultural 
and moral assumptions underlying their investigations, positive psychologists not only 
distort the outlooks of cultures that do not subscribe to an individualistic framework, they 
also insulate themselves from reflecting critically on their work. Alternative forms of inquiry 
are offered to assist positive psychology in overcoming these limitations. 
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Notes: A critical account of the assumptions underpinning positive psychology and the 
culturally influenced view of well-being it promotes. Relates to well-being and personhood. 
58. Chrysanthou, M.   (2002). Transparency and selfhood: Utopia and the 
informed body. Social Science & Medicine, 54(3), 469-479. Article. 
Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000173266800014. 
doi:10.1016/s0277-9536(01)00033-8 
Abstract: One aspect of the development of a health-orientated consumer culture is the 
growth of self-screening and self-diagnosis among the lay public-e.g. over-the-counter 
diagnostic tests, Computerized health assessments, DIY genetic tests. This trend is 
interpreted as the expression of a distinctively postmodern 'utopian' impulse. 
Postmodernity's inwardly directed gaze has replaced the communitarian vision of modernity. 
In the absence of overarching visions, the postmodern utopian telos becomes the 
attainment of a perfect, imperishable body. Somatopia is the collective expression of these 
privatized and personalized body projects. The accomplishment and authentication of these 
body projects necessitates the creation of a 'transparent body'. This 'transparent body' is 
enabled and constructed by developments in information and medical technologies. The 
political and health implications of the transparent, 'informed' body are explored.  
Notes: An analysis of the importance of the ‘utopian’ body in postmodernity. Selfhood is said 
to be increasingly sought and validated by body improvement processes as individuals focus 
on their ‘utopian’ goal. Relates to personhood and well-being. 
59. Coall, D. A.   & Hertwig, R.   (2010). Grandparental investment: Past, 
present, and future. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33(1), 1-+. Article. 
Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000276976600001. 
doi:10.1017/s0140525x09991105 
Abstract: What motivates grandparents to their altruism? We review answers from 
evolutionary theory, sociology, and economics. Sometimes in direct conflict with each other, 
these accounts of grandparental investment exist side-by-side, with little or no theoretical 
integration. They all account for some of the data, and none account for all of it. We call for 
a more comprehensive theoretical framework of grandparental investment that addresses 
its proximate and ultimate causes, and its variability due to lineage, values, norms, 
institutions (e.g., inheritance laws), and social welfare regimes. This framework needs to 
take into account that the demographic shift to low fecundity and mortality in economically 
developed countries has profoundly altered basic parameters of grandparental investment. 
We then turn to the possible impact of grandparental acts of altruism, and examine whether 
benefits of grandparental care in industrialized societies may manifest in terms of less 
tangible dimensions, such as the grandchildren's cognitive and verbal ability, mental health, 
and well-being. Although grandparents in industrialized societies continue to invest 
substantial amounts of time and money in their grandchildren, we find a paucity of studies 
investigating the influence that this investment has on grandchildren in low-risk family 
contexts. Under circumstances of duress for example, teenage pregnancy or maternal 
depression there is converging evidence that grandparents can provide support that helps to 
safeguard their children and grandchildren against adverse risks. We conclude by discussing 
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the role that grandparents could play in what has been referred to as Europe's demographic 
suicide. 
Notes: Important discussion of the literature on grandparenting that argues for the 
integration of explanations from evolutionary, social and economic accounts of 
grandparenting. The authors also encourage research into the effects of grandparenting on 
outcomes for grandchildren, including on their overall well-being. Relates to evolutionary 
psychology and well-being and has implications for personhood development. 
60. Coall, D. A.   & Hertwig, R.   (2011). Grandparental investment: A relic of 
the past or a resource for the future? Current Directions in Psychological 
Science, 20(2), 93-98. Retrieved from 
http://cdp.sagepub.com/content/20/2/93.abstract. 
doi:10.1177/0963721411403269 
Abstract: From changing diapers and minding the kids when school is out to providing 
support when they set fire to the carpet, grandparents can be invaluable to have around. 
What motivates grandparents to lend a hand? Several disciplines have offered answers. The 
most important accounts come from life-history theory and evolutionary psychology, 
sociology, and economics. These accounts exist side-by-side, but there is little theoretical 
integration among them. But regardless of whether grandparental investment is traced back 
to ancestral selection pressure or attributed to an individual grandparent’s values or norms, 
one important question is, what impact does it have in industrialized, low-fertility, low-
mortality societies? We briefly review the initial evidence concerning the impact of 
grandparental investment in industrialized societies and conclude that in difficult 
circumstances, grandparents can provide the support that safeguards their grandchildren’s 
development. Additional cross-disciplinary research to examine the effects of 
intergenerational transfers in our evolutionarily unique environment of grandparenthood is 
needed. 
Notes: A review of evidence for the efficacy of grandparenting support in grandchildren’s 
development. Concludes that, especially in difficult circumstances, such support can buffer 
adverse effects. Relates to evolutionary psychology and well-being and has implications for 
personhood. 
61. Coall, D. A.  ; Meier, M.  ; Hertwig, R.  ; Wänke, M.   & Höpflinger, F.   
(2009). Grandparental investment: The influence of reproductive timing 
and family size. American Journal of Human Biology, 21(4), 455-463. 
Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ajhb.20894. 
doi:10.1002/ajhb.20894 
Abstract: The influence that grandparents have on the life history traits of their descendants 
has been studied extensively. However, no attention has been paid to the potential 
influence a grandparent's own reproductive history has on the investment they make in their 
grandchildren. We use data from 658 Swiss grandchildren and 591 of their grandparents to 
investigate whether grandparents' reproductive scheduling and family size influence the 
amount of investment grandparents make in a focal grandchild (shared contacts, occasions 
to meet, activities, discussions, interests, and important roles the grandparent plays). 
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Grandparents who were younger when they had their first child had more children and 
grandchildren; this relationship strengthened after controlling for grandparental age, sex, 
lineage, and education (all P < 0.001). Generally, having more children or grandchildren was 
associated with reduced levels of grandparental investment. After adjustment for a wide 
range of factors known to influence investment, having more children or grandchildren and 
having a first child or grandchild at a younger age were associated with reduced investment 
in 14 of 24 analyses (all P < 0.09). The association between reproductive scheduling and 
investment was partially mediated by the grandparent's family size. Interestingly, these 
relationships were only present in data reported from the grandchild's point of view, not the 
grandparent's. This analysis provides preliminary evidence that grandparents' reproductive 
strategies have consequences for the amount of investment they make in their 
grandchildren. These results are examined in terms of the trade-offs between current and 
future reproduction and offspring quality and quantity.  
Notes: A significant empirical study measuring the relationship between grandparent 
reproductive strategies (e.g., having children early and having many children) and 
grandparental investment in grandchildren. Evolutionary psychological predictions were 
supported. Relates to evolutionary psychology and has implications for well-being. 
62. Colarelli, S. M.   & Dettmann, J. R.   (2003). Intuitive evolutionary 
perspectives in marketing practices1. Psychology & Marketing, 20(9), 
837-865. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/227715071?accountid=27890 
Abstract: Firms spend considerable sums of money on marketing, and they continue to do so 
because marketing works. However, marketing can only work if marketers have a reasonably 
accurate view of human nature. It is argued that many consumer products and 
advertisements reflect an accurate view of human nature, a view that is compatible with the 
tenets of evolutionary psychology. Implicit theories of human nature that are out of synch 
with reality sell few products. An overview of an evolutionary perspective on marketing is 
provided here, and connections between marketing practices and evolved adaptations, 
including kin selection, prestige seeking, preferences for salt, sweets, and fat, and savanna-
like landscapes are examined. Adaptations that differ by sex and how they are mirrored in 
marketing are also examined. Finally, some marketing practices that reflect evolutionary 
principles of variation are discussed.  
Notes: An application of principles from evolutionary psychology to successful marketing 
practice. It is particularly relevant given discussions in the well-being literature that concern 
the effect of modern media and commercial environments on well-being. Relates to 
evolutionary psychology and has implications for well-being. 
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63. Conradson, D.   (2005). Landscape, care and the relational self: 
Therapeutic encounters in rural England. Health & Place, 11(4), 337-348. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1353829205000146. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.healthplace.2005.02.004 
Abstract: Over the last decade a number of studies have employed notions of therapeutic 
landscape to describe the ways in which places become implicated in processes of healing or 
health enhancement. While this work has usefully highlighted the environmental, social and 
symbolic dimensions of such places, relatively less consideration has been given to the 
relational dynamics through which these therapeutic effects emerge. In this paper I seek to 
address this absence through engagement with two related bodies of work: ecological 
formulations of place and relational notions of selfhood. These ideas are explored with 
reference to the experiences of guests at a respite care centre in Dorset, a predominantly 
rural county in southern England. Alongside its residential services, this centre places a 
strong emphasis on facilitating guests’ engagement with the wider natural environment in 
which it is set. A number of general analytical and methodological points are developed with 
regard to future therapeutic landscape research. 
Notes:  
An interesting analysis of the links between therapeutic landscapes and ecological and 
relational notions of selfhood. Relates to personhood and well-being. 
64. Cordes, C.  ; Richerson, P. J.  ; McElreath, R.   & Strimling, P.   (2008). A 
naturalistic approach to the theory of the firm: The role of cooperation 
and cultural evolution. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 
68(1), 125-139. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268108000784. 
doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2008.03.008 
Abstract: One reason why firms exist, this paper argues, is because they are suitable 
organizations within which cooperative production systems based on human social 
predispositions can evolve. In addition, we show how an entrepreneur, given these 
predispositions, can shape human behavior within a firm. To illustrate these processes, we 
will present a model that depicts how the biased transmission of cultural contents via social 
learning processes within the firm influence employees’ behavior and the performance of 
the firm. These biases can be traced back to evolved social predispositions. Humans lived in 
tribal scale social systems based on significant amounts of intra- and even intergroup 
cooperation for tens if not a few hundred thousand years before the first complex societies 
arose. Firms rest upon the social psychology originally evolved for tribal life. We also relate 
our conclusions to empirical evidence on the performance and size of different kinds of 
organizations. Modern organizations have functions rather different from ancient tribes, 
leading to friction between our social predispositions and organization goals. Firms that 
manage to reduce this friction will tend to function better. 
Notes: An interesting application of evolutionary psychology to the operation and success of 
firms. Suggests that there is a potential conflict between cooperative predispositions that 
The Well-Evolved Life: Well-being, Evolution and Personhood 
33 
have evolved and the organisational settings in modern firms. Relates to evolutionary 
psychology and has implications for well-being 
65. Cornejo, C.   (2012). Contrasting Vygotsky's and Bakhtin's approaches to 
consciousness. Culture & Psychology, 18(1), 109-120. Article. Retrieved 
from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000301887200008. 
doi:10.1177/1354067x11427470 
Abstract: Matusov (2011) sustains that Vygotsky and Bakhtin represent irreconcilable 
theoretical approaches. In his view, Vygotsky's model is monologic and universalist, while 
Bakhtin's is dialogic and pluralist. Although the two authors differ importantly, one cannot 
speak of irreconcilability for two main reasons. First, Vygotsky's approach is much more 
multifaceted and even contradictory than usually thought. In fact, his concept of sense 
echoes the Romanticist claim that experience exceeds the limits of language. Second, a 
dialogical conception of mind is not outside the reach of Hegelian tradition, which, in 
Matusov interpretation, is where Vygotsky's approach comes from. I emphasize that 
Bakhtin's unit of analysis is the voice-a concept more sociologic than psychological. "Voice" is 
insensitive to selfhood and should not be taken as synonymous of "person." 
Notwithstanding, Vygotsky and Bakhtin share beliefs with respect to the social constitution 
of the mind that allow including them in the same research program. 
Notes: A discussion of the compatibility of Vygotskyan and Bhaktinian notions of the ‘self’. 
Relates to personhood. 
66. Cosentino, E.   (2011). Self in time and language. Consciousness and 
Cognition, 20(3), 777-783. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1053810010002655. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2010.12.006 
Abstract: Time has been considered a crucial factor in distinguishing between two levels of 
self-awareness: the “core,” or “minimal self,” and the “extended,” or “narrative self.” 
Herein, I focus on this last concept of the self and, in particular, on the relationship between 
the narrative self and language. In opposition to the claim that the narrative self is a 
linguistic construction, my idea is that it is created by the functioning of mental time travel, 
that is, the faculty of human beings to project themselves mentally backwards in time to 
relive, or forward to anticipate, events. Moreover, I propose that narrative language itself 
should be considered a product of a core brain network that includes mechanisms, such as 
mental time travel, mindreading, and visuo-spatial systems. 
Notes: A cognitive interpretation of the narrative sense of self as involving mental ‘time 
travel’, both backwards and forwards. The model is mapped onto brain networks. Relates to 
personhood. 
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67. Cox, L. M.   & Lyddon, W. J.   (1997). Constructivist conceptions of self: A 
discussion of emerging identity constructs. Journal of Constructivist 
Psychology, 10(3), 201-219. Article. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://WOS:A1997XF76200001. doi:10.1080/10720539708404623 
Abstract: A significant feature of the postmodern turn in the sociobehavioral sciences 
focuses on the way self or identity is understood. In particular, postmodern scholars have 
challenged modernist notions of an essentialized self and have paved the way for the 
emergence of various constructivist conceptions of selfhood. In this article different 
constructivist theories of self are reviewed and discussed in relation to the current 
postmodern zeitgeist-self as (a) self-theory, (b) evolving process, (c) transcendent, (d) 
narrative, and (e) social/economic/political/construction. Critical points of convergence and 
divergence among these theories are discussed. 
Notes: An overview of different strands within a social constructivist approach to selfhood. 
Useful as a means of categorising the theories promoted under this general approach. 
Relates to selfhood/ personhood. 
68. Cramer, P. .  & Tracy, A.   (2005). The pathway from child personality to 
adult adjustment: The road is not straight. Journal of Research in 
Personality, 39(3), 369-394. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S009265660400073X. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2004.07.003 
Abstract: In a prospective longitudinal study of 62 individuals from the Berkeley Guidance 
Study of the Institute of Human Development, we examined the pathway from early 
childhood personality to early adult adjustment and maladjustment. The results from a path 
analysis indicated that shifts in personality from childhood to adulthood, influenced by the 
use of defense mechanisms, was the strongest predictor of adult adjustment. 
Developmental shifts in Outgoingness, influenced by the use of the defense of projection, 
predicted better psychological health, less depression, but more anxiety. Shifts in Self-
confidence, influenced by the use of the defense of identification, predicted better 
psychological health, less depression, and less anxiety. A theoretical explanation of these 
relations is provided. 
Notes: An important longitudinal study that tracked the influence of childhood personality 
factors on early adult adjustment. Relates to personhood and well-being. 
69. Crocker, J.   (2011). Presidential address: Self-image and compassionate 
goals and construction of the social self: implications for social and 
personality psychology. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 15(4), 
394-407. doi:10.1177/1088868311418746 
Abstract: Interpersonal dynamics of self-esteem are explored. The author proposes that the 
desire to be seen as having positive qualities and avoid being seen as having dreaded 
qualities paradoxically leads to lowered self-esteem and lowered regard from others through 
its adverse effects on interpersonal relationships. The author also argues that the human 
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capacity to transcend concerns with the images others hold of oneself, through caring about 
the well-being of other people, paradoxically leads to higher self-esteem and regard from 
others through its salutary effects on relationships. Data from two recent studies 
demonstrate these paradoxical effects and prompt questions about the nature of persons 
and situations, research methods, and the union between personality and social psychology. 
Accordingly, the author reflects more broadly on how people create their social situations, 
which in turn create the self, and what that means about the methods scholars use to 
understand social behavior. 
Notes: An interesting suggestion about the relationships between self-driven attempts to be 
regarded well by others and actual regard. Paradoxically, attempts to enhance other regard 
can work against self-esteem and other regard. This happens primarily through the effect of 
such atttempts on the interactions that comprise interpersonal relationships. Relates to 
personhood and well being. 
70. Csikszentmihalyi, M.   (1992). Imagining the self: An evolutionary 
excursion. Poetics, 21(3), 153-167. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0304422X9290002K. 
doi:10.1016/0304-422x(92)90002-k 
Abstract: Organisms increase adaptive efficiency - and reduce entropy - by extracting 
information from the environment. In addition to relying on direct sensory information, 
humans have developed the ability to form images based on sensory input, thereby 
extending their capacity to model external conditions. A further advance is reached when 
images become detached from their sources in direct experience, and are created and 
manipulated internally in the mind - at which point we enter the realm of imagination. 
Imagination expands the open systemic dimension of the organism enormously, by allowing 
the mind to operate on data that need not be materially available. The ‘evolutionary 
explosion’ of the Upper Paleolithic seems to have been a high point in the transfer of 
information, mediated by visual images, that provided the basis for the development of 
writing and other forms of extra-somatic memory. One of the most important and 
interesting classes of data represents images of human beings and their inner states. 
Hunters, warriors, priests, rulers and saints have been depicted or described in song and 
verse as models for humanity to fear or to aspire to. The idealized portraits of women and 
children have served to instill meekness and obedience. The present study will focus on 
images of the optimally functioning human organism as represented in various media and in 
different cultures. This image seems to describe a negentropic state of involvement, control 
of mental and physical states, yet unselfconscious participation in systems of greater 
complexity. The evolutionary implications of this image will be explored. 
Notes: A major theoretical exploration of the relationships between self, evolution and well-
being/optimal functioning mediated through imagination. Relates to evolutionary 
psychology, well-being and personhood. 
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71. Csikszentmihalyi, M.   (2001). Expressive forms and the evolution of 
consciousness. In J. S. Editors-in-Chief:  Neil & B. B. Paul (Eds.), 
International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (pp. 5180-
5186). Oxford: Pergamon. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B0080430767040705. 
doi:10.1016/b0-08-043076-7/04070-5 
Abstract: Expressive forms are seen from an evolutionary perspective as attempts on the 
part of individuals possessed of self-reflective consciousness to discover and to express their 
images of self. The main focus is on how symbolic forms ranging from household objects, 
clothing, dance and music to ritual performances serve to reify both individuation on the one 
hand, and social integration on the other. The adaptive significance of expression is 
explored. 
Notes: Personal expressiveness is understood from an evolutionary perspective and in 
relation to images of the self. Relates to evolutionary psychology and selfhood/ personhood. 
72. Cummins, R. A.  ; Eckersley, R.  ; Opallant, J.  ; Van Vugt, J.   & Misajon, R.   
(2003 ). Developing a national index of subjective well-being: The 
Australian Unity Well-being Index. Social Indicators Research, 64 (2 
(Nov)), 159-190. 
Abstract: The Australian Unity Well-being Index has been designed as a new barometer of 
Australians' satisfaction with their lives, and life in Australia. It is based on, and develops, the 
theoretical model of subjective well-being homeostasis. The Index comprises two sub-scales 
of Personal and National Well-being. Data were collected through a nationally 
representative sample of 2,000 people in April/May 2001. Factor analysis confirmed the 
integrity of the two sub-scales and, confirming empirical expectation, the average level of 
life satisfaction was 75.5 percent of the scale maximum score. Group comparisons revealed 
that all age groups maintained their Personal Indexscore within the normal range. In 
addition, people in country areas were more satisfied with their personal lives than city-
dwellers, but less satisfied about the national situation, and people who had recently 
experienced a strong positive event evidenced a rise in well-being, whereas those who had 
experienced a strong negative event evidenced well-being in the low-normal range. It is 
argued that these data generally support homeostatic theory. However, an unusual result 
was that females were more satisfied with their own lives than males. A tentative argument 
is advanced that this may represent a constitutional difference. It is concluded that the 
Australian Unity Well-being Index has potential as a valid, reliable and sensitive instrument 
to monitor national well-being. 
Notes: A significant attempt to create a comprehensive measure of Australians’ well-being. 
Relates to well-being. 
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73. Cummins, R. A.  ; Lau, A. A. L. D.  ; Mellor, D.   & Stokes, M. A.   (2009). 
Encouraging governments to enhance the happiness of their nation: Step 
1: Understand subjective well-being. Social Indicators Research 91, 23-
36. 
Abstract: This article considers the issue of facilitating policies that enhance population 
happiness. An impediment to such action is the failure of most policy makers to understand 
that subjective well-being can be measured and understood within the framework of 
science. Additionally, they fail to realize that enhancing the subjective well-being of 
populations enhances not only the functioning of individuals but that of the population as a 
whole. A framework for understanding calls on the Theory of Subjective Well-being 
Homeostasis and data from the Australian Unity Well-being Index. This Index has been used 
to monitor the subjective well-being of the Australian population over the 6-year period 
2001–2006. The article begins by a description of the subjective well-being construct and the 
theory that it is homeostatically managed. The operation of homeostasis makes very 
determined predictions as to the kinds of relationships that should be found in association 
with various environmental challenges and resources. These predictions will be examined in 
the light of the data from our surveys and the benefits of population happiness will be 
discussed. Finally, consideration will be given as to and how such understanding may be 
conveyed to politicians, in order to assist the development of policies aimed at enhancing 
the level of happiness in society. 
Notes: An argument for the use of the Australian Unity Well-Being Index and its underlying 
homeostatic theory of well-being to assist in policy making concerning well-being. Relates to 
well-being. 
74. Cunha, C.   & Goncalves, M. M.   (2009). Accessing the experience of a 
dialogical self: Some needs and concerns. Culture & Psychology, 15(1), 
120-133. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000263912600006. 
doi:10.1177/1354067x08099618 
Abstract: This commentary focuses on Konig's (2009) work as an opportunity to elaborate on 
selfhood as a dynamic and dialogical phenomenon. We depart from Bakhtinian dialogism 
and dialogical self theory to focus on the dynamics of selfhood processes and draw a more 
explicit theoretical link between the dialogical self and phenomenological experience. The 
interconnected dimensions of discontinuity and continuity in a multiple, multipositioned self 
are also elaborated. We defend that the construction of similitude in the self is permitted by 
self-regulation and self-organization processes that create recurring patterns in a moving 
self. Finally, the role that the introduction of difference and alterity can play in the 
promotion of change and development is also discussed. 
Notes: A dialogical framework for understanding the self in its phenomenological 
dimensions. Relates to personhood. 
The Well-Evolved Life: Well-being, Evolution and Personhood 
38 
75. D'Acci, L.  (2011). Measuring well-being and progress. Social Indicators 
Research, 104(1), 47-65. Article. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://WOS:000294541900004. doi:10.1007/s11205-010-9717-1 
Abstract: Well-being is becoming a concept which is more and more involved in any world 
development consideration. A large amount of work is being carried out to study 
measurements of well-being, including a more holistic vision on the development and 
welfare of a country. This paper proposes an idea of well-being and progress being in 
equilibrium with each other. This is distant from the two extreme positions: poor but happy, 
and rich then happy; too romantic the first, and reductive the second. After a short 
explanation on the meaning of Objective and Subjective well-being, we show some 
interesting relations between economic and social variables, and we propose a new index to 
measure the well-being and progress of the countries: the Well-being & Progress Index 
(WPI). It includes several aspects of well-being and progress, like human rights, economic 
well-being, equality, education, research, quality of urban environment, ecological 
behaviours, subjective well-being, longevity, and violent crime. The most frequently used 
indexes usually only focus on some aspects, like ecology, or economy, or policy, or 
education, or happiness, and so forth. On the contrary, this new WPI index allows a global 
and well-balanced vision, thanks to the large range of indicators used, and how 
representative they are. 
Notes: Discusses measures of well-being at the national level and argues that both objective 
and subjective aspects of well-being can be combined in the ‘Well-being and Progress Index’ 
(WPI). The aim of the paper is to integrate notions of well-being and understandings of 
progress into a comprehensive index that has subjective well-being as only one amongst 
many indicators. Relates to well-being. 
76. Davidson, R. J.   (2004). Well-being and affective style: neural substrates 
and biobehavioural correlates. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society of London B. Biological Sciences., 359 (1449 (September 29)), 
1395–1411  
Abstract: One of the most salient features of emotion is the pronounced variability among 
individuals in their reactions to emotional incentives and in their dispositional mood. 
Collectively, these individual differences have been described as affective style. Recent 
research has begun to dissect the constituents of affective style. The search for these 
components is guided by the neural systems that instantiate emotion and emotion 
regulation. In this article, this body of research and theory is applied specifically to positive 
affect and well-being. The central substrates and peripheral biological correlates of well-
being are described. A resilient affective style is associated with high levels of left prefrontal 
activation, effective modulation of activation in the amygdala and fast recovery in response 
to negative and stressful events. In peripheral biology, these central patterns are associated 
with lower levels of basal cortisol and with higher levels of antibody titres to influenza 
vaccine. The article concludes with a consideration of whether these patterns of central and 
peripheral biology can be modified by training and shifted toward a more salubrious 
direction. 
Notes: A significant and detailed overview of the neurology and biobehavioural correlates of 
affective well-being. Relates to evolutionary/ biological psychology and well-being. 
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77. de Catanzaro, D.   (1991). Evolutionary limits to self- preservation. 
Ethology and Sociobiology, 12(1), 13-28. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/016230959190010N. 
doi:10.1016/0162-3095(91)90010-n 
Abstract: A simple mathematical formula can be derived, on the basis of inclusive fitness 
theory and notions of reproductive value, to represent the residual capacity of an individual 
to influence his inclusive fitness. This formula involves the individual's remaining 
reproductive potential in his expected natural lifetime, plus the summated impacts of his 
continued existence on the remaining reproductive potentials of each of his kin, each 
weighted by the coefficient of relationship. In theory, this quantity should predict the extent 
to which self-preservation is optimally expressed in that individual. For asocial species, the 
value will vary from zero up to the maximal reproductive value observable, and the logic of 
the Medawar-Williams theory of senescence should apply directly. However, for highly social 
species like our own, it can be demonstrated that negative values can also obtain, given the 
conjunction of low residual reproductive potential and burdensomeness toward kin. Much 
empirical evidence suggests that outright self-destructiveness is often found in 
circumstances of such conjunction. 
Notes: A formal analysis of the conditions required in a social species for individuals to have 
a negative residual inclusive fitness, hence leading to the possibility of self-destruction. 
Relates to evolutionary psychology, personhood and well-being. 
78. de la Sablonniere, R.  ; Auger, E.  ; Sadykova, N.   & Taylor, D. M.   (2010). 
When the "We" impacts how "I" feel about myself: Effect of temporal 
collective relative deprivation on personal well-being in the context of 
dramatic social change in Kyrgyzstan. European Psychologist, 15(4), 271-
282. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000285378800004. 
doi:10.1027/1016-9040/a000062 
Abstract: Dramatic social change leads to profound societal transformations in many 
countries around the world. The two recent revolutions in March 2005 and April 2010, and 
the ethnic conflict in June 2010 in Kyrgyzstan are vivid examples. The present research aims 
to understand people's reactions to dramatic social change in terms of personal well-being. 
To further understand how people react psychologically to dramatic social change, the 
theoretical framework of our research is based on a dominant theory in social psychology: 
Collective relative deprivation theory. In the past, researchers have argued that collective 
relative deprivation is logically associated with collective outcomes, and thus is not likely to 
impact personal well-being (e. g., Walker & Mann, 1987). Others, however, have argued that 
feelings of collective relative deprivation do impact personal well-being (e. g., Zagefka & 
Brown, 2005). We postulate that these inconsistent results arise because past research has 
failed to consider multiple points of comparison over time to assess collective relative 
deprivation. Specifically, we theorize that multiple points of collective relative deprivation 
need to be taken into account, and in so doing, collective relative deprivation will, indeed, be 
related to personal well-being. We also explore the entire trajectory of collective relative 
deprivation (which represents how an individual perceives the evolution of his/her group's 
history across time) to predict personal well-being. In the present study, we tested these 
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theoretical propositions in the context of dramatic social change in Kyrgyzstan. Regressions, 
group-based trajectory modeling, and MANOVA confirm our hypotheses. 
Notes: Seeks to understand the relationships between personal well-being and collective 
social changes. Relates to well-being and personhood (especially its links to collective 
identity). 
79. Deci, E. L.   & Ryan, R. M.   (2000). The "what" and "why" of goal pursuits: 
Human needs and the self-determination of behavior. Psychological 
Inquiry, 11(4), 227-268. Review. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://WOS:000166046400001. doi:10.1207/s15327965pli1104_01 
Abstract: Self-determination theory (SDT) maintains that an understanding of human 
motivation requires a consideration of innate psychological needs for competence, 
autonomy and relatedness. We discuss the SDT concept of needs as it relates to previous 
need theories, emphasizing that needs specify the necessary conditions for psychological 
growth, integrity and well-being. This concept of needs leads to the hypotheses that 
different regulatory processes underlying goal pursuits are differentially associated that 
effective functioning and well-being and also that different goal contents have different 
relations to the quality of behavior and mental health, specifically because different 
regulatory processes and different goal contents are associated with differing degrees of 
need satisfaction. Social contexts and individual differences that support satisfaction of the 
basic needs facilitate natural growth processes including intrinsically motivated behavior and 
integration of extrinsic motivations, whereas those that forestall autonomy, competence, or 
relatedness are associated with poorer motivation, performance, and well-being. We also 
discuss the relation of the psychological needs to cultural values, evolutionary processes, 
and other contemporary motivation theories. 
Notes: A broad-ranging discussion of the relationships between levels of needs and their 
satisfaction and the consequences for well-being and performance. The development of 
autonomy, competence and relatedness are highlighted as positive indicators of well-being 
and performance. Evolutionary perspectives are included in discussion. Relates to well-
being, personhood development and evolutionary psychology. 
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80. Deci, E. L.   & Ryan, R. M.   (2008). Hedonia, eudaimonia, and well-being: 
An introduction. Journal of Happiness Studies, 9(1), 1-11. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/215879966?accountid=27890 
http://bb5xk7cw9v.search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-
8&rfr_id=info:sid/ProQ%3Aabiglobal&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:j
ournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Journal+of+Happiness+Studies&rft.ati
tle=Hedonia%2C+eudaimonia%2C+and+well-
being%3A+an+introduction&rft.au=Deci%2C+Edward+L%3BRyan%2C+Ri
chard+M&rft.aulast=Deci&rft.aufirst=Edward&rft.date=2008-01-
01&rft.volume=9&rft.issue=1&rft.spage=1&rft.isbn=&rft.btitle=&rft.title
=Journal+of+Happiness+Studies&rft.issn=13894978 
Abstract: Research on well-being can be thought of as falling into two traditions. In one--the 
hedonistic tradition--the focus is on happiness, generally defined as the presence of positive 
affect and the absence of negative affect. In the other--the eudaimonic tradition--the focus 
is on living life in a full and deeply satisfying way. Recognizing that much recent research on 
well-being has been more closely aligned with the hedonistic tradition, this special issue 
presents discussions and research reviews from the eudaimonic tradition, making clear how 
the concept of eudaimonia adds an important perspective to our understanding of well-
being. 
Notes: Introduces the focus on eudaimonic approaches to well-being. Relates to well-being.  
81. Demsetz, H.   (1996). Rationality, evolution, and acquisitiveness. 
Economic Inquiry, 34(3), 484-495. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/200844922?accountid=27890 
Abstract: Alchian's (1950) article Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory is discussed, 
and the notion that it is easy to eliminate rationality from economic behavior by appealing to 
evolution as a substitute is argued against. Rationality is discussed and a specific meaning for 
this term that distinguishes it from the axioms of choice found in economic theory is 
developed. This definition is used and rationality is linked to a behavioral propensity almost 
unique to the human species - acquisitiveness. It is concluded from this linkage that 
acquisitiveness can speed up the evolution of intelligence. 
Notes: An exploration of the links between human rationality and evolutionary theory 
through a focus on acquisitiveness. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood. 
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82. Deneulin, S.   & McGregor, J. A.   (2010). The capability approach and the 
politics of a social conception of well-being. European Journal of Social 
Theory, 13(4), 501-519. Article. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://WOS:000284377800005. doi:10.1177/1368431010382762 
Abstract: The capability approach constitutes a significant contribution to social theory but 
its potential is diminished by its insufficient treatment of the social construction of meaning. 
Social meanings enable people to make value judgements about what they will do and be, 
and also to evaluate how satisfied they are about what they are able to achieve. From this 
viewpoint, a person's state of well-being must be understood as being socially and 
psychologically co-constituted in specific social and cultural contexts. In this light, the telos 
of 'living well' which is at the heart of Sen's version of the capability approach is inadequate 
and must be modified to a telos of 'living well together' which includes consideration of the 
social structures and institutions which enable people to pursue individual freedoms in 
relation to others. The policy significance of the capability approach can be further 
strengthened by paying greater consideration to the political economy of policy decision-
making processes and the ways in which conflicts and distributions of power are 
institutionalized. 
Notes: Argues for the dependence of ‘living well’ on human sociality and the consequenct 
social construction of meanings for people. Relates to personhood and well-being. 
83. Derksen, M.   (2007). Cultivating human nature. New Ideas in Psychology, 
25(3), 189-206. 
Abstract: Evolutionary psychology claims to offer a unified perspective on human nature and 
culture, which can serve to further the integration of psychology and the social sciences. I 
describe four approaches to evolutionary psychology, and note increasing attention to the 
agency of the individual in constructing the biological and cultural environment. These 
approaches, however, share a problematic conception of culture as information. I explore 
the possibility of using Latour's concept of mediation to analyse the relation between human 
nature and culture without restricting the latter to information, and collect a number of 
recent studies and essays that illustrate the way individuals mediate nature and culture. 
Notes: A critique of evolutionary appoaches to psychology that relegate cultural processes 
to information received by the individual. Attempts to argue against the increasing focus on 
the role of the individual in constructing social and biological environments. Relates to 
evolutionary psychology and personhood. 
84. Deshmukh, V. D.   (2008). The multistream self: Biophysical, mental, 
social, and existential. The Scientific World Journal, 8, 331-341. Article. 
Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000254985000034. 
doi:10.1100/tsw.2008.19 
Abstract: Self is difficult to define because of its multiple, constitutive streams of functional 
existence. A more comprehensive and expanded definition of self is proposed. The standard 
bio-psycho-social model of psyche is expanded to biophysical-mental-social and existential 
self. The total human experience is better understood and explained by adding the 
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existential component. Existential refers to lived human experience, which is firmly rooted in 
reality. Existential living is the capacity to live fully in the present, and respond freely and 
flexibly to new experience without fear. Four common fears of isolation, insecurity, 
insignificance, and death can be overcome by developing a lifestyle of whole-hearted 
engagement in the present reality, creative problem solving, self-actualization, and altruism. 
Such integrative living creates a sense of presence with self-awareness, understanding, and 
existential well-being. Well-being is defined as a life of happiness, contentment, low distress, 
and good health with positive outlook. Self is a complex, integrative process of living 
organisms. It organizes, coordinates, and integrates energy-information within and around 
itself, spontaneously, unconsciously, and consciously. Self-process is understood in terms of 
synergetics, coordination dynamics, and energy-information-directed self-organization. It is 
dynamic, composite, ever renewing, and enduring. It can be convergent or divergent, and 
can function as the source or target of its own behavior-mentation. The experience of self is 
continuously generated by spontaneous activation of neural networks in the cerebral 
neocortex by the brainstem-diencephalic arousal system. The multiple constitutive 
behavioral-mental streams develop concurrently into a unique experience of self, specific for 
a person at his/her developmental stage. The chronological neuro-behavioral-mental 
development of self is described in detail from embryonic stage to old age. Self can be 
behaviorally-mentally oriented and realized in three complimentary modes of being: 
egocentric, allocentric, and ecosystemic or existential. The existential mode is both 
immanent and transcendent, and can be self-actualized, resulting in a healthy, creative, 
conflict-free, and meaningful life. 
Notes: A wide-ranging analysis of the self, particularly in its ‘existential’ dimension. Relates 
to selfhood/ personhood. 
85. Dezecache, G.   & Dunbar, R. I. M.   (2012). Sharing the joke: The size of 
natural laughter groups. Evolution and Human Behavior, 33(6), 775-779. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090513812000682. 
doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2012.07.002 
Abstract: Recent studies suggest that laughter plays an important role in social bonding. 
Human communities are much larger than those of other primates and hence require more 
time to be devoted to social maintenance activities. Yet, there is an upper limit on the 
amount of time that can be dedicated to social demands, and, in nonhuman primates, this 
sets an upper limit on social group size. It has been suggested that laughter provides the 
additional bonding capacity in humans by allowing an increase in the size of the “grooming 
group.” In this study of freely forming laughter groups, we show that laughter allows a 
threefold increase in the number of bonds that can be “groomed” at the same time. This 
would enable a very significant increase in the size of community that could be bonded. 
Notes: Explores the role of humour in permitting increases in the size of socially-bonded 
groups. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood. 
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86. Dickens, P.   (2001). Linking the social and natural sciences: Is capital 
modifying human biology in its own image? Sociology, 35(1), 93-110. 
Retrieved from http://soc.sagepub.com/content/35/1/93.abstract. 
doi:10.1177/0038038501035001007 
Abstract: Social science has long fought shy of the natural sciences. Meanwhile, concerns 
with the environment, health and the new genetics are creating a need for systematic links 
to be made between these disciplines. This paper suggests a new way in which social theory 
can be linked to biology. Recent developments in biology point to the importance of 
considering organisms in relation to their environment. And work in epidemiology stresses 
the links between the infant-development, health in later life and the well-being of future 
generations. Complex combinations of genetically-determined predispositions and capitalist 
social relations are responsible for important features of contemporary social stratification 
and well-being. The paper is informed by critical realist epistemology and Marx's theory of 
the subsumption. Such a fusion leads to a key assertion. Capital tends to modify the powers 
of human biology in its own image. 
Notes: An argument for viewing economic and social conditions in capitalism as structuring 
of evolved human biology to fit itself. Relates to evolutionary psychology, well-being and 
personhood. 
87. Dickins, T. E.   (2005). Can there ever be a non-specific adaptation? A 
response to Simon J. Hampton. Journal for the Theory of Social 
Behaviour, 35(3), 329-340. Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5914.2005.00275.x. 
doi:10.1111/j.1468-5914.2005.00275.x 
No abstract. 
Notes: Article Introduction: Hampton (2004) has recently discussed the application of 
evolutionary theory to the behavioural sciences. In his paper he argues that social situations 
are so unpredictable that the optimal evolutionary response is to select for a social-cognition 
adaptation, or social intelligence, which he refers to as an adaptation for nothing in 
particular.This paper will begin with an outline of Hampton's arguments in which he details 
the problem of unpredictability. It will then go on to describe Hampton's proposed solution 
and finally present some criticisms of his solution that are firmly embedded within 
contemporary evolutionary theory. 
Notes: An argument in response to the claim that social intelligence, per se, would have 
been selected for in human evolutionary history. Relates to evolutionary psychology and 
personhood. 
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88. Diener, E.  ; Napa-Scollon, C.  ; Oishi, S.  ; Dzokoto,V. . & Suh, E.   (2000). 
Positivity and the construction of life satisfaction judgments: Global 
happiness is not the sum of its parts. Journal of Happiness Studies, 1(2), 
159-176. Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A%3A1010031813405. 
doi:10.1023/a:1010031813405 
Abstract: The present study investigated how reports of satisfaction with specific versus 
global domains can be used to assess a disposition towards positivity in subjective well-being 
reports. College students from 41 societies (N = 7167) completed measures of life 
satisfaction and ratings of global and specific aspects of their lives. For example, participants 
rated satisfaction with their education (global) and satisfaction with their professors, 
textbooks, and lectures (specific). It was hypothesized that global measures would more 
strongly reflect individual differences in dispositional positivity, that is, a propensity to 
evaluate aspects of life in general as good. At both the individual and national levels, 
positivity predicted life satisfaction beyond objective measures. Also, positivity was 
associated with norms about ideal life satisfaction such that countries and individuals who 
highly valued positive emotions were more likely to display positivity. The difference 
between more global versus more concrete measures of satisfaction can be used as an 
indirect and subtle measure of positivity. 
Notes: A useful empirical study that dissects the relationships between different ‘levels’ of 
satisfaction and does so in a way that identifies general tendencies towards positivity. 
Relates to well-being. 
89. Diener, E.  ; Ng, W.  ; Harter, J.   & Arora, R.   (2010). Wealth and 
happiness across the world: Material prosperity predicts life evaluation, 
whereas psychosocial prosperity predicts positive feeling. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 99(1), 52-61. 
Abstract: The Gallup World Poll, the first representative sample of planet Earth, was used to 
explore the reasons why happiness is associated with higher income, including the meeting 
of basic needs, fulfillment of psychological needs, increasing satisfaction with one's standard 
of living, and public goods. Across the globe, the association of log income with subjective 
well-being was linear but convex with raw income, indicating the declining marginal effects 
of income on subjective well-being. Income was a moderately strong predictor of life 
evaluation but a much weaker predictor of positive and negative feelings. Possessing luxury 
conveniences and satisfaction with standard of living were also strong predictors of life 
evaluation. Although the meeting of basic and psychological needs mediated the effects of 
income on life evaluation to some degree, the strongest mediation was provided by 
standard of living and ownership of conveniences. In contrast, feelings were most associated 
with the fulfillment of psychological needs: learning, autonomy, using one's skills, respect, 
and the ability to count on others in an emergency. Thus, two separate types of prosperity-
economic and social psychological-best predict different types of well-being. 
Notes: Provides extensive evidence of the differential relationships between life satisfaction, 
quality of social relationships, wealth and positive affect. A major study of global subjective 
well-being (SWB). Relates to well-being. 
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90. Diener, E.   & Seligman, M. E. P.   (2004). Beyond money: Toward an 
economy of well-being. Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 5(1), 
1-31. Retrieved from http://psi.sagepub.com/content/5/1/1.abstract. 
doi:10.1111/j.0963-7214.2004.00501001.x 
Abbreviated Abstract: Policy decisions at the organizational, corporate, and governmental 
levels should be more heavily influenced by issues related to well-being—people's 
evaluations and feelings about their lives. Domestic policy currently focuses heavily on 
economic outcomes, although economic indicators omit, and even mislead about, much of 
what society values. We show that economic indicators have many shortcomings, and that 
measures of well-being point to important conclusions that are not apparent from economic 
indicators alone. For example, although economic output has risen steeply over the past 
decades, there has been no rise in life satisfaction during this period, and there has been a 
substantial increase in depression and distrust. We argue that economic indicators were 
extremely important in the early stages of economic development, when the fulfillment of 
basic needs was the main issue. As societies grow wealthy, however, differences in well-
being are less frequently due to income, and are more frequently due to factors such as 
social relationships and enjoyment at work. Important noneconomic predictors of the 
average levels of well-being of societies include social capital, democratic governance, and 
human rights. In the workplace, noneconomic factors influence work satisfaction and 
profitability. It is therefore important that organizations, as well as nations, monitor the 
well-being of workers, and take steps to improve it … Desirable outcomes, even economic 
ones, are often caused by well-being rather than the other way around … . Periodic, 
systematic assessment of well-being will offer policymakers a much stronger set of findings 
to use in making policy decisions. 
Notes: A discussion of the broad influences on well-being at the social and economic levels 
leading to the conclusion that policy needs to take account of the wide-ranging influences on 
human well-being. Relates to well-being. 
91. Dolan, P.  ; Hallsworth, M.  ; Halpern, D.  ; King, D.  ; Metcalfe, R.   & 
Vlaev, I.   (2012). Influencing behaviour: The mindspace way. Journal of 
Economic Psychology, 33(1), 264-277. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167487011001668. 
doi:10.1016/j.joep.2011.10.009 
Abstract: The ability to influence behaviour is central to many of the key policy challenges in 
areas such as health, finance and climate change. The usual route to behaviour change in 
economics and psychology has been to attempt to ‘change minds’ by influencing the way 
people think through information and incentives. There is, however, increasing evidence to 
suggest that ‘changing contexts’ by influencing the environments within which people act (in 
largely automatic ways) can have important effects on behaviour. We present a mnemonic, 
MINDSPACE, which gathers up the nine most robust effects that influence our behaviour in 
mostly automatic (rather than deliberate) ways. This framework is being used by 
policymakers as an accessible summary of the academic literature. To motivate further 
research and academic scrutiny, we provide some evidence of the effects in action and 
highlight some of the significant gaps in our knowledge. 
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Notes: A review of the various ways in which personal behaviour is influenced, beneath 
conscious awareness, by characteristics of the context or setting. Relates to personhood – 
especially the degree of agency often considered to be involved. 
92. Dombeck, M. T.   (1991). The contexts of caring: conscience and 
consciousness. NLN publications, (15-2401), 19-36. Retrieved from <Go 
to ISI>://MEDLINE:2057336 
Abstract: In this paper, I have maintained a distinction between person and self in order to 
describe and analyze contexts of caring in nursing encounters. As the nursed person's 
perspectives are examined in light of the nurse's capacity to engage his or her own 
experience, four contextual categories emerge: comprehension, consideration, concern, and 
communion. Such concepts can help us describe and analyze many situations in clinical 
nursing and in nursing education. The following paragraphs describe several of the 
possibilities for future research. It is important to study in which contexts in nursing 
personhood and selfhood are enhanced and when they are diminished. Diminishment of 
personhood leads to depersonalization which describes a condition of loss of agency and 
helplessness in a world where others are in control. This can happen to the nursed person 
and to the nursing person. When nurses are placed in contexts where they experience lack 
of agency and authority in their practice settings (even when they attempt to engage others 
with concern and compassion), they can start to feel and become depersonalized. 
Diminishment of self leads to dehumanization, which describes a loss of contact with one's 
own experience. Rules and relationships are oppressive or inflexible and the participants 
experience meaninglessness. For example, how long can nurses be in daily situations of 
administering painful procedures to patients without experiencing dehumanization? The 
same question can be asked of nurses at all levels in hierarchies, and in all relationships, for 
example, nursing instructors with students, nurse administrators with staff nurses, faculty in 
academic institutions, and staff nurses with each other. Depersonalization and 
dehumanization eventually lead to one another. Another significant question to explore 
could be this: In which of the four contexts defined above does the nurse experience most 
satisfaction, most dissatisfaction, and the condition we call burnout? We live in a world, a 
society, and a profession where depersonalization and dehumanization are the plight of 
many. How can personhood and selfhood be enhanced or even restored in our hospitals, 
clinics, classrooms, and academic institutions? I propose that investigations of the contexts 
of caring can help us explore, discover, describe, and analyze these questions. 
Notes: A conceptual account of the relationship between considerations of personhood and 
selfhood and their consequences for depersonlisation and dehumanisation in a nursing 
context. Relates to selfhood/ personhood and well-being. 
93. Dressler, W. W.   (2006). Commentary: Taking culture seriously in health 
research. International Journal of Epidemiology, 35(2), 258-259. 
Retrieved from http://ije.oxfordjournals.org/content/35/2/258.short. 
doi:10.1093/ije/dyi236 
No abstract. 
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Notes: Commentary on Eckersley's article 'Is modern Western Culture a health hazard?'  
Relates to well-being. 
94. Drigotas, S. M.   (2002). The Michelangelo phenomenon and personal 
well-being. Journal of Personality, 70(1), 59-77. Article. Retrieved from 
<Go to ISI>://WOS:000173590800004. doi:10.1111/1467-6494.00178 
Abstract: Previous research has demonstrated that when a close romantic partner views you 
and behaves toward you in a manner that is congruent with your ideal self, you experience 
movement toward your ideal self (termed the "Michelangelo phenomenon"; Drigotas, 
Rusbult, Wieselquist, & Whitton, 1999). The present research represents an attempt to 
demonstrate the phenomenon's link to personal well-being. Results of a cross-sectional 
study of individuals in dating relationships, with a 2-month follow-up assessing breakup, 
replicated previous findings regarding relationship well-being and revealed strong links 
between the model and personal well-being, even when accounting for level of relationship 
satisfaction. Such results provide further evidence for the social construction of the self and 
personal well-being. 
Notes: An empirical investigation of the dependence of personal well-being upon close, 
romantic relationships in which people are viewed by their partner in a way congruent with 
their ideal self. Relates to personhood and well-being. 
95. Ebstein, R. P. .; Israel, S.  ; Chew, S. H.  ; Zhong, S.   & Knafo, A. (2010). 
Genetics of human social behavior. Neuron, 65(6), 831-844. Retrieved 
from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0896627310001376. 
doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2010.02.020 
Abstract: Human beings are an incredibly social species and along with eusocial insects 
engage in the largest cooperative living groups in the planet's history. Twin and family 
studies suggest that uniquely human characteristics such as empathy, altruism, sense of 
equity, love, trust, music, economic behavior, and even politics are partially hardwired. The 
leap from twin studies to identifying specific genes engaging the social brain has occurred in 
the past decade, aided by deep insights accumulated about social behavior in lower 
mammals. Remarkably, genes such as the arginine vasopressin receptor and the oxytocin 
receptor contribute to social behavior in a broad range of species from voles to man. Other 
polymorphic genes constituting the “usual suspects”—i.e., those encoding for dopamine 
reward pathways, serotonergic emotional regulation, or sex hormones—further enable 
elaborate social behaviors. 
Notes: An overview of work on the evolved and genetic bases of human social and 
cooperative behaviours and emotions. Relates to evolutionary psychology, well-being and 
personhood. 
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96. Eckersley, R.   (2000). The state and fate of nations: Implications of 
subjective measures of personal and social quality of life. Social 
Indicators Research, 52(1), 3-27. Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A%3A1007071621613. 
doi:10.1023/a:1007071621613 
Abstract: The equation of `more’ with `better’ – of standard of living with quality of life – is 
at the heart of a growing international debate about indicators of progress. At one level, the 
debate is about the adequacy of GDP (Gross Domestic Product) as the dominant indicator of 
national performance. However, the debate also reaches far beyond this question to 
challenge conventional thinking about progress. Quality of life includes both objective and 
subjective elements, so indicators of progress should include measures of how people feel 
about their lives. Drawing mainly on Australian data – but also on US and international 
studies – this analysis examines and differentiates between subjective measures of personal 
and social quality of life, and discusses their use in evaluating whether life is getting better – 
or worse. 
Notes: Discusses the relationship between subjective and objective measures of well-being, 
arguing for the inclusion of subjective measures at the national level. Relates to well-being. 
97. Eckersley, R.   (2006). Is modern Western culture a health hazard? 
International Journal of Epidemiology, 35(2), 252-258. Retrieved from 
http://ije.oxfordjournals.org/content/35/2/252.short. 
doi:10.1093/ije/dyi235 
No abstract. 
Notes: 3 Key messages from end of article:  
"Cultural factors such as materialism and individualism are underestimated determinants of 
population health and well-being in Western societies. 
Evidence links cultural factors, via psychosocial pathways, to psychological well-being, and 
well-being, through behavioural and physiological pathways, to physical health. 
An important and growing cost of our modern way of life is 'cultural fraud': the promotion of 
images and ideals of 'the good life' that serve the economy but do not meet psychological 
needs or reflect social realities." 
A general discussion of how well-being is influenced by cultural messages via social 
interactions. Relates to well-being. 
98. Eckersley, R.   (2009). Population measures of subjective well-being: How 
useful are they? Social Indicators Research, 94(1), 1-12. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/197628151?accountid=27890 
Abstract: This article focuses on the contributions and, importantly, the limitations of 
subjective well-being (happiness/satisfaction) measures as indicators of broad population 
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well-being and societal functioning. The popular practice of comparing happiness among 
countries gives a skewed view of how well their people are faring. Charting trends over time 
in happiness and mental health gives contradictory pictures of population well-being; even 
the responses to different questions within the same survey can yield very different findings. 
Asking people about their own lives and about social conditions produces contrasting 
results. These issues challenge the orthodox model of human development, which places 
Western liberal democracies at its leading edge. According to an alternative, psychosocial-
dynamics, model, some, at least, may be societies in decline. Reconciling these views is no 
simple matter.  
Notes: A critical commentary on how best to measure well-being given the uncertain 
relationship between personal and social aspects of well-being. Relates to well-being. 
99. Ellis, B. J.   & Bjorklund, D. F. (Eds.). (2005). Origins of the social mind; 
evolutionary psychology and child development: Guildford Press. 
No abstract.  
Notes: Editors Ellis and Bjorklund (respectively, U. of Arizona and Florida Atlantic U.) gather 
ideas behind the synthesis of evolutionary biology and developmental psychology, bringing 
together 19 contributions from developmental scientists whose work is moved by an 
evolutionary perspective. Arrangement is in three sections on conceptual foundations of the 
emerging field; personality and social development; and cognitive development. The 
contributions address the role of developmental plasticity in the evolution of human 
cognition (evidence from enculturated apes); early stress; behavioral genetics; determinants 
of pubertal timing; functional aspects of human adolescence; play; infant perception; 
language evolution; religious causal beliefs in children and adults; a revision of Simon Baron-
Cohen's 1994 model of the "mindreading system," and folk knowledge and academic 
learning, among other topics.  
Relates to evolutionary psychology and has clear implications for the development of 
selfhood/ personhood. 
100. Ermer, E.  ; Cosmides, L.   & Tooby, J.   (2008). Relative status regulates 
risky decision making about resources in men: Evidence for the co-
evolution of motivation and cognition. Evolution and Human Behavior, 
29(2), 106-118. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S109051380700116X. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.11.002 
Abstract: Relative social status strongly regulates human behavior, yet this factor has been 
largely ignored in research on risky decision making. Humans, like other animals, incur risks 
as they compete to defend or improve their standing in a social group. Among men, access 
to culturally important resources is a locus of intrasexual competition and a determinant of 
status. Thus, relative status should affect men's motivations for risk in relevant domains. 
Contrasting predictions about such effects were derived from dominance theory and risk-
sensitive foraging theory. Experiments varied whether subjects thought they were being 
observed and evaluated by others of lower, equal or higher status, and whether decisions 
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involved resources (status relevant) or medical treatments (status irrelevant). Across two 
experiments, men who thought others of equal status were viewing and evaluating their 
decisions were more likely to favor a high-risk/high-gain means of recouping a monetary loss 
over a no-risk/low-gain means with equal expected value. Supporting predictions from 
dominance theory, this motivation for risk taking appeared only in the equal status 
condition, only for men, and only for resource loss problems. Taken together, the results 
support the idea that motivational systems designed to negotiate a status-saturated social 
world regulate the cognitive processes that generate risky decision making in men. 
Notes: Experimental study of the relationship between risky decision making, relative status 
and competition for resources. Males were found to be sensitive to the status level of those 
judging their efforts and so chose riskier strategies when believing that equal status level 
peers were judging them. Relates to evolutionary psychology and development of male 
personhood as it relates to risky decision-making. 
101. Essock-Vitale, S. M.   & McGuire, M. T.   (1980). Predictions derived from 
the theories of kin selection and reciprocation assessed by 
anthropological data. Ethology and Sociobiology, 1(3), 233-243. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0162309580900102. 
doi:10.1016/0162-3095(80)90010-2 
Abstract: A review of the anthropological exchange literature indicates that predictions 
following from the evolutionary biological theories of kin selection and reciprocation are 
nearly always supported. For example, studies suggest that kin are more likely than nonkin 
to be the recipients of assistance for which no reciprocation is expected. While most of the 
data on differences in helping and reciprocity with closeness of kinship are qualitative rather 
than quantitative, the frequency of quantitative studies appears to be increasing. Hence, the 
behavioral observations and systematic subject questioning by anthropologists may be of 
increasing usefulness to human ethologists and evolutionary biologists. 
Notes: An early study that argues that anthropological evidence supports kin selection 
theories of helping behaviour. Relates to evolutionary psychology. 
102. Fabrega, H.   (1994). Personality-disorders as medical entities - A cultural 
interpretation. Journal of Personality Disorders, 8(2), 149-167. Article. 
Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:A1994NU40000008 
Abstract: This paper touches on four related but analytically different ways in which the 
personality disorders can be conceptualized. Viewed from a classical ''biomedical'' point of 
view, they constitute medical entities for which there exists a growing neurobiological 
rationale and validation. In this view, PDs have a legitimate claim to being bonafide 
psychiatric entities. From a cultural constructionist point of view, PDs are based on 
conceptions of personhood and standards of culturally appropriate behavior that have 
evolved in Anglo-American societies. In this view, PDs are quintessential cultural products 
that owe their meaning and descriptive content to a distinctive cultural tradition. From a 
social-historical point of view, the PDs illustrate dramatically the process of medicalization 
that has taken place in Anglo-American societies, especially as this pertains to social 
The Well-Evolved Life: Well-being, Evolution and Personhood 
52 
behavior. In a society in which characterological factors have become criteria not only for 
normality as compared to deviance but also for the pathological, the idea that the label 
''disorders' can be applied to aspects of personhood follows logically. (This aspect of PDs is 
implied in this paper and is more explicitly dealt with elsewhere-see Fabrega, 1989, for a 
summary and also Foucault, 1965, and Kittrie, 1972.) Finally, as is illustrated in this paper, 
the PDs pose a philosophical conundrum insofar as it is conceptually difficult to draw a sharp 
line between the scientific (i.e., evolutionary/psychological) and the culturally standard (i.e., 
Anglo-American conventions). The parallelism of meaning of the descriptors of the language 
of evolutionary psychology and of a local cultural psychology makes it difficult to refute the 
reductionist position that the PDs are based on ethnocentric assumptions. The notion of a 
dialectical interplay between culture, biology, and history in the formation of personality and 
personality disorders is basic to contemporary psychiatric theory and highlights the 
limitations of biological and cultural reductionism. 
Notes:  Argues that personality disorders are hard to distinguish from culturally based 
preferences for aspects of personhood. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood. 
103. Farnell, B.   (1999). Moving bodies, acting selves. Annual Review of 
Anthropology, 28, 341-373. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/199819200?accountid=27890 
Abstract: This review describes a paradigmatic shift in anthropological studies in human 
movement, from an observationist view of behavior to a conception of body movement as 
dynamically embodied action. After outlining the scope of such study, historical and cultural 
reasons for the relative neglect of body movement in anthropological enquiry are examined 
critically and placed in the wider context of recent cultural and social theorizing about the 
body and the problem of dynamic embodiment. A historical overview situates earlier 
approaches such as kinesics and proxemics, in relation to more recent developments in 
theory and method such as those offered by semasiology and the concept of the "action" 
sign. Overlapping interests with linguistic and cognitive anthropology are described. The 
emergence of a holistic "anthropology of human movement" has raised new research 
questions that require new resources.Theoretical insights have challenged researchers to 
devise new methods and to adopt or devise new technologies, such as videotape and an 
adequate transcription system. An example of the latter illustrates the analytic advantages 
of literacy in the medium. 
Notes: A useful article aimed to be accessible to the general reader which focuses on an 
anthropological understanding of the nature of action as thoroughly embodied. Relates to 
personhood and has implications for evolutionary psychology. 
104. Ferrer-i-Carbonell, A.   & Gowdy, J. M.   (2007). Environmental 
degradation and happiness. Ecological Economics, 60(3), 509-516. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921800905005835. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2005.12.005 
Abstract: The focus of this paper is the relationship between subjective measures of well-
being and individual environmental attitudes. We use an ordered probit model to examine 
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the relationship between measures of subjective well-being and attitudes regarding ozone 
pollution and species extinction. Using data from the British Household Panel Survey we find 
a negative coefficient for concern about ozone pollution on individual's well-being and a 
positive one for concern about species extinction. These results hold when explanatory 
variables are included indicating whether or not the person lives in a polluted environment, 
whether or not the person engages in outdoor leisure activities, and the region where an 
individual lives. These results also hold when we control for individual psychological traits. 
Notes: Argues that individual well-being has different relationships to different 
environmental attitudes. Relates to well-being. 
105. Fiske, A. P.   (2000). Complementarity theory: Why human social 
capacities evolved to require cultural complements. Personality and 
Social Psychology Review, 4(1), 76-94. Article. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://WOS:000086668300007 
Abstract: This article introduces complementarity theory, which explains the psychology of 
cultural diversity as a product of evolved social proclivities that enable-and require people to 
coordinate action in culture-specific ways. The theory presents evolutionary process and 
psychological mechanisms that may account for the cultural variability of social coordination 
devices such as language, relational models, rituals, moral interpretations of misfortune, 
taboos, religion, marriage, and descent systems. Human fitness and well-being depend on 
social coordination characterized by complementarity among the participants' actions. This 
complementarity is based primarily on coordination devices derived from the conjunction of 
cultural paradigms and specific, highly structured, evolved proclivities. The proclivities have 
no adaptive value without the paradigms, and the paradigms have no meaning without the 
proclivities. They are coadapted to function together. Operating in conjunction with each 
other, proclivities and paradigms jointly define the generative structures for meaningful 
coordination of social interaction in each particular culture. 
Notes: This article notes the relationship between proclivities and specific cultural practices 
and paradigms as a means of explaining cultural diversity. Relates to evolutionary psychology 
and personhood. 
106. Fitzgerald, C. J.   & Danner, K. M.   (2012). Evolution in the office: How 
evolutionary psychology can increase employee health, happiness, and 
productivity. Evolutionary Psychology, 10(5), 770-781. Article. Retrieved 
from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000313204100002 
Abstract: We review the empirical literature that has implemented aspects of our ancestral 
environment into the workplace and discuss the positive influence these factors have had on 
employees' physical and psychological health. We focus upon several components of our 
ancestral environment, including sunlight, greenery, sleep, physical movement, and social 
interaction with fellow humans as well as animals (specifically, dogs). Employers who are 
willing to adopt an evolutionary psychological approach to organizing their workplaces may 
drastically improve their workers' overall physical and psychological health as well as their 
overall productivity. This will, in turn, decrease employer costs related to medical care, 
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absenteeism, and lack of productivity. Suggestions regarding how to implement these 
evolutionary psychological methods to the workplace are also discussed. 
Notes: Review of the application of insights from evolutionary psychology into the modern 
workplace to improve employee well-being. Relates to evolutionary psychology and well-
being. 
107. Fivush, R.   (2010). Speaking silence: The social construction of silence in 
autobiographical and cultural narratives. Memory, 18(2), 88-98. Article. 
Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000277649800002. 
doi:10.1080/09658210903029404 
Abstract: Voice and silence are socially constructed in conversational interactions between 
speakers and listeners that are influenced by canonical cultural narratives which define lives 
and selves. Arguing from feminist and sociocultural theories, I make a distinction between 
being silenced and being silent; when being silenced is contrasted with voice, it is 
conceptualised as imposed, and it signifies a loss of power and self. But silence can also be 
conceptualised as being silent, a shared understanding that need not be voiced. More 
specifically, culturally dominant narratives provide for shared understandings that can 
remain silent; deviations from the norm call for voice, and thus in this case silence is power 
and voice expresses loss of power. At both the cultural and the individual level, there are 
tensions between culturally dominant and prescriptive narratives and narratives of 
resistance and deviation, leading to an ongoing dialectic between voice and silence. I end 
with a discussion of why, ultimately, it matters what is voiced and what is silenced for 
memory, identity and well-being. 
Notes: An interesting conceptual analysis of how silence in discourse can either be positive 
or negative in relation to identity and well-being. Relates to personhood and well-being. 
108. Flinn, M. V.  ; Geary, D. C.   & Ward, C. V.   (2005). Ecological dominance, 
social competition, and coalitionary arms races: Why humans evolved 
extraordinary intelligence. Evolution and Human Behavior, 26(1), 10-46. 
Retrieved from 
http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1090513804000595?showal
l=true 
Abstract: Human cognitive abilities are extraordinary. Our large brains are significantly 
modified from those of our closest relatives, suggesting a history of intense natural 
selection. The conditions favoring the evolution of human cognitive adaptations, however, 
remain an enigma. Hypotheses based on traditional ecological demands, such as hunting or 
climatic variability, have not provided satisfying explanations. Recent models based on social 
problem solving linked with ecological conditions offer more convincing scenarios. But it has 
proven difficult to identify a set of selective pressures that would have been sufficiently 
unique to the hominin lineage. What was so special about the evolutionary environments of 
our ancestors that caused them, and them alone, to diverge in such astonishing ways from 
their close relatives and all other life forms? Richard Alexander proposed a comprehensive 
integrated explanation. He argued that as our hominin ancestors became increasing able to 
master the traditional “hostile forces of nature,” selective pressures resulting from 
The Well-Evolved Life: Well-being, Evolution and Personhood 
55 
competition among conspecifics became increasingly important, particularly in regard to 
social competencies. Given the precondition of competition among kin- and reciprocity-
based coalitions (shared with chimpanzees), an autocatalytic social arms race was initiated, 
which eventually resulted in the unusual collection of traits characteristic of the human 
species, such as concealed ovulation, extensive biparental care, complex sociality, and an 
extraordinary collection of cognitive abilities. We term this scenario the “ecological 
dominance–social competition” (EDSC) model and assess the feasibility of this model in light 
of recent developments in paleoanthropology, cognitive psychology, and neurobiology. We 
conclude that although strong or direct tests are difficult with current data, Alexander's 
model provides a far-reaching and integrative explanation for the evolution of human 
cognitive abilities that is consistent with evidence from a wide range of disciplines. 
Notes: An article supportive of a social genesis of increased cognitive capacity in humans. 
Relates to environmental psychology and personhood. 
109. Forgeard, M. J. C.   & Seligman, M. E. P.   (2012). Seeing the glass half full: 
A review of the causes and consequences of optimism. Pratiques 
Psychologiques, 18(2), 107-120. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S126917631200003X. 
doi:10.1016/j.prps.2012.02.002 
Abstract: During the past few decades, the psychological trait of optimism has garnered an 
increasing amount of interest from scientists, and numerous studies have now shown that 
optimism is associated with important benefits. The present review summarizes the main 
findings from this body of research. We begin by describing the two main ways in which 
researchers have defined and operationalized optimism, as “optimistic explanatory style” 
and as “dispositional optimism”. Second, we provide an overview of the various studies 
documenting the benefits of optimism. Optimism indeed appears to be associated with 
higher levels of subjective well-being, better health, and more success. In addition, we 
describe some of the ongoing controversies in this area of research. Third, we summarize 
what researchers currently know about the causes of optimism, and how optimism can be 
fostered in adults as well as in youth. Finally, the present review highlights the adaptive 
nature of optimism, while recognizing that being optimistic under all circumstances may not 
always be best. Cultivating flexible and realistic optimism may therefore be most 
advantageous. We conclude by pointing out important areas of research for the future. 
These include continuing the search for the biological and brain substrates of optimism, and 
investigating the psychological and physiological benefits of adopting a flexible (as opposed 
to rigid) optimistic outlook on life. 
Notes: The article focuses on the role of optimism in well-being. Given the conceptual 
relationship between optimism and agency it also has implications for understanding 
personhood. Overall, a useful article contributing to the research on well-being, personhood 
and evolutionary psychology. 
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110. Fredrickson, B. L.   (2004). The broaden-and-build theory of positive 
emotions. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. B. 
Biological Sciences, 359(1449, September 29), 1367–1378  
Abstract: The broaden-and-build theory describes the form and function of a subset of 
positive emotions, including joy, interest, contentment and love. A key proposition is that 
these positive emotions broaden an individual's momentary thought-action repertoire: joy 
sparks the urge to play, interest sparks the urge to explore, contentment sparks the urge to 
savour and integrate, and love sparks a recurring cycle of each of these urges within safe, 
close relationships. The broadened mindsets arising from these positive emotions are 
contrasted to the narrowed mindsets sparked by many negative emotions (i.e. specific 
action tendencies, such as attack or flee). A second key proposition concerns the 
consequences of these broadened mindsets: by broadening an individual's momentary 
thought-action repertoire--whether through play, exploration or similar activities--positive 
emotions promote discovery of novel and creative actions, ideas and social bonds, which in 
turn build that individual's personal resources; ranging from physical and intellectual 
resources, to social and psychological resources. Importantly, these resources function as 
reserves that can be drawn on later to improve the odds of successful coping and survival. 
This chapter reviews the latest empirical evidence supporting the broaden-and-build theory 
and draws out implications the theory holds for optimizing health and well-being. 
Notes: A significant theory in the areas of well-being and the evolutionary adaptiveness of 
both negative and positive emotions. Relates to evolutionary psychology, well-being and the 
development of personhood. 
111. Freeman, L.   (2011). Reconsidering relational autonomy: A feminist 
approach to selfhood and the other in the thinking of Martin Heidegger. 
Inquiry-an Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 54(4), 361-383. Article. 
Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000294116100003. 
doi:10.1080/0020174x.2011.592342 
Abstract: This paper examines a convergence between Heidegger's reconceptualization of 
subjectivity and intersubjectivity and some recent work in feminist philosophy on relational 
autonomy. Both view the concept of autonomy to be misguided, given that our capacity to 
be self-directed is dependent upon our ability to enter into and sustain meaningful 
relationships. Both attempt to overturn the notion of a subject as an isolated, atomistic 
individual and to show that selfhood requires, and is based upon, one's relation to and 
dependence upon others. The paper argues that Heidegger's notion of authentic Mitsein 
(being-with) rejects traditional notions of autonomy and subjectivity in favor of a relational 
model of selfhood. Ultimately, it provides a new point of entry into contemporary debates 
within feminist philosophy on Heidegger's thinking and defends Heidegger from certain 
feminist critiques. 
Notes: Conceptually challenges the notion of autonomy as independence from others. It 
connects work in feminism on autonomy with the philosophy of Heidegger. Relates to 
personhood. 
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112. Freeman, M.   (1995). Groping in the light. Theory & Psychology, 5(3), 
353-360. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:A1995RJ22100002. 
doi:10.1177/0959354395053002 
Even though Fisher's (1995) own 'solution' to the alleged problems brought on by social 
constructionism in regard to the self is questionable in that positing internal causes leads to 
much the same moral impasse as those more external formulations he seeks to critize, it is 
nevertheless of value both to call attention to the limits of the movement and to imagine 
alternatives that might better allow human agency and moral responsibility into their reach. 
He is therefore to be commended for thinking against the grain as well as for following his 
apparent intuition that there may be more to selfhood and moral life than the conventional 
wisdom would indicate. After having drawn out the implications of this intuition, some 
direction is provided for thinking about moral life in a manner different from the social 
constructionists and from Fisher himself. 
Notes: Part of a debate in the journal over internalist, Cartesian views of the self and social 
constructionist accounts of the self. Relates to selfhood/ personhood. 
113. Freeman, M.   (1998). Mythical time, historical time, and the narrative 
fabric of the self. Narrative Inquiry, 8(1), 27-50. Article; Proceedings 
Paper. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000078062500003. 
doi:10.1075/ni.8.1.03fre 
Abstract: Despite the belief that narrative may serve as an important vehicle for exploring 
human experience and selfhood, there frequently exists the paradoxical supposition that 
narrative accounts cannot help but falsify life itself: Insofar as time is viewed in 
fundamentally linear terms and experience, in turn, is viewed as that which simply "goes on" 
in time, narratives may be viewed as entailing an imposition of literary form upon that which 
is ostensibly formless. After considering the idea of mythical time, tied to the image of the 
circle, and the idea of historical time, tied to the image of the line, it is suggested that human 
experience and selfhood are themselves woven out of the fabric of narrative. In light of 
contemporary understandings of the self, particularly those promoted in certain quarters of 
post-structuralist and social constructionist thought, it is further suggested that the narrative 
fabric of the self has become frayed. By rethinking the interrelationship of time, experience, 
and self via the idea of narrative, there emerges the opportunity to recognize more fully the 
profound continuities between myth and history as well as life and literature. 
Notes: A conceptual consideration of the relationship between narrative form and human 
experience of the self. Relates to personhood. 
114. Freeman, M.   (1999). Culture, narrative, and the poetic construction of 
selfhood. Journal of Constructivist Psychology, 12(2), 99-116. Article. 
Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000079275900002. 
doi:10.1080/107205399266136 
Abstract: Recent explorations of the relationship between narrative and self, particularly 
those tied to social constructionism, have served as a valuable corrective to the still-
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prevalent tendency in psychology to divorce the self from its social surround. Yet certain of 
these explorations, by privileging the social over the individual, have led to a vision of 
selfhood that is problematic in its own right. Specifically, it is argued that, even though the 
"tools" employed in the construction of selfhood are social in nature, the configurational 
acts through which this construction occurs are better conceived in poetic terms, as 
imaginative labor seeking to give form and meaning to experience. In considering the poetic 
construction of selfhood, this article attempts to articulate further the relationship between 
narrative and self, the cultural dimension of personal experience, and the importance of the 
idea of narrative for expanding the scope of psychological knowledge. 
Notes: The argument is made that social constructionist approaches to the self involve their 
own conceptual difficulties which can be overcome by a poetic understanding of the process 
of self formation. In that understanding, social processes represent the means by which the 
self is constructed and do not amount to the process of construction itself. Relates to 
personhood. 
115. Freese, J.  ; Jui-Chung Allen, L.   & Wade, L. D.   (2003). The potential 
relevances of biology to social inquiry. Annual Review of Sociology, 29, 
233-256. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/199610521?accountid=27890 
http://bb5xk7cw9v.search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-
8&rfr_id=info:sid/ProQ%3Asocscijournals&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:
mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Annual+Review+of+Sociology&rf
t.atitle=The+potential+relevances+of+biology+to+social+inquiry&rft.au=
Freese%2C+Jeremy%3BJui-
Chung+Allen+Li%3BWade%2C+Lisa+D&rft.aulast=Freese&rft.aufirst=Jere
my&rft.date=2003-01-
01&rft.volume=29&rft.issue=&rft.spage=233&rft.isbn=&rft.btitle=&rft.ti
tle=Annual+Review+of+Sociology&rft.issn=03600572 
Abstract: Sociologists often react with hostility to explanations that evoke biology, and some 
critics of the discipline contend that this "biophobia" undermines the credibility of sociology 
and makes it seem increasingly irrelevant in larger public debates. The negative reactions are 
many times diffuse and undiscerning of the different endeavors lumped together whenever 
one speaks broadly of biological (or "biosocial") explanations. We seek to introduce greater 
awareness of these distinctions with a review organized in terms of some of the distinct 
ways that the biological can be asserted to be relevant to the conduct of social inquiry. The 
review has three sections. First, we discuss assertions of the relevance of the human 
evolutionary past for understanding the character of human nature, for which evolutionary 
psychology currently receives the most attention. Second, we consider the work of 
behavioral genetics and the assertion of the relevance of genetic differences between 
persons for understanding differences in behaviors and outcomes. Third, we consider 
assertions of the relevance of particular proximate bioindicators for understanding how the 
biological and social interact, focusing particularly on studies of testosterone and the 
prospects of developments in neuroscientific measurement. We do not believe that 
developments in these fields will force sociologists to acquire considerable biological 
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expertise to pursue questions central to the discipline, but we do advocate further efforts 
from biologically minded sociologists to articulate understandings of the relationship 
between sociology and biology that will continue to push us past the commonplace view 
that biological and sociological explanations are inevitably opposed.  
Notes: Provides an argument in support of theoretical connections between sociological and 
biological understandings of people and argues that these are not necessarily incompatible 
views. Relates to evolutionary and biological approaches to the explanation of human social 
behaviour. 
116. Furlanetto, T.  ; Bertone, C.   & Becchio, C.   (2013). The bilocated mind: 
New perspectives on self-localization and self-identification. Frontiers in 
Human Neuroscience, 7, 1-6. Perspective. Retrieved from 
http://www.frontiersin.org/Journal/Abstract.aspx?s=537&name=human
_neuroscience&ART_DOI=10.3389/fnhum.2013.00071. 
doi:10.3389/fnhum.2013.00071 
Abstract: Does the human mind allow for self-locating at more than one place at a time? 
Evidence from neurology, cognitive neuroscience, and experimental psychology suggests 
that mental bilocation is a complex, but genuine experience, occurring more frequently than 
commonly thought. In this article, we distinguish between different components of bilocated 
self-representation: self-localization in two different places at the same time, self-
identification with another body, reduplication of first-person perspective. We argue that 
different forms of mental bilocation may result from the combination of these components. 
To illustrate this, we discuss evidence of mental bilocation in pathological conditions such as 
heautoscopy, during immersion in virtual environments, and in everyday life, during social 
interaction. Finally, we consider the conditions for mental bilocation and speculate on the 
possible role of mental bilocation in the context of social interaction, suggesting that self-
localization at two places at the same time may prove advantageous for the construction of 
a shared space. 
Notes: An interesting study of the possibility for ‘bi-location’ of the mind – locating oneself 
in more than one place at once. Relates to personhood. 
117. Gaertner, L.  ; Sedikides, C.  ; Luke, M.  ; O'Mara, E. M.  ; Iuzzini, J.  ; 
Jackson, L. E.  ; et al. (2012). A motivational hierarchy within: Primacy of 
the individual self, relational self, or collective self? Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 48(5), 997-1013. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022103112000571. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2012.03.009 
Abstract: The individual self, relational self, and collective self are important and meaningful 
aspects of identity. However, they plausibly differ in their relative importance such that one 
self lies closer to the motivational core of the self-concept, better represent the “home 
base” of selfhood, or, simply stated, is motivationally primary. Four multi-method studies 
tested the relative motivational-primacy of the selves. Despite their disparate methods, the 
studies yielded consistent evidence of a three-tiered hierarchy with the individual self at the 
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top, followed by the relational self, and trailed at the bottom by the collective self. The same 
hierarchy emerged in the Eastern culture of China and the Western cultures of the US and 
UK. Such pancultural consistency suggests that the motivational hierarchy is a fundamental 
pattern of the human self. 
Notes: Investigates the motivational relationships between various ‘selves’, from the 
individual to the collective self and concludes that the individual self is motivationally 
fundamental. Relates to evolutionary psychology and selfhood/ personhood. 
118. Gangestad, S. W.   & Scheyd, G. J.   (2005). The evolution of human 
physical attractiveness. Annual Review of Anthropology, 34, 523-548. 
Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/199820444?accountid=27890 
Abstract: Everywhere the issue has been examined, people make discriminations about 
others' physical attractiveness. Can human standards of physical attractiveness be 
understood through the lens of evolutionary biology? In the past decade, this question has 
guided much theoretical and empirical work. In this paper, we (a) outline the basic 
adaptationist approach that has guided the bulk of this work, (b) describe evolutionary 
models of signaling that have been applied to understand human physical attractiveness, 
and (c) discuss and evaluate specific lines of empirical research attempting to address the 
selective history of human standards of physical attractiveness. We also discuss ways 
evolutionary scientists have attempted to understand variability in standards of 
attractiveness across cultures as well as the ways current literature speaks to body 
modification in modern Western cultures. Though much work has been done, many 
fundamental questions remain unanswered.  
Notes: Examines the literature on physical attractiveness as an evolved preference. Relates 
to evolutionary psychology and personhood. 
119. Gergen, K. J.   (1991). The saturated self: Dilemmas of identity in 
contemporary life: Basic Books. 
No abstract. 
Notes: This is a major work in the social constructionist literature on the nature of 
(post)modern selves. Gergen argues that the unity of the self is now increasingly challenged 
by the many identities and roles expressed in a world of greater contact with diverse other 
selves, cultures and mediated experiences. Relates to personhood. 
120. Gergen, K. J.   & Gergen, M. M.   (1988). Narrative and the self as 
relationship. In B. Leonard (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social 
Psychology (Vol. Volume 21, pp. 17-56): Academic Press. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0065260108602233. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60223-3 
No Abstract. 
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Publisher Summary: This chapter explores the nature of stories of self, both as they are told 
and lived in social life. It examines the story form—or more formally, the structure of 
narrative accounts. It then describes the way narratives of the self are constructed within 
social life and the uses to which they are put. As story advances, it becomes increasingly 
clear that narratives of the self are not fundamentally possessions of the individual; rather 
they are products of social interchange—possessions of the socius. This analysis sets the 
stage for a discussion of lived narrative. The chapter proposes the traditional concept of 
individual selves is fundamentally problematic. What have served as individual traits, mental 
processes, or personal characteristics can promisingly be viewed as the constituents of 
relational forms. The form of these relationships is that of the narrative sequence. Thus, by 
the end of story it can be found that the individual self has all but vanished into the world of 
relationship. 
Notes: Emphasises the relational nature of selves and their constant (re)construction 
through changing relations. Relates to personhood, especially narrative accounts of selves 
and persons. 
121. Ghiselin, M. T.   (2009). Darwin and the evolutionary foundations of 
society. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 71(1), 4-9. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268109000596. 
doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2006.10.015 
Abstract: Although Charles Darwin never presented an explicit theory of society he wrote 
extensively on topics related to the origin and evolution of society. His ideas were influenced 
by classical economists, especially Adam Smith. His naturalistic and comparative studies on 
diverse societies affected his views on social and economic progress. His research on 
developmental psychology addressed fundamental issues in the evolution of social behavior. 
Much influenced by Adam Smith, he related the origin of the moral sentiments and the 
social instincts to evolutionary theory. Recognizing that families as well as organisms are 
ontological individuals that can be selected, he explained self-sacrifice largely by competition 
between groups, and downplayed reciprocity. 
Notes: Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood. 
122. Gilbert, P.   (2003). Evolution, social roles, and the differences in shame 
and guilt. Social Research, 70(4), 1205-1230. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/209671886?accountid=27890 
No abstract. 
Notes: The fear of shame and ridicule can be so strong that people will risk serious physical 
injury or even death to avoid it because shame can indicate serious damage to social 
acceptance and a breakdown in a variety of social relationships. Gilbert traces the 
evolutionary root of shame and presents a comprehensive differentiation between shame 
and guilt. He concludes that evolutionary considerations can aid in the search for 
underpinning basic strategies, motives, and competencies for behavior, and also points to 
the fact the human evolution has been marked by major developments in one's capacities 
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for symbolic self-other awareness, theory of mind, and metacognitions. Relates to 
evolutionary psychology and personhood. 
123. Gillett, G.   (2002). You always were a bastard. The Hastings Center 
Report, 32(6), 23-28. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/220164120?accountid=27890 
Abstract: Are the aggressive remarks of a person with dementia expressions of real feelings, 
now visible only because a polite veneer has been stripped away? A careful understanding of 
the nature of personhood suggests otherwise. The self is an intricate story, constructed of 
casual encounters with the world, the conceptual categories with which we understand the 
world and the meanings we then attach to our encounters with the world, all reworked and 
edited in light of our values. The person with dementia has lost control of the editing.  
Notes: An interesting insight into the nature of personhood, and of how the self is subtly 
altered through a disease such as Alzheimers. Relates to personhood. 
124. Giovanola, B.   (2005). Personhood and human richness: Good and well-
being in the capability approach and beyond. Review of Social Economy, 
63(2), 249+. Article. Retrieved from 
http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA134677735&v=2.1&u=lin
coln1&it=r&p=ITOF&sw=w 
Abstract: This paper aims at developing the Capability Approach's (CA) underlying 
philosophical anthropology and ethics by focusing on the work of its major exponents, 
Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. I first discuss CA's critique of happiness as subjective 
well-being and defend the idea of 'flourishing' which ultimately refers to the Aristotelian 
concept of eudaimonia. I then focus on the notions of 'good' and 'well-being' and address 
the problem of the compatibility between a substantive notion of the Good (expressed 
through universal moral values) and individual preferences. I thus tackle the issue of 
adaptive preferences (which is investigated both from a methodological and an ethical 
perspective) and suggest that the process of adaptation should be thought in the dynamic 
frame of the constitution of the self. Therefore, in the second half of the paper I investigate 
the CA's idea of personhood and focus on some important assumptions behind its 
underlying anthropological model--above all the notion of 'human richness'. As a result, I 
first point out the dynamic dimension of personhood, according to which individuals are 
'becoming themselves' in search of self-realisation and construction of their identities. 
Second, I highlight its relational dimension, according to which every one is the expression of 
the anthropological richness and at the same time represents the highest possibility of 
richness for every other one. 
Notes: A discussion of the ‘capability approach’ taken from welfare economics in terms of its 
understanding of personhood and identity construction through use of ‘capabilities’ to 
operate effectively in society. Relates to personhood and well-being. 
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125. Giovanola, B.   (2009). Re-thinking the anthropological and ethical 
foundation of economics and business: Human richness and capabilities 
enhancement. Journal of Business Ethics, 88(3), 431-444. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/198223715?accountid=27890 
Abstract: This article aims at showing the need for a sound ethical and anthropological 
foundation of economics and business, and argues the importance of a correct 
understanding of human values and human nature for the sake of economics and of 
businesses themselves. It is suggested that the ethical-anthropological side of economics 
and business can be grasped by taking Aristotle's virtue ethics and Amartya Sen's capability 
approach (CA) as major reference points. We hold that an "Aristotelian economics of 
virtues", connected with the CA's notion of human richness, can promote the shift to the 
concept of personhood, and can lead to a more "humanized" business, by fostering human 
flourishing, the enhancement of human capabilities, and the pursuit of a more humane 
development for each and every person.  
Notes: Emphasises the need to consider personhood to ensure a humane business world 
that fosters human flourishing. Demonstrates the application of particular understandings of 
personhood to social settings. Relates to personhood and well-being. 
126. Giovanola, B.   (2010). Human flourishing beyond economic well-being: 
The contribution of phenomenology towards a "richer" idea of 
personhood. In Heralding the New Enlightenment(Vol. 105), pp. 339-351. 
Dordrecht: Springer. 
Abstract: The paper aims at showing the necessity of a sound anthropological and ethical 
foundation of economics In this framework it is also discussed whether Phenomenology can 
contribute to a renewed interpretation of economic and ethical issues and, in particular, of 
the relationship between ethics and economics. More specifically, the phenomenological 
approach is taken into account with regard to its contribution to the development of a 
complex and dynamic idea of personhood, which relies on the notion of human flourishing 
and underlies the relationship between ethics and economics. 
Notes: A phenomenological approach to the incorporation of ethics into an economic 
perspective that emphasises a dynamic, flourishing view of personhood. Relates to 
personhood and well-being. 
127. Glas, G.   (2006). Person, personality, self, and identity: A philosophically 
informed conceptual analysis. Journal of Personality Disorders, 20(2), 
126-138. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000237301400003. 
doi:10.1521/pedi.2006.20.2.126 
Abstract: Who is the person, or self, associated with personality disorder and its treatment? 
How are we to account for a self conceptualized in terms of schemas and representations, 
that at the same time-as self-scrutinizes these schemas and representations (as in cognitive 
therapy for personality disorders)? Five approaches to personhood are examined: 
metaphysical, empirical, transcendental, hermeneutical, and phenomenological. An 
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elementary sense of selfhood is tied to all one's experiences and activities, this sense of self 
is experientially irreducible and conceptually connected to a primordial form of self-
relatedness. After examining these issues, I formulate four provisional conclusions: (a) the 
separation between person and roles (functions, personality features) is a modem fiction-
persons are not neutral bearers of roles and functions; (b) the concept of personality in 
DSM-IV refers to nonhomogeneous behaviors such as feelings, moods, inclinations, 
temperaments, and habits, and these behaviors differ with respect to their distance to the 
core self, (c) there exists an enormous variety of ways of self-relating and this variety may 
affect the contents of the core self under certain circumstances; and (d) the concept of 
person may be primitive; that is, irreducible and referring to a background of unity and 
integrity. 
Notes: A conceptual analysis of the self as ‘experientially irreducible’. Relates to 
personhood. 
128. Godoy, R.  ; Eisenberg, D. T. A.  ; Reyes-García, V.  ; Huanca, T.  ; Leonard, 
W. R.  ; McDade, T.   W.; et al. (2008). Assortative mating and offspring 
well-being: theory and empirical findings from a native Amazonian 
society in Bolivia. Evolution and Human Behavior, 29(3), 201-210. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090513807001419. 
doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.12.003 
Abstract: Mate choice matters for inclusive fitness, household economic efficiency, 
assimilation, stratification, and economic inequalities in society. In positive assortative 
mating, people pair with someone who resembles them along a trait, whereas in negative 
assortative mating, people pair with someone who differs from them along a trait. In 
industrial nations, people tend to follow positive assortative mating for fundamental 
demographic dimensions (e.g., age, schooling) and might practice negative assortative 
mating for economic outcomes (e.g., earnings). Research on assortative mating has focused 
on industrial nations, generally compared only one trait between couples, and paid scant 
attention to the effects of assortative mating for offspring well-being. If assortative mating 
enhances inclusive fitness, it might also enhance offspring well-being. Drawing on data from 
a farming–foraging society in the Bolivian Amazon (Tsimane') that practices preferential 
cross-cousin marriage, we (a) identify six parental traits (age, knowledge, wealth, schooling, 
height, and smiles) for which Tsimane' might practice assortative mating and (b) test the 
hypothesis that assortative mating enhances offspring well-being. Proxies for offspring well-
being include height and school attainment. Tsimane' resemble people of industrial nations 
in practicing mostly positive assortative mating. Pairwise, mother–father and Pearson 
correlations of age, schooling, and earnings among Tsimane' resemble correlations of 
industrial nations. Correlation coefficients for the six parental traits were far higher than 
correlations that might happened just by chance. We found weak support for the hypothesis 
that assortative mating improves offspring well-being. 
Notes: Examines assortative mating in a farming-foraging society with a focus on child well-
being outcomes. Relates to evolutionary psychology and well-being. 
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129. Gordon, G.   & Esbjörn-Hargens, S. (2007). Are we having fun yet? An 
exploration of the transformative power of play. Journal of Humanistic 
Psychology, 47(2), 198-222. Retrieved from 
http://jhp.sagepub.com/content/47/2/198.abstract. 
doi:10.1177/0022167806297034 
Abstract: In an effort to understand the transformative potential of adult play, this article 
explores a developmental model that outlines the unfolding complexity of play in light of the 
evolution of consciousness. It correlates specific play forms with developmental stages and 
shows how forms of play can both instigate and support transitions between stages. It 
further outlines how characteristics intrinsic to play support the evolution of consciousness. 
Notes: Argues for the fundamental role of play in the evolution of consciousness. Relates to 
personhood and well-being.  
130. Gorelik, G.  ; Shackelford, T. K.   & Salmon, C. A.   (2010). New horizons in 
the evolutionary science of the human family. Review of General 
Psychology, 14(4), 330-339. Article. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://WOS:000285403600005. doi:10.1037/a0021438 
Abstract: Familial relationships cannot be properly understood outside of an evolutionary 
framework. Pseudoscientific and traditional modes of thought have steered us away from an 
accurate account of ourselves and our kin. Recent theoretical and empirical advances in the 
evolutionary sciences, such as the theories of inclusive fitness, parental investment, and 
parent-offspring conflict, have aided our understanding of familial conflict and cooperation. 
We suggest that a gene's eye perspective of human families can likewise illuminate much of 
human psychology and behavior by contrasting individual interests with genetic interests. 
Furthermore, theoretical and empirical work on genetic imprinting and extended phenotypic 
action-at-a-distance have unveiled the extent to which co-evolutionary arms races and 
manipulation lie at the heart of familial interactions and psychological disorders. We posit 
that human cultural trends and morals can ultimately be grounded on an evolutionary 
foundation: not only do human laws and institutions reflect group-level manifestations of 
gene-level cooperative adaptations, but also they may reflect gene-level manipulative 
adaptations. An awareness of evolutionary dynamics can advance human well-being and 
unveil the hidden mechanisms beneath all human and nonhuman relationships. 
Notes: Argues for an evolutionary and genetic understanding of human familial relationships 
as a means of advancing human well-being. Relates to evolutionary psychology, well-being 
and personhood. 
131. Gove, W. R.   (1994). Why we do what we do: A biopsychosocial theory 
of human motivation. Social Forces, 73(2), 363-363. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/229857396?accountid=27890 
Abstract: This article presents an outline of a theory of human motivaton that draws on 
biological, psychological, and social processes. It focuses on the following issues: (1) the 
intrinsic unpredictability of the world that people experience, (2) the innate and noninnate 
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differences in the attributes of individuals, (3) the premise that persons can reasonably be 
viewed as responsible for their actions, (4) the importance of a meaningful life and how this 
life is obtained, (5) reformulating learning theory by including the principle that behaviour 
activates a physiologic process that is intrinsically rewarding, a process that raises questions 
about basic suppositions of symbolic interactionism, cognitive psychology, and rational 
choice theory, (6) the causes and consequences of gender differences in instrumental and 
nurturant behaviour, (7) and examination of why the positive states of psychological well-
being are often associates with a high level of stress and a lack of personal control, (8) the 
process of adult psychological maturation, which indicates that as persons age they become 
more contented with their lives and more concerned with the well-being of others, and (9) 
the limitations of the concept of "agency" in structuration theory, as it is not attentive to the 
differences among individuals in their capabilities, personalities, and unique life experiences. 
Notes: Argues that sociologists need to pay attention not only to social forces but also to 
biological and psychosocial processes, because they all play a part in motivating and shaping 
behaviour. Relates to evolutionary psychology, well-being and personhood. 
132. Graham, R. G.   & Martin, G. I.   (2012). Health behavior: A darwinian 
reconceptualization. American Journal of Preventive Medicine, 43(4), 
451-455. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0749379712004503. 
doi:10.1016/j.amepre.2012.06.016 
No abstract. 
Notes: The authors investigate why humans act irrationally and persist in unhealthy 
behaviours even when the evidence is clear of the dangers to health of indulging in the 
behaviours. They argue that much of the modern health agenda is at odds with "behaviours 
that often lack meaning and value in an ancestral sense." For example, smoking is 
pleasurable for those who partake, and is often undertaken in a social context, which 
according to a Darwinian perspective "contributes to survival through social desirability and 
is therefore widespread." The reason why many smoking -cessation campaigns are 
successful can also be understood from a Darwiniam perspective- as smoking is banned in 
public places, the social benefits are undermined. An interesting perspective on evolutionary 
psychology and well-being, arguing that psychological models of human health behaviour 
need to be "infused with Darwinianism" for greater success in programs aimed at creating 
more healthy behaviours. Relates to evolutionary psychology, personhood and well-being. 
133. Greene, J.   & Haidt, J.   (2002). How (and where) does moral judgment 
work? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6(12), 517-523. 
Abstract: Moral psychology has long focused on reasoning, but recent evidence suggests 
that moral judgment is more a matter of emotion and affective intuition than deliberate 
reasoning. Here we discuss recent findings in psychology and cognitive neuroscience, 
including several studies that specifically investigate moral judgment. These findings indicate 
the importance of affect, although they allow that reasoning can play a restricted but 
significant role in moral judgment. They also point towards a preliminary account of the 
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functional neuroanatomy of moral judgment, according to which many brain areas make 
important contributions to moral judgment although none is devoted specifically to it. 
Notes: The author concludes that as all the brain regions discussed in the article have also 
been implicated in non-moral processes it is becoming increasingly clear that there is no 
specifically moral part of the brain. Relates to evolutionary psychology/ neuropsychology 
and the development of the moral dimension of personhood. 
134. Gregor, B.   (2005). Selfhood and the three r's: Reference, repetition, and 
refiguration. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 58(2), 63-
94. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000233879700001. 
doi:10.1007/s11153-005-1594-1 
No abstract. 
Beginning of Introduction: "This paper examines the problem of the self in time, and the role 
that writing plays therein. Because the self is a temporal phenomenon, questions arise 
regarding its continuity in time: Does personal identity endure over time? What sort of 
integrity might the self have if it is always changing? This raises the further problem of 
reference, particularly if one rejects the notion of a substantial self: what resources do we 
have to refer to the self? Søren Kierkegaard and Paul Ricoeur both situate this discussion 
within the boundaries of writing. While recognizing the limitations of thought, reference, 
and writing, both authors push these boundaries in the hope that new possibilities of 
meaning might emerge through creative modes of discourse …" 
Notes: A philosophical discussion of the stability of selfhood and the self. Relates to 
selfhood/ personhood. 
135. Grinde, B.   (1996). Darwinian happiness: Biological advice on the quality 
of life. Journal of Social and Evolutionary Systems, 19(3), 249-260. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1061736196900351. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1061-7361(96)90035-1 
Abstract: There is an increasing interest in understanding human behavior from a biological 
or evolutionary point of view. I believe this perspective on human nature may help us 
improve the life of the individual, and design a better society. The present article suggests a 
biologically-based understanding of what constitutes the quality of life, which I refer to as 
Darwinian happiness. The key concepts are: one, to avoid stress by adjusting the conditions 
of life to our inborn tendencies; and two, to utilize the reward mechanisms offered by the 
brain. The concepts and their implications are discussed. 
Notes: The author presents ideas and examples of why he thinks society is not organised in a 
way that will allow humans to thrive and experience greater well-being. He discusses how 
"adapting society to human nature may be an equally important principle for improving the 
conditions of the human species" and "an understanding of the behavioral biology of 
humans should help us improve the way we organize our societies."  The discussion targets 
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all the interfaces considered in this bibliogrpahy. Relates to evolutionary psychology, 
personhood and well-being. 
136. Grinde, B.   (1998). The biology of religion: A Darwinian gospel. Journal of 
Social and Evolutionary Systems, 21(1), 19-28. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1061736199800046. 
doi:10.1016/s1061-7361(99)80004-6 
Abstract: The vigor of religious feelings, and the fact that most, if not all, cultures include a 
system of spiritual belief, suggest that humans have an innate predisposition towards 
religiousness. There are several possible adaptive advantages that may help explain such a 
disposition; religions promote cooperative relations, they induce people to obey sensible 
rules, and they soothe the minds of their followers. These advantages could very well have 
directed evolution towards the design of a spiritually inclined brain. Accepting that God is 
inside our heads, the important question is not if he exists, but rather: What can he do for 
us? As a rule of thumb humans are advised to conform to their inborn tendencies, implying 
that we ought to believe in spirits. Religiousness offers both direct rewards, for example the 
joy associated with communicating with a god, as well as indirect benefits such as those 
suggested above. 
Notes: The author looks at how religiousness seems to be an inborn tendency, that religions 
have survived despite often strong adverse forces, and humans have and still do put a lot of 
energy into religious behaviour, either emotional, or physical (great works of art, structures 
that have survived from previous cultures). As well as contributing to the well-being of 
individuals, religious communities can help our social needs, an element of life that he claims 
is not as well addressed in today's society as in tribal settings. He argues that finding a God 
that meets the needs of the individual and society, can be beneficial to well-being. Relates to 
evolutionary psychology, personhood and well-being. 
137. Grinde, B.   (2000). A biological perspective on musical appreciation. 
Nordisk Tidsskrift for Musikkterapi, 9(2), 18-27. 
Abstract: Music has a powerful effect on the human psyche, an effect that can be used for 
therapeutic purposes. As the capacity to respond to and enjoy music appears to be innate, it 
is relevant to look for an evolutionary explanation. I suggest that a preoccupation with 
certain types of sounds has been adaptive, and that the main evolutionary advantage is 
related to play and exploratory behaviour associated with our dependence on language. The 
human brain employs agreeable and punitive sensations in order to influence behaviour. I 
propose that the brain induces us to concentrate on sounds, by offering pleasant sensations, 
in order to improve our ability to hear and to vocalise, and that one reason why we 
appreciate music is because it has the particular qualities required for maximum exploitation 
of these sensations. 
Notes: Provides an evolutionary explanation of the appeal of music, and its pleasurable 
qualities. Relates to evolutionary psychology and well-being. 
The Well-Evolved Life: Well-being, Evolution and Personhood 
69 
138. Grinde, B.   (2002). Happiness in the perspective of evolutionary 
psychology. Journal of Happiness Studies, 3(4), 331-354. Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A%3A1021894227295. 
doi:10.1023/a:1021894227295 
Abstract: The human capacity for positive and negative feelings is shaped by the forces of 
evolution, thus the evolutionary perspective should be relevant to the study of happiness. 
This paper attempts to identify the more pertinent innate qualities of the human brain, and 
discusses how the evolutionary perspective can be used to relate these qualities to the study 
of happiness. Two aspects of our evolutionary legacy appear to be particularly relevant: One, 
the consequences of discords between the present way of living and the environment of 
evolutionary adaptation; and two, the presence of feelings designed to influence behaviour. 
The purpose of the present paper is to both expand on these two aspects and thereby arrive 
at an evolutionary based description of happiness; and to discuss the relationship between 
this biological account and some current approached to the study of happiness. 
Notes: The article discusses the relevance of the evolutionary perspective to the study of 
happiness. Relates to evolutionary psychology and well-being. 
139. Grinde, B.   (2004). Darwinian Happiness: can the evolutionary 
perspective on well-being help us to improve society? World Futures: 
The Journal of Global Education, 60, 317-329. 
Abstract: The concept of Darwinian Happiness was coined to help people take advantage of 
knowledge on how evolution has shaped the brain; as processes within this organ are the 
main contributors to well-being. Fortuitously, the concept has implications that may prove 
beneficial for society: Compassionate behavior offers more in terms of Darwinian Happiness 
than malicious behavior; and the probability of obtaining sustainable development may be 
improved by pointing out that consumption beyond sustenance is not important for well-
being. It is difficult to motivate people to act against their own best interests. Darwinian 
Happiness offers a concept that, to some extent, combines the interests of the individual 
with the interests of society. 
Notes: "One of the main challenges of industrialized societies is to persuade people to 
behave in a manner that is for the common good. Cooperative behavior was presumably 
easier to achieve in the Stone Age, at least within the tribe, due to the strong bonds 
between individual members. Studies on contemporary tribal societies support this 
contention (Keesing, 1981). In the present world, most social groups lack this intimacy, 
whether one looks at local units such as a work place or large groups such as nations. To 
make matters even more difficult, we need people to behave to the benefit of not only their 
local community, but to the benefit of the entire world in an effort to help create a 
sustainable Earth for future generations. The task requires considerable effort; thus, any 
factor that can contribute in a positive direction should be exploited."   
The author has previously put forward a particular appreciation of quality of life based on a 
biological perspective, and he has referred to this as Darwinian Happiness (Grinde, 1996, 
2002a, 2002b). In this article the author advances the idea that "knowledge about Darwinian 
Happiness may help people make choices that improve their quality of life while at the same 
time acting to the benefit of society". Relates to evolutionary psychology and well-being. 
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140. Grinde, B.   (2005). An approach to the prevention of anxiety-related 
disorders based on evolutionary medicine. Preventive Medicine, 40, 904-
909. 
Abstract: Anxiety-related disorders are among the more common ailments of modern 
societies. Presumably, their prevalence is partly due to environmental factors, which 
suggests that anxiety may be one of the health problems that are aggravated by discords 
(adverse mismatches) between the present way of life and what our genes are adapted to. 
Consequently, it may be possible to find preventive measures by using the perspective of 
evolutionary medicine. I shall argue that the prevalence of anxiety-related problems reflects 
that the nerve circuitry and endocrine activity associated with the fear function have 
developed beyond normal. Moreover, that this expansion is due to excessive or abnormal 
triggering, particularly at an early age. Possible discords that may be responsible, such as 
present child care practices, will be discussed. 
Notes: Argues that anxiety disorders are, in part, the result of a mismatch between evolved 
functions of the nervous and endocrine systems and current practices. Relates to 
evolutionary psychology, well-being and personhood. 
141. Grinde, B.   (2009). An evolutionary perspective on the importance of 
community relations for quality of life. The Scientific World Journal, 9, 
588-605. 
Abstract: The evolutionary perspective is relevant for the study of quality of life in that the 
brain, including its capacity for positive and negative states of mind, has been shaped by the 
forces of evolution. The present text uses this perspective to discuss three questions related 
to the observation that human interactions are a particularly important factor for well-being: 
(1) What is known about the inherent nature of our social propensities? (2) Is the present 
situation responsible for a suboptimal quality of life? (3) Are there alternatives to the 
organisation of mainstream Western society? Based on this discussion, the question is raised 
as to whether it is possible to suggest improvements. Briefly, it seems possible to create 
conditions that enhance social relations and to the extent that happiness is considered an 
important objective, this is a relevant endeavour. 
Notes: An analysis of the centrality of social relations to quality of life and a discussion of the 
implications for this in today’s society. Relates to evolution, personhood and well-being. 
142. Grinde, B.   (2010). An evolutionary perspective on happiness as 
understood in the tradition of Tibetan Buddhism. The Open Behavioral 
Science Journal, 4, 31-36. 
Abstract: Buddhism is one of the oldest spiritual traditions that have retained considerable 
influence. The Tibetan version offers distinct advice as to the pursuit of happiness. The 
present text evaluates this advice in the context of a biological approach to understanding 
what happiness is. Briefly, the notion that it is possible to develop the brain's capacity for 
positive feelings and that meditative techniques are a useful tool, can be substantiated. 
Consequently, with sufficient training, happiness can, at least in theory, be achieved 
regardless of external circumstances. To this purpose, it is essential to avoid excessive 
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activity in nerve curcuits causing negative feelings,either by avoiding situations that activate 
these feelings, or by using cognitive techniques that impede the underlying neurology. 
Finally, the emphasis on compassion as a route to happiness appears to be not just 
"politically correct", but to reflect particular qualities of the human brain. 
Notes: Argues that Tibetan Buddhist meditative practices can be supported by an 
evolutionary analysis of the functions and operations of positive affects. Relates to 
evolution, personhood and well-being. 
143. Grinde, B.   (2012). An evolutionary perspective on happiness and mental 
health. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 33(1-2), 49-67. Article. Retrieved 
from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000309439100003 
Abstract: The purpose of this article is to present a model of well-being based on current 
research in neurobiology and psychology, integrated in an evolutionary perspective of the 
human mind. Briefly, the primary purpose of nervous systems is to direct an animal toward 
behavior should be conducive to survival and procreation, and as a rule of thumb this implies 
either approach or avoidance. While behavior originally was based on reflexes, in humans 
the brain contains a system of negative and positive affect. Although an array of functions 
has evolved that employ emotions in order to handle various pursuits, recent studies suggest 
that they converge on shared neural circuits involved in mood, that is, they converge on 
circuits designed to generate reward and punishment. Happiness can be construed as the 
net output of these brain modules. Neural circuits tend to gain in strength and influence 
upon frequent activation, which suggests a strategy for improving happiness and mental 
health: to avoid excessive stimulation of negative modules, to use cognitive interference to 
enhance the "turn off" function of these modules, and to exercise modules involved in 
positive feelings. 
Notes: An evolutionary and neurobiological investigation of well-being and ways to enhance 
positive affects. Relates to evolutionary and biological psychology and well-being. 
144. Gruber, J.  ; Mauss, I. B.   & Tamir, M.   (2011). A dark side of happiness? 
How, when, and why happiness is not always good. Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 6(3), 222-233. Retrieved from 
http://pps.sagepub.com/content/6/3/222.abstract. 
doi:10.1177/1745691611406927 
Abstract: Happiness is generally considered a source of good outcomes. Research has 
highlighted the ways in which happiness facilitates the pursuit of important goals, 
contributes to vital social bonds, broadens people’s scope of attention, and increases well-
being and psychological health. However, is happiness always a good thing? This review 
suggests that the pursuit and experience of happiness might sometimes lead to negative 
outcomes. We focus on four questions regarding this purported “dark side” of happiness. 
First, is there a wrong degree of happiness? Second, is there a wrong time for happiness? 
Third, are there wrong ways to pursue happiness? Fourth, are there wrong types of 
happiness? Cumulatively, these lines of research suggest that although happiness is often 
highly beneficial, it may not be beneficial at every level, in every context, for every reason, 
and in every variety. 
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Notes: An overview of relevant literature that cautions against the general goal of 
happiness. Relates to evolutionary psychology, personhood and well-being. 
145. Guhn, M.   & Goelman, H.   (2011). Bioecological theory, early child 
development and the validation of the population-level early 
development instrument. Social Indicators Research, 103(2), 193-217. 
Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/880351076?accountid=27890 
Abstract: The Early Development Instrument (EDI; Janus and Offord in Canadian Journal of 
Behavioural Science 39:1–22, 2007) project is a Canadian population-level, longitudinal 
research project, in which teacher ratings of Kindergarten children’s early development and 
well-being are linked to health and academic achievement variables at the individual level, 
and to demographic, cultural, and socioeconomic variables at the community level. In this 
article, we draw from Bronfenbrenner’s bioecological theory of human development to 
create a coherent theoretical framework for guiding validation research within a population 
level approach to child development research in general and for the EDI project in particular. 
The discussion draws from a range of social and health sciences as well as validity theory. 
The paper seeks to align complex conceptual, theoretical, methodological, and psychometric 
considerations, to provide specific design, methodology, and validation recommendations 
for a population-level approach to studying children’s development and well-being, and to 
discuss the strengths and challenges of this approach. 
Notes: Discusses measurement and validation of population level well-being indicators. 
Relates to personhood development and well-being. 
146. Guignon, C.   (2012). Becoming a person: Hermeneutic phenomenology's 
contribution. New Ideas in Psychology, 30(1), 97-106. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0732118X09000750. 
doi:10.1016/j.newideapsych.2009.11.005 
Abstract: Hermeneutic phenomenology sets out to describe human beings as they show up 
in “average everydayness,” prior to high-level theorizing and reflection. From this 
standpoint, human existence is found to be meaning- and value-laden, and so in need of 
interpretation in order to be properly understood. The description of everydayness leads to 
a critique of the “substance ontology” presupposed by many natural sciences, and instead 
characterizes a human being as an “event” or “life story” unfolding between birth and death. 
Working within this approach to understanding humans as events, the philosopher Martin 
Heidegger (1889–1976) gives an account of what he calls an “authentic” (literally, “proper” 
or “owned”) individual. This account gives us a distinctive way of understanding what it is to 
be a “person” in the fullest sense of this word. A person, on this account, is an individual 
who can assess her primary desires in the light of “higher” or “second-order” motivations 
concerning what sort of person she wants to be. As a participant in a social context, she is 
indebted to the historical tradition of a community for her possibilities of self-interpretation 
and self-evaluation. In a social context, she can be a “respondent,” answerable for what she 
does. And she is equipped to be an effective moral agent in facing situations demanding 
decisions. An authentic individual or “person” has a kind of freedom that makes meaningful 
choice possible. 
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Notes: A conceptual consideration of personhood based on a Heideggerian framework. 
Relates to personhood.  
147. Gusnard, D. A.  (2005). Being a self: Considerations from functional 
imaging. Consciousness and Cognition, 14(4), 679-697. Review. Retrieved 
from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000234124000003. 
doi:10.1016/j.concog.2005.04.004 
Abstract: Having a self is associated with important advantages for an organism. These 
advantages have been suggested to include mechanisms supporting elaborate capacities for 
planning, decision-making, and behavioral control. Acknowledging such functionality offers 
possibilities for obtaining traction on investigation of neural correlates of selfhood. A 
method that has potential for investigating some of the brain-based properties of self arising 
in behavioral contexts varying in requirements for such behavioral guidance and control is 
functional brain imaging. Data obtained with this method are beginning to converge on a set 
of brain areas that appear to play a significant role in permitting conscious access to 
representational content having reference to self as an embodied and independent 
experiencer and agent. These areas have been identified in a variety of imaging contexts 
ranging from passive state conditions in which they appear to manifest ongoing activity 
associated with spontaneous and typically 'self-related' cognition, to tasks targeting explicitly 
experienced properties of self, to demanding task conditions where activity within them is 
attenuated in apparent redirection of cognitive resources in the service of task guidance and 
control. In this paper, these data will be reviewed and a hypothesis presented regarding a 
significant role for these areas in enabling degrees of self-awareness and participating in the 
management of such behavioral control.  
Notes: An investigation of research on the neural bases of the self and self-related cognition. 
Relates to biological psychology and selfhood/ personhood. 
148. Gutiérrez, F.  ; Gárriz, M.; Peri, J. M.  ; Ferraz, L.; Sol, D.; Navarro, J. B.  ; 
et al. (2012 (in press)). Fitness costs and benefits of personality disorder 
traits. Evolution and Human Behavior. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090513812000906. 
doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2012.09.001 
Abstract: Extreme personality traits in humans often have detrimental life consequences, so 
they have long been supposed to be diseases. However, many other species display 
personality variants that are maintained due to their fitness advantages; in this case, they 
are construed as strategies. To examine the fitness costs and benefits of pathological 
personality traits in humans, we measured features of the A (socially odd, distrustful), B 
(incentive-seeking, selfish) and C (fearful, inhibited) clusters with the Personality Diagnostic 
Questionnaire-4 + (PDQ-4 +) in a sample of 738 outpatients. Fitness relevant parameters like 
mating success, reproductive output, self preservation, and access to status were assessed 
with the Life Outcome Questionnaire. No fitness advantages were found for high-A subjects. 
In contrast, high-B subjects tripled low-B subjects with regard to mating success and had 
39% more offspring. Further, high-C subjects outperformed low-C subjects in attaining status 
and avoiding risks. These findings help explain the commonness of some extreme personality 
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traits in humans, and suggest that they should be seen as evolutionary strategies rather than 
as diseases. 
Notes: Suggests that some extreme personality traits in humans should be seen as 
evolutionary strategies (as types of selves) rather than as diseases. Relates to evolutionary 
psychology, personhood and well-being. 
149. Haller, M. . & Hadler, M.   (2006). How social relations and structures can 
produce happiness and unhappiness: An international comparative 
analysis. Social Indicators Research, 75(2), 169-216. Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11205-004-6297-y. doi:10.1007/s11205-004-
6297-y 
Abstract: In this paper, subjective well being, as measured by survey questions on happiness 
and life satisfaction, is investigated from a sociological-comparative point of view. The 
central thesis is that happiness and satisfaction must be understood as the outcome of an 
interaction process between individual characteristics and aspirations on the one side, and 
social relations and macrosocial structures on the other side. A distinction is made between 
life satisfaction and happiness; the former is more seen as the outcome of an evaluation 
process including material and social aspirations and achievements, the latter as an outcome 
of positive experiences, particularly close personal relationships. The focus of this paper is on 
micro- and macrosocial conditions favouring or inhibiting the emergence of happiness and 
satisfaction. It is hypothesized that dense and good basic social relations, occupational 
involvement and success, sociocultural (religious and altruistic) orientations and 
participation are conducive to happiness and life satisfaction; the same should be true at the 
macrolevel for economic prosperity, relatively equal social structures, a well-established 
welfare state and political democracy. The latter conditions, however, should be more 
important for life satisfaction than for happiness. A comparative, multilevel regression 
analysis of happiness in 41 nations around the world is carried out (using the World Value 
Survey 1995–1997). Both our general assumption and most of the specific hypotheses could 
be confirmed. It turned very clearly that “happiness” and “life satisfaction” are two different 
concepts. It could be shown that microsocial embedding and sociocultural integration of a 
person are highly relevant for happiness. However, contrary to earlier studies, we find that 
macrosocial factors like the economic wealth of nation, the distribution of income, the 
extent of the welfare state and political freedom are also relevant, particularly for 
satisfaction. What counts most is the ability to cope with life, including subjective health and 
financial satisfaction, close social relations, and the economic perspectives for improvement 
in the future, both at the level of the individual and at that of the society. These abilities are 
certainly improved by favourable macrosocial conditions and institutions, such as a more 
equal income distribution, political democracy and a welfare state. 
Notes: An investigation of the differences between individual attributions of happiness and 
life satisfaction, in relation to social relations and macrosocial factors. Relates to well-being. 
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150. Hara Estroff, M.   (1999). The power of play. Psychology Today, 32(4), 36-
40+. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/214496001?accountid=27890 
No abstract. 
Notes: On frontispiece: "Most of us think of adult play as respite or indulgence, but having 
fun is no trivial pursuit. In fact it’s crucial to our mental creativity, health, and happiness." 
Discusses the role of play in creativity and well-being. Relates to well-being. 
151. Hardcastle, V. G.   (2000). The development of the self. Cognitive 
Systems Research, 1(2), 77-86. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S138904179900008X. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1389-0417(99)00008-X 
No Abstract. 
Notes: A discussion of children's narratives as viewed through their journal entries. Relates 
to personhood. 
152. Harré, R.   (1983). Personal being: A theory for individual psychology. 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
No abstract. 
Notes: An early and comprehensive theoretical account of the social origins of personal 
being and personhood. Harré provides an account that emphasises the ‘continuities’ of 
personhood: consciousness; biography; and, agency. Relates to personhood. 
153. Harré, R.   (1998). The singular self: An introduction to the psychology of 
personhood. London: Sage. 
No abstract. 
Notes: A further development of Harre’s ideas on personhood, with consideration of three 
selves: Self 1; Self 2; and Self 3. Self 1 is the unique point of view that defines each person as 
a distinct, continuous singularity. Self 2 – in its restricted sense – is that set of attributes that 
a person has which is a unique set (no other person has just that set). The unrestricted sense 
of Self 2 also includes those attributes that a person has had or will have over a lifetime. (The 
difference between the restricted and unrestricted versions of Self 2 is, Harre claims, 
important in conceptualising Alzheimer’s and related experiences). Self 3 is a complex 
production or persona – not just the persona the person believes they are presenting (of 
their Self 1 and Self 2) but also those personae that are interpreted by the diverse groups 
that encounter the person. Relates to personhood. 
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154. Harris, P. B.   & Keady, J.   (2009). Selfhood in younger onset dementia: 
Transitions and testimonies. Aging & Mental Health, 13(3), 437-444. 
Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000266489900015. 
doi:10.1080/13607860802534609 
Abstract: Younger people with dementia and their carers are an overlooked population for 
research, policy and practice attention. In this study, data were collected from both the 
United States and the UK in order to explore the meaning and construction of selfhood and 
identity. The US data collection included in-depth interviews with 23 people diagnosed with 
younger-onset dementia, while the UK data collection comprised 15 face-to-face interviews 
with younger carers of younger people with dementia; all carers were/had been caring for a 
younger person with dementia diagnosed through the DSM-IV-R criteria. A grounded theory 
analysis of the data resulted in the emergence of five themes to explain the interview data, 
these were: (1) identity as a worker; (2) identity of abandoned individual; (3) sexual identity; 
(4) family identity; and (5) identity as an individual engaged in living. Additional research is 
necessary to further develop the attributes and application of these identity profiles. 
Notes: Considers the multiple identities of young people with dementia, and their carers. 
Important consideration in relation to the development of personhood. Relates to 
personhood and well-being. 
155. Heinamaa, S.   (2012). The self and the others: Common topics for 
Husserl and Wittgenstein. Southern Journal of Philosophy, 50(2), 234-
249. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000304805400007. 
doi:10.1111/j.2041-6962.2012.00099.x 
Abstract: Several commentators have argued that Husserl's phenomenological project is 
compromised or even destroyed by Wittgenstein's critical inquiries into our use of 
psychological concepts. In contrast to oppositional interpretations, this paper explicates 
certain crucial connections between Husserl's phenomenology and Wittgenstein's late 
thinking shared views that concern the embodied nature of selfhood and our relations to 
other selves. In line with certain recent contributions, I argue that there are important 
similarities between Husserl's analysis of these phenomena and Wittgenstein's remarks on 
our use of language and that these connections, when noticed and explicated, can help us 
avoid simplified, barren contrasts and get clear about our actual philosophical alternatives. 
Notes: Argues that phenomenological and Wittgensteinian analyses of selfhood converge in 
relation to its embodied aspect. Relates to personhood. 
156. Heins, V. . (2010). Of persons and peoples: Internationalizing the critical 
theory of recognition. Contemporary Political Theory, 9(2), 149-170. 
Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/237002644?accountid=27890 
Abstract: Although Axel Honneth's critical theory of recognition continues to resonate 
among political theorists, its relationship to the debate on political and moral 
cosmopolitanism remains unclear. The paper aims to fill this gap by defining a few 
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guideposts to a 'recognition-theoretical' conception of the international. My argument is 
that Honneth's theory oscillates between a liberal-cosmopolitan model of the global spread 
of human rights and an alternative model that is closer to the anti-cosmopolitanism of the 
late Rawls. Both models reflect certain assumptions about the moral standing of political 
communities or 'peoples', even if those assumptions remain implicit and unexamined. I 
begin by discussing the premise that recognition theory is all about 'natural' persons instead 
of 'artificial' persons such as states or peoples. I proceed by comparing Rawls's notion of a 
distinct logic of the international to Honneth's more ambiguous gestures toward an 
international political theory. Finally, I offer some thoughts on the place of peoples and 
sovereign statehood in the theory of recognition.   
Notes: Are 'peoples' also persons and should they be recognised as such? An interesting 
debate on personhood and the extent to which it can be expanded to entities more 
extensive than individual human beings. Relates to personhood. 
157. Helliwell, J. F.   &. Putnam, R.D. (2004 ). The social context of well-being. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. B. Biological 
Sciences., 359(1449, September 29), 1435–1446. 
Abstract: Large samples of data from the World Values Survey, the US Benchmark Survey 
and a comparable Canadian survey are used to estimate equations designed to explore the 
social context of subjective evaluations of well-being, of happiness, and of health. Social 
capital, as measured by the strength of family, neighbourhood, religious and community ties, 
is found to support both physical health and subjective well-being. Our new evidence 
confirms that social capital is strongly linked to subjective well-being through many 
independent channels and in several different forms. Marriage and family, ties to friends and 
neighbours, workplace ties, civic engagement (both individually and collectively), 
trustworthiness and trust: all appear independently and robustly related to happiness and 
life satisfaction, both directly and through their impact on health. 
Notes: Explores correlations between how the networks of interaction between people – 
‘social capital’ – affects subjective well-being. Relates to well-being. 
158. Henrich, J.  , & McElreath, R.   (2003). The evolution of cultural evolution. 
Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, and Reviews, 12(3), 123-135. 
Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/evan.10110. 
doi:10.1002/evan.10110 
Abstract: Humans are unique in their range of environments and in the nature and diversity 
of their behavioral adaptations. While a variety of local genetic adaptations exist within our 
species, it seems certain that the same basic genetic endowment produces arctic foraging, 
tropical horticulture, and desert pastoralism, a constellation that represents a greater range 
of subsistence behavior than the rest of the Primate Order combined. The behavioral 
adaptations that explain the immense success of our species are cultural in the sense that 
they are transmitted among individuals by social learning and have accumulated over 
generations. Understanding how and when such culturally evolved adaptations arise 
requires understanding of both the evolution of the psychological mechanisms that underlie 
human social learning and the evolutionary (population) dynamics of cultural systems. 
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Notes: Discusses the adaptive abilities of humans to exist in many conditions through a 
process of cultural adaptation and evolution. It is claimed that cultural evolution depends, in 
part, upon the evolution of psychological mechanisms. Relates to evolutionary psychology. 
159. Herman, L. M.   (2012). Body and self in dolphins. Consciousness and 
Cognition, 21(1), 526-545. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1053810011002650. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2011.10.005 
Abstract: In keeping with recent views of consciousness of self as represented in the body in 
action, empirical studies are reviewed that demonstrate a bottlenose dolphin’s (Tursiops 
truncatus) conscious awareness of its own body and body parts, implying a representational 
“body image” system. Additional work reviewed demonstrates an advanced capability of 
dolphins for motor imitation of self-produced behaviors and of behaviors of others, including 
imitation of human actions, supporting hypotheses that dolphins have a sense of agency and 
ownership of their actions and may implicitly attribute those levels of self-awareness to 
others. Possibly, a mirror-neuron system, or its functional equivalent to that described in 
monkeys and humans, may mediate both self-awareness and awareness of others. 
Notes: A study that extends personhood attributes to an investigation of dolphins which 
raises the question of the evolutionary and neurological basis of self-awareness in the animal 
kingdom. Relates to selfhood/ personhood and evolutionary psychology. 
160. Herrmann-Pillath, C.   (2009). Elements of a neo-Veblenian theory of the 
individual. Journal of Economic Issues, 43(1), 189-214. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/208778744?accountid=27890 
http://bb5xk7cw9v.search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-
8&rfr_id=info:sid/ProQ%3Asocscijournals&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:
mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Journal+of+Economic+Issues&rft
.atitle=Elements+of+a+Neo-
Veblenian+Theory+of+the+Individual&rft.au=Herrmann-
Pillath%2C+Carsten&rft.aulast=Herrmann-
Pillath&rft.aufirst=Carsten&rft.date=2009-03-
01&rft.volume=43&rft.issue=1&rft.spage=189&rft.isbn=&rft.btitle=&rft.t
itle=Journal+of+Economic+Issues&rft.issn=00213624 
Abstract: Neuroeconomics and behavioral economics (NEBE) is one of the most dynamic 
fields in contemporary economics. However, from the viewpoint of economic methodology 
there are still substantial reasons why NEBE is irrelevant for economic theory. This paper 
argues that they will only become an essential part of economics if they are embedded into 
a fully-fledged institutional and evolutionary paradigm. I develop a Neo-Veblenian theory of 
the individual that starts out from the observation that modern brain sciences do not 
support the notion of the brain to be an integrated and consistent rational decision 
apparatus. An evolutionary explanation is offered for this, which reinstates Veblen's 
distinction between adaptation as engineering optima and social selection. Individual 
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identity does only emerge through communication and interaction among brains, in 
particular via language. The concept of the "extended brain" is proposed, which is applied to 
define human individuality as a social phenomenon. Thus, the systematic unity of 
neuroeconomics and institutional economics is established.  
Notes: A conceptual investigation of how an evolutionary and institutional understanding of 
neuroeconomics and behavioural economics might help to understand individuality in social 
terms and, so, unite neuroeconomics with institutional economics. Relates to evolutionary 
psychology and personhood. 
161. Ho, D. Y. F.  ; Fu, W.   & Ng, S. M.   (2004). Guilt, shame and 
embarrassment: Revelations of face and self. Culture & Psychology, 
10(1), 64-84. Article. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://WOS:000221723200004. doi:10.1177/1354067x04044166 
Abstract: The authors derive evidence on guilt, shame and embarrassment from (a) Chinese 
and Japanese cultural data on expressions of emotion, (b) empirical studies of losing face, 
and (c) multilingual-multicultural clinical experiences. A scheme that has transcultural 
applicability is proposed for differentiating guilt, shame and embarrassment. The evidence 
supports the conclusion that these three emotions are marked by qualitatively different 
attributes. Probes into emotional life serve to reveal aspects of face and self. Face defined 
both as self presented to others, and as self perceived by others, mirrors the duality of self. 
Two methodological issues are discussed: what is meant by 'private experience'; and the 
need for an extended conception of selfhood. 
Notes: An investigation of the concept of self in relation to the social emotions of shame, 
guilt and embarrassment in different cultural and multicultural settings. Raises issues about 
what is meant by ‘private experience’ and suggests the need to understand selfhood beyond 
the individual level. Relates to selfhood/ personhood. 
162. Horelli, L.   (2006). Environmental human-friendliness as a contextual 
determinant for quality of life. Revue Européenne de Psychologie 
Appliquée/European Review of Applied Psychology, 56(1), 15-22. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1162908805000800. 
doi:10.1016/j.erap.2005.02.012 
Abstract: The aim of the article is to define some criteria of human-friendly environments 
and to explain why the concept of environmental human-friendliness (EHF) is important in 
the analysis and improvement of the quality of people's lives. EHF is a complex multi-
dimensional and multi-level concept that refers to environments or settings which provide 
support to individuals and different groups so that they can implement their goals or 
projects, with a potential impact on the subjective well-being. EHF can be described and 
assessed by an individual criterion (person–environment fit) and a group criterion (collective 
environment fit). A heuristic model of the conditions for EHF is presented that can be 
applied in the analysis of the context of well-being and in the envisioning phase of the 
improvement of conditions for the quality of life. 
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Notes: This article gives some examples of patterns and structures to show that 
environmental human-friendliness is a significant contextual determinant of quality of life.  
Useful in the context of well-being and also suggestive of the importance of the relationship 
between persons and environments. Relates to well-being and personhood. 
163. Hornung, B. R.  . (2006). Happiness and the pursuit of happiness: A 
sociocybernetic approach. Kybernetes, 35(3/4), 323-346,280-281. 
Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/213915239?accountid=27890 
Abstract: To provide a coherent theoretical framework for interdisciplinary research on 
happiness, integrating the psychological, physiological/biological, and social/cultural levels, 
permitting integration of disparate approaches within and across disciplines. Principles and 
findings of cybernetics are combined to shed light on difficulties encountered by research on 
happiness. Using a problem-oriented approach, the reference system is defined as a 
psychological information-processing and decision-making system. This is an actor system in 
the social world needing orientation to act. Bossel's systems theory of orientation is applied 
to emotionality as a subsystem of the psychological system. Happiness, in terms of 
orientation theory, can be conceived as a meta-orientor indicating wholeness, health, and 
the functioning of the overall-system. Emotionality and rationality are complementary 
decision-making systems. Conditions are identified for developing the capability for 
emotional orientation and happiness in individuals. These conditions are strongly dependent 
on the social/cultural environment. Among them are the need for diversity in real-life 
experience and for psychological acceptance of both oneself and the (sociocultural) 
environment. They can permit (relative) stability of happiness defined as an emotional state. 
Further research can produce methods to improve happiness both by coaching individuals 
and by developing social conditions more conducive to happiness, e.g. in education. 
Happiness is a subjective indicator for physical, psychological, and social well-being taken 
together, which is the definition of health of WHO. This sociocybernetic approach, 
combining systems concepts with orientation theory, can serve as an integrative theoretical 
framework for so far separate theoretical approaches. 
Notes: A ‘sociocybernetic’ theory that grounds happiness and well-being wthin a systems 
and orientation theory framework, highlighting the role of social and cultural environment in 
producing well-being. Relates to evolutionary psychology and well-being. 
164. Hughes, C.   & Dunn, J.   (1997). “Pretend you didn't know”: Preschoolers' 
talk about mental states in pretend play. Cognitive Development, 12(4), 
477-497. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0885201497900198. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0885-2014(97)90019-8 
Abstract: Fifty preschoolers (mean age = 47 months; SD = 5 months) were recruited from 
local inner-city nurseries to take part in a study of early friendships and the development of 
social understanding. Friendship pairs (10 boy-boy pairs; 10 girl-girl pairs and 5 boy-girl pairs) 
were filmed playing together for 20 minutes in a quiet room supplied with toys and dressing-
up materials. The videos were then transcribed and coded for mental-state talk and pretend 
play. The children were also given a battery of tests tapping theory-of-mind skills and verbal 
The Well-Evolved Life: Well-being, Evolution and Personhood 
81 
ability. The results indicated a strong association between children's engagement in pretend 
play, and the frequency and nature of mental-state talk. This association is discussed in 
relation to (1) effects of context, (2) individual differences in children's understanding of 
mind and verbal ability, and (3) the social nature of pretend play. 
Notes: An interesting study of the way in which, through play, ‘mental-state talk’ is 
rehearsed. Emphasises the relationship between social play and ‘theory of mind’ attribution 
and mentation. Relates to personhood development. 
165. Huppert, F. A.   & Baylis, N.   (2004 ). Well-being: towards an integration 
of psychology, neurobiology and social science. Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society of London B. Biological Sciences, 
359(1449; September 29), 1447–1451. . 
No abstract. 
Notes: Introduction to article: The study of well-being is a rapidly evolving field, and an 
exquisite example of a truly multidisciplinary endeavour. Two of the strongest strands have 
emerged from recent research on positive psychology and on social capital, but the field 
reaches well beyond these domains. We summarise some of the major themes that unite 
these different approaches and disciplines, highlighting both commonalities and 
controversies. The five themes on which we focus are (i) evolution and development; (ii) the 
nature of well-being, (iii) well-being and capabilities; (iv) the relationship between health 
and well-being; and (v) the implications of the findings of the research for intervention 
strategies and public policies. 
Relates to well-being and evolutionary psychology. 
166. Jackson, T.   (2002). Evolutionary psychology in ecological economics: 
Consilience, consumption and contentment. Ecological Economics, 41(2), 
289-303. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S092180090200040X. 
doi:10.1016/s0921-8009(02)00040-x 
Abstract: This paper makes the case that if ecological economics seeks ‘consilience’ with 
biology it must acquaint itself with evolutionary theories about social development and 
human behaviour. The author reviews some of the literature in this area. Particular attention 
is paid to the newly emerging discipline of evolutionary psychology, which sets out a neo-
Darwinian view of human nature in which individual and social behaviour is dominated by 
the evolutionary strategies of the ‘selfish gene’. The paper discusses the relevance of this 
perspective for two specific ‘problem areas’ in ecological economics. The first of these is the 
question of consumption and consumer behaviour. The second is the problem of ‘mismatch’ 
between the pursuit of economic growth and social well-being or contentment. These 
examples illustrate that evolutionary psychology may sometimes provide a natural ally for 
ecological economics, in particular pointing up certain failures of conventional economics. 
On the other hand, it also offers harsh lessons concerning the difficulty of changing evolved 
behaviour patterns. The paper suggests three possible avenues of response by ecological 
economists to the insights of evolutionary psychology. 
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Notes: This article looks at the relevance of evolutionary psychology and the selfish gene for 
"two specific 'problem areas' in ecological economics. The first of these is the question of 
consumption and consumer behaviour. The second is the problem of ‘mismatch’ between 
the pursuit of economic growth and social well-being or contentment." Suggests both that 
the way people live in today's society does not allow them necessarily to thrive and 
experience greater well-being and that this situation may be difficult to change. Seems to 
oversimplify evolutionary psychology as ‘selfish gene’ theory. 
Relates to evolutionary psychology and well-being. 
167. Jackson, T.   (2005). Live better by consuming less? Is there a "double 
dividend" in sustainable consumption? Journal of Industrial Ecology, 9(1-
2), 19-36. Article; Proceedings Paper. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://WOS:000231609200005. doi:10.1162/1088198054084734 
Abstract: Industrial ecology has mainly been concerned with improving the efficiency of 
production systems. But addressing consumption is also vital in reducing the impact of 
society on its environment. The concept of sustainable consumption is a response to this. 
But the debates about sustainable consumption can only really be understood in the context 
of much wider and deeper debates about consumption and about consumer behavior itself. 
This article explores some of these wider debates. In particular, it draws attention to a 
fundamental disagreement that runs through the literature on consumption and haunts the 
debate on sustainable consumption: the question of whether, or to what extent, 
consumption can be taken as "good for us." Some approaches assume that increasing 
consumption is more or less synonymous with improved well-being: the more we consume 
the better off we are. Others argue, just as vehemently, that the scale of consumption in 
modern society is both environmentally and psychologically damaging, and that we could 
reduce consumption significantly without threatening the quality of our lives. This second 
viewpoint suggests that a kind of "double dividend" is inherent in sustainable consumption: 
the ability to live better by consuming less and reduce our impact on the environment in the 
process. In the final analysis, this article argues, such "win-win" solutions may exist but will 
require a concerted societal effort to realize. 
Notes: A discussion of the dilemma over the role of consumption in relation to well-being: its 
positive versus negative affects on well-being and its effects on environmental conditions. 
Relates to well-being. 
168. Johnson, B. E.   (1992). Learning in school - Facilitating the child's 
emerging construction of self. Education, 112(3), 439-442. Article. 
Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:A1992HQ48100020 
Abstract: The self is the sum of the individual's learning capacity and the goal of education is 
its development. A child's emerging construction of self is dependent on social activity for 
sustained growth and development. The social institution of the school provides this social 
activity in the form of schooling. The impact of schooling on a child's developing sense of self 
needs to be explored, so that this interrelationship is directed in the child's best interests. 
Looking at learning from the view of the child's developing selfhood provides us with an 
inherently social frame of reference and an understanding from the perspective of what the 
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learner needs in order to grow. This approach serves as a salient reminder that school 
learning is a social experience for the maximizing of the child's intellectual potential. The 
claim is made that learning in school can more comprehensively facilitate the emergent 
development of self through daily language experiences encountered in listening to 
literature. 
Notes: Argues that schooling is an important social setting within which children, today, 
construct their sense of selves. Selfhood is seen as inherently social. Relates to selfhood/ 
personhood. 
169. Johnson, E. L.   (2013). Mapping the field of the whole human: Toward a 
form psychology. New Ideas in Psychology, 31(2), 130-150. Retrieved 
from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0732118X12000505. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2012.09.002 
Abstract: The concept of personality has served as the model of the whole human being 
within modern psychology for most of the 20th century. However, the original reasons for 
this selection were based on philosophical assumptions that have since come to be rejected 
by philosophers of science. Other approaches to the whole human have been identified 
within psychology, as well as philosophy and theology, which can also serve as models of the 
whole human in psychology, and which highlight additional, distinctly human kinds of 
psychological wholeness. The value of a number of the most important models will be 
discussed, and it will be suggested that the concept of form could serve as a higher-order 
concept for the psychological subdiscipline of the whole human being. 
Notes: Considers the way in which the whole human being is captured by the notion of 
personality and suggests that it fails in this task. Alternative approaches are considered, with 
the notion of ‘form’ suggested as a potential higher-order concept to enable the whole 
human being to be understood. Relates to personhood. 
170. Jones, C. J.  ; Livson, N.   & Peskin, H.   (2006). Paths of psychological 
health: Examination of 40-year trajectories from the Intergenerational 
Studies. Journal of Research in Personality, 40(1), 56-72. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0092656605000644. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2005.09.006 
Abstract: Patterns of stability and change in psychological health, as assessed via the 
California Psychological Inventory’s v3 scale, are examined in two long-term longitudinal 
samples (N = 279). Longitudinal hierarchical linear modeling analyses indicate a modest, but 
significant, linear increase in v3 from age 33 to 75 for the sample as a whole, with significant 
individual differences in v3 change also evident. When psychological health is categorized as 
either high or low, using a v3 cut-off score of 36, the majority of individuals show stable high 
psychological health from age 33 to 75; significant minorities show stable low, increased, 
and decreased psychological health with age. Differential patterns of psychological health 
change are successfully predicted by preadult psychological health resources, adult cognitive 
and social resources, and early adult norm-orientation. Overall, results illustrate the 
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complexity of normal adult development, and the differential mechanisms involved in 
maintaining, attaining, and losing psychological health over a 40-year period. 
Notes: An interesting and significant longitudinal study of psychological health tracking 
adults from 33 to 75 years old. Generally, health modestly increases. Psychological health is 
partly dependent upon cognitive and social resources. Relates to evolutionary psychology, 
personhood and well-being. 
171. Jones, D.   (1999). Evolutionary psychology. Annual Review of 
Anthropology, 28, 553-575. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/199842377?accountid=27890 
Abstract: Studying human behaviour in the light of evolutionary theory involves studying the 
comparative evolutionary history of behaviors (phylogeny), the psychological machinery that 
generates them (mechanisms), and the adaptative value of that machinery in past 
reproductive competition (natural selection). To show the value of a phylogenetic 
perspective, I consider the ethology of emotional expression and the cladistics of primate 
social systems. For psychological mechanisms, I review evidence for a pan-human set of 
conceptual building blocks, including innate concepts of things, space, and time, of number, 
of logic, of natural history, and of "other minds" and social life, which can be combined to 
generate a vast array of culture-specific concepts. For natural selection, I discuss the sexual 
selection of sex differences and similarities, and the social selection of moral sentiments and 
group psychology. 
Notes: Investigates the evolutionary approach in the context of anthropological concerns 
with the development of human behaviours, using emotional expression and primate social 
systems as examples. Relates to evolutionary psychology. 
172. Kall, L. F.   (2009). Expression between self and other. Idealistic Studies, 
39(1-3), 71-86. Article. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://WOS:000278902200006 
Abstract: In discussions concerning intersubjectivity the notion of expression has come to 
play a part of increasing significance. Expression shifts our point of departure away from 
subjectivity as something mysterious hidden within the body to subjectivity as altogether 
embodied and embedded in the world. In this article I engage writings by Maurice Merleau-
Ponty to argue that expression is essentially something that happens in a communicative 
space in between self and other while at the same time giving rise to both. I show how 
locating expression in a shared space between self and other is a way of emphasizing that 
self and other are not only expressive of selfhood, but are also expressed by one another 
and emerge in relation to one another. I point to this understanding of expression as a way 
of recognizing that there is both a fundamental reciprocity and asymmetry between self and 
other. 
Notes: Argues that expressivity is located in shared space rather than emanating from 
within. Uses Merleau-Ponty to argue for an embodied and socially situated arena of 
expression. Compatible with a highly social reading of personhood. Relates to personhood. 
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173. Kane, R.   (2009). Free will and the dialectic of selfhood: Can one make 
sense of a traditional free will requiring ultimate responsibility? Ideas Y 
Valores, (141), 25-43. Article. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://WOS:000281288400003 
Abstract: For four decades, I have been developing a distinctive view of free will according to 
which agents are required to be ultimately responsible for the creation or formation of their 
own wills (characters and purposes). The aim of this paper is to explain how a free will of this 
traditional kind-which I argue is incompatible with determinism-can be reconciled with 
modern developments in the sciences and philosophy. I address criticisms that a 
nondeterminist free will of this kind does not allow sufficient agent control, reduces to mere 
chance or randomness, fails to account of moral responsibility, and cannot be reconciled 
with modern science; and I relate such a free will to the nature of the self or person by 
developing what I call a "dialectic of selfhood." 
Notes: An interesting discussion of the controversial notion of a nondeterministic theory of 
free will. Provides a defence of such a formulation of personhood. Relates to personhood. 
174. Kaposy, C.   (2009). Will neuroscientific discoveries about free will and 
selfhood change our ethical practices? Neuroethics, 2(1), 51-59. Article. 
Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000284868400006. 
doi:10.1007/s12152-008-9020-x 
Abstract: Over the past few years, a number of authors in the new field of neuroethics have 
claimed that there is an ethical challenge presented by the likelihood that the findings of 
neuroscience will undermine many common assumptions about human agency and 
selfhood. These authors claim that neuroscience shows that human agents have no free will, 
and that our sense of being a "self" is an illusory construction of our brains. Furthermore, 
some commentators predict that our ethical practices of assigning moral blame, or of 
recognizing others as persons rather than as objects, will change as a result of 
neuroscientific discoveries that debunk free will and the concept of the self. I contest 
suggestions that neuroscience's conclusions about the illusory nature of free will and the self 
will cause significant change in our practices. I argue that we have self-interested reasons to 
resist allowing neuroscience to determine core beliefs about ourselves. 
Notes: A discussion of the implications of advances in neurosciences for the understanding 
of selves and persons and, more importantly, for our practices in relation to persons, seeing 
them primarily as objects. The position is defended that this will not occur for self-interested 
reasons. [Begs the question of whether or not it will be our understanding of objects, rather 
than persons, that is likely to change.] Relates to personhood and biological/evolutionary 
psychology. 
The Well-Evolved Life: Well-being, Evolution and Personhood 
86 
175. Kay, M.   (2005). Emotion (or life, the universe, everything). The 
Australian Journal of Anthropology, 16(2), 198-211. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/212597156?accountid=27890 
Abstract: Emotions are fundamental to human life; they define its quality and motivate 
action. In the past, social scientists who have studied emotions have treated them as 
biological, cultural or social phenomena. These approaches have tended to fall on either side 
of the culturally recognised division between nature and culture, and so have failed to 
recognise that emotions bridge this division, that they are thought of as both biological and 
cultural, as consisting of both physical feeling and cultural meaning. In this article, an 
alternative approach is presented in which emotions are treated as ecological mechanisms 
that operate in the relationship between an individual human being and their environment. 
In this approach, which draws on models of emotion proposed by William James and 
Antonio Damasio, emotions connect individual human beings to their surroundings and play 
an important role in learning. A focus on the individual as the centre of analytical attention-
often referred to as 'methodological individualism'-is a logical consequence of the ecological 
approach to emotion, which also has significant implications for the relationships between 
ecological anthropology and other branches of the discipline, and between anthropology 
and other disciplines. In the face of an ecological understanding of emotion, all relations, 
including social relations, become ecological and social anthropology melts into and is 
subsumed by ecological anthropology. At the same time, anthropology tends to lose its 
distinctiveness from biology, psychology and other disciplines by focusing on a phenomenon 
that is of common interest to all the human sciences.  
Notes: The author argues that the study of emotion is the key to understanding something 
fundamental about the 'big' questions, such as, how do humans operate, how do they live 
together, what kinds of beings are they? Concludes that we need an ecological approach to 
emotion. "The key to understanding human action is to understand people's emotional 
commitments - what they care most about and why, how they come to care about particular 
things".  Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood. 
176. Keating, C. F.  ; Mazur, A.   & Segall, M. H.   (1981). A cross-cultural 
exploration of physiognomic traits of dominance and happiness. 
Ethology and Sociobiology, 2(1), 41-48. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0162309581900212. 
doi:10.1016/0162-3095(81)90021-2 
Abstract: Morphological traits may convey social messages among humans as they do 
among other species. This study presents data from observers in 11 national/cultural 
settings who viewed 19 pairs of portrait photographs and selected either more dominant-
looking or happier-looking pair members. Significant cross-sample agreement in dominance 
attributions emerged for eight portrait pairs. Significant cross-sample agreement in 
happiness attributions occured for nine portrait pairs. Post hoc, among the characteristics of 
dominant faces were receded hairlines and relatively broad faces. The traits of happier- 
looking faces frequently included relatively dark eyes and thick lips, with some exceptions. 
Notes: An investigation of cross-cultural ‘universals’ for dominance and happiness 
attributions to human facial expressions. Concludes that there is significant agreement on 
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such attributions and, therefore, that they amount to an evolved universal. Relates to 
evolutionary psychology and well-being. 
177. Keenan, T.   & Ellis, B. J.   (2003). Children’s performance on a false-belief 
task is impaired by activation of an evolutionarily-canalized response 
system. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 85(3), 236-256. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022096503000729. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0022-0965(03)00072-9 
Abstract: We examine whether children’s performance on a false-belief task is impaired by 
task content that activates an early-developing, prepotent motivational system: predator-
avoidance. In two studies (N=46 and N=37), children aged 3–4 years completed variants of a 
false-belief task that involved predator-avoidance, playmate-avoidance, prey-seeking, and 
playmate-seeking, respectively. The proportion of correct answers on the playmate-
avoidance task (Study 1: 52%; Study 2: 51%) was significantly greater than the proportion of 
correct answers on the analogous predator-avoidance task (Study 1: 28%; Study 2: 22%). This 
difference was not an artifact of children generally performing better on playmate stories 
than on predator–prey stories. The findings are consistent with the hypothesis that 
activation of the predator-avoidance system generates prepotent response patterns that 
pre-empt full consideration of the mental states of the prey characters in false-belief stories. 
Notes: An evoltuionary approach to cognitive performance related to evolved motivational 
systems, in particular the attribution of mental states to others. Suggests that evolutionary 
imperatives for predator-avoidance over-ride such attributions. Relates to evolutionary 
psychology and personhood. 
178. Keller, H.   (2000). Human parent-child relationships from an 
evolutionary perspective. The American Behavioral Scientist, 43(6), 957-
969. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/214769712?accountid=27890 
Abstract: In this article, a proximate conception of parental investment for humans is 
developed. Parenting investment is introduced as a part of life histories, specifying the 
optimization of reproductive success in terms of inclusive fitness. Contextual, parental and 
children's characteristics that influence investment decisions are specified. We can 
distinguish between four systems of parenting: primary care, body stimulation, body contact 
and face-to-face interaction, which prompts different socialization experiences with 
different psychological consequences. Parental behaviors within these different systems may 
vary in terms of the expression of warmth and contingency. Parenting is described here as 
an inter-generational transmission mechanism of psychological characteristics as well as 
reproductive styles. 
Notes: Examines parental investment in the details of interactions between parents and 
offspring. Through these details of interaction, psychological characteristics as well as 
parenting styles are transmitted to the offspring. Relates to evolutionary psychology, 
personhood and has implications for well-being. 
The Well-Evolved Life: Well-being, Evolution and Personhood 
88 
179. Kenrick, D. T.  ; Griskevicius, V.  ; Sundie, J. M.  ; Li, N. P.  ; Li, Y. J.   & 
Neuberg, S. L.   (2009). Deep rationality: The evolutionary economics of 
decision making. Social Cognition, 27(5), 764-785. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/229588216?accountid=27890. 
doi:10.1037/0033-295x.113.3.628.2006-08257-00810.1037/0033-
295x.113.3.62810.1037/0033-295x.99.4.68910.1037/0022-
3514.92.1.151 10.1037/10.1037/0022-3514.92.1.42 10.1111/j.1467-
9280.2007.01842.x 
Abstract: What is a "rational" decision? Economists traditionally viewed rationality as 
maximizing expected satisfaction. This view has been useful in modeling basic 
microeconomic concepts, but falls short in accounting for many everyday human decisions. 
It leaves unanswered why some things reliably make people more satisfied than others, and 
why people frequently act to make others happy at a cost to themselves. Drawing on an 
evolutionary perspective, we propose that people make decisions according to a set of 
principles that may not appear to make sense at the superficial level, but that demonstrate 
rationality at a deeper evolutionary level. By this, we mean that people use adaptive 
domain-specific decision-rules that, on average, would have resulted in fitness benefits. 
Using this framework, we re-examine several economic principles. We suggest that 
traditional psychological functions governing risk aversion, discounting of future benefits, 
and budget allocations to multiple goods, for example, vary in predictable ways as a function 
of the underlying motive of the decision-maker and individual differences linked to evolved 
life-history strategies. A deep rationality framework not only helps explain why people make 
the decisions they do, but also inspires multiple directions for future research.  
Notes: Argues that the understanding of human economic rationality needs to take account 
of the particularities that evolution has designed into domain-specific decision making in 
humans. Supposedly non-rational decisions can, from this perspective, be understood as 
demonstrating an evolutionarily adaptive ‘deep rationality’ that would have served humans 
well over evolutionary time. Relates to evolutionary psychology, aspects of personhood 
(agent decision making) and well-being 
180. Keverne, E.   (2004 ). Understanding well-being in the evolutionary 
context of brain development. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society of London B. Biological Sciences., 359(1449, September 29), 
1349–1358. . 
Abstract: Much of the work on well-being and positive emotions has tended to focus on the 
adult, partly because this is when problems are manifest and well-being often becomes an 
issue by its absence. However, it is pertinent to ask if early life events might engender 
certain predispositions that have consequences for adult well-being. The human brain 
undergoes much of its growth and development postnatally until the age of seven and 
continues to extend its synaptic connections well into the second decade. Indeed, the 
prefrontal association cortex, areas of the brain concerned with forward planning and 
regulatory control of emotional behaviour, continue to develop until the age of 20. In this 
article, I consider the significance of this extended postnatal developmental period for brain 
maturation and how brain evolution has encompassed certain biological changes and 
predispositions that, with our modern lifestyle, represent risk factors for well-being. An 
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awareness of these sensitive phases in brain development is important in understanding 
how we might facilitate secure relationships and high self-esteem in our children. This will 
provide the firm foundations on which to develop meaningful lifestyles and relationships 
that are crucial to well-being. 
Notes: An integration of neurobiology, neurodevelopment, well-being and aspects of the self 
(e.g., self-esteem). The argument is made that the postnatal period, up to about the age of 
20 years, represents an important neurodevelopmental period that has implications for later 
well-being. Importantly, the social environment during this time acts as a potentially 
damaging influence on neurodevelopment. Relates to evolutionary psychology, personhood 
and well-being. 
181. Kim, Y. Y.   (2008). Intercultural personhood: Globalization and a way of 
being. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 32(4), 359-368. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0147176708000278. 
doi:10.1016/j.ijintrel.2008.04.005 
Abstract: This theoretical essay makes a case for “intercultural personhood” as a viable 
model for human development in today's increasingly integrated world. Critiquing the 
largely static, monolithic, and value-laden perspective on cultural identity prevalent in social 
science literature, the author emphasizes the complex and evolving nature of identity. The 
term, intercultural identity, is employed as a counterpoint to, and as an extension of, cultural 
identity, and as a concept that represents the phenomenon of identity adaptation and 
transformation beyond the perimeters of the conventional, categorical conception of 
cultural identity. The stress–adaptation–growth dynamic in the author's integrative theory of 
cross-cultural adaptation provides a systemic account for the identity development process 
as the interplay of acculturation and deculturation. The author argues that, through 
prolonged and cumulative intercultural communication experiences, individuals around the 
world can, and do, undergo a gradual process of intercultural evolution. The emerging 
intercultural personhood is characterized by two interrelated key patterns in self-other 
orientation: individuation and universalization. Empirical evidence for this theoretical 
argument is offered through some of the pertinent research findings as well as case 
illustrations based on publicly available personal testimonials and biographic narratives. 
Notes: The author argues that through intercultural communication in a globalising world, 
individuals experience a gradual process of intercultural evolution, and also that the 
emerging intercultural personhood is characterised by individuation and universalization. 
Relates to personhood. 
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182. Kins, E.  ; Beyers, W.  ; Soenens, B.   & Vansteenkiste, M.   (2009). 
Patterns of home leaving and subjective well-being in emerging 
adulthood: The role of motivational processes and parental autonomy 
support. Developmental Psychology, 45(5), 1416-1429. Article; 
Proceedings Paper. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://WOS:000269366900018. doi:10.1037/a0015580 
Abstract: In Western, postindustrial societies, the timing of home leaving is increasingly 
delayed. The diversity of home-leaving patterns, resulting from this evolution, has not yet 
been systematically studied from a psychological perspective. In this study, the authors 
aimed to examine how emerging adults' living arrangements-and the motives underlying 
those arrangements, as conceptualized in self-determination theory-relate to subjective 
well-being. A Belgian sample of 224 emerging adults and their parents completed self-report 
questionnaires. Analyses that used structural equation modeling showed that autonomous 
motivation for one's living arrangement is more strongly related to emerging adults' well-
being than the living arrangement per se. Further, autonomy-supportive parenting was 
found to relate positively to an autonomously regulated residential status. Implications for 
the meaning and development of autonomy during emerging adulthood are discussed. 
Notes: Through a study of home-leaving patterns and their effect on subjective well-being, it 
is concluded that autonomous motivation, rather than the nature of the living arrangement 
is most closely correlated with well-being. This aligns with studies of the importance of 
autonomy in the development of personhood in modern societies and suggests that, 
therefore, the development of autonomy in such settings is subsequently important for well-
being. Relates to personhood and well-being. 
183. Kirkwood, T. B. L.   (2002). Evolution of ageing. Mechanisms of Ageing 
and Development, 123(7), 737-745. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047637401004195. 
doi:10.1016/s0047-6374(01)00419-5 
Abstract: Explaining why ageing occurs is a solution to the longstanding enigma of the role of 
senescence in nature. Even after half a century of progress, this solution continues to unfold. 
Evolution theory argues strongly against programmed ageing, suggesting instead that 
organisms are programmed for survival, not death. In the current view, ageing results from 
the twin principles that (i) the force of natural selection declines with age, and (ii) longevity 
requires investments in somatic maintenance and repair that must compete against 
investments in growth, reproduction and activities that might enhance fitness. In addition to 
explaining why ageing occurs, the evolutionary theory also provides insight into the 
mechanisms underlying the complex cellular and molecular changes that contribute to 
senescence, as well as an array of testable predictions. Some of the most interesting current 
problems are to understand how the genetic factors influencing ageing and longevity are 
predicted to respond to fluctuating environments, such as temporary periods of famine, as 
well as to other kinds of spatial and/or temporal heterogeneity. Rapid progress in human 
genomics raises the prospect of greatly increasing our knowledge of the determinants of 
human longevity. To make progress in understanding the role and evolution of genetic and 
non-genetic factors in human longevity, we need more detailed theoretical studies of how 
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intra-population variables, such as socio-economic status, influence the selection forces that 
shape the life history. 
Notes: A conceptual discussion of the nature and role of ageing in nature, especially 
humans. Evolutionary arguments are considered and genetic bases of senescence 
considered. Given the role of ageing and death in the life course and its relationship with 
well-being, this discussion also has implications for notions of self, personhood and well-
being. As the authors state, "The message ‘we are not programmed to die, merely 
insufficiently programmed to survive’ focuses attention on genetic mechanisms of ‘longevity 
assurance’ that may, in future, enable research in this field to enhance quality of later life." 
Relates to evolutionary psychology, personhood and well-being. 
184. Kirkwood, Thomas B. L.   & Melov, S.   (2011). On the programmed/non-
programmed nature of ageing within the life history. Current Biology, 
21(18), R701-R707. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0960982211007895. 
doi:10.1016/j.cub.2011.07.020 
Abstract: Understanding why and how senescence evolved is of great importance in 
investigating the multiple, complex mechanisms that influence the course of ageing in 
humans and other organisms. Compelling arguments eliminate the idea that death is 
generally programmed by genes for ageing, but there is still a widespread tendency to 
interpret data in terms of loosely defined ‘age regulation’, which does not usually make 
either evolutionary or mechanistic sense. This review critically addresses the role of natural 
selection in shaping ageing within the life history and examines the implications for research 
on genetic pathways that influence the life span. It is recognised that in exceptional 
circumstances the possibility exists for selection to favour limiting survival. In acknowledging 
that, at least in theory, ageing might occasionally be adaptive, however, the high barriers to 
validating actual instances of adaptive ageing are made clear. 
Notes: Another discussion of the process of ageing and its relationship to evolutionary 
processes of selection and adaptation. Ageing is not thought to be related to genetic triggers 
and, the authors argue, is only adaptive in extreme cases. Relates to evolutionary 
psychology, personhood (as ageing is a stage of personhood) and well-being. 
185. Kjell, O. N. E.   (2011). Sustainable well-being: A potential synergy 
between sustainability and well-being research. Review of General 
Psychology, 15(3), 255-266. Article. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://WOS:000294370100006. doi:10.1037/a0024603 
Abstract: This article outlines a potential synergy between sustainability and well-being 
research. Currently aims within well-being and sustainability research focus on increasing 
well-being. First, sustainability is defined and important concepts within it highlighted, that 
is, aims, interdependencies, constraints, values and balanced adaptive processes. It is 
suggested that positioning well-being more clearly within the sustainability framework can 
enhance the role of sustainability: for example, in terms of aims and monitoring progress. In 
turn, the sustainability framework outlined, guides the second part of the article, illustrating 
how it can reciprocally enhance well-being research. That is, comprehensive empirical, 
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evolutionary, cross-cultural, and self-conceptual evidence illustrate individuals' 
interdependencies with other people and nature. Despite this, contemporary hedonic and 
eudaimonic well-being approaches and accompanying measures are demonstrated to be 
isolating; investigating well-being individualistically and in a decontextualized manner. This is 
in line with the individualistic and independent values of Western cultures. Therefore, it is 
suggested that employing the sustainability framework emphasizing interdependencies 
within well-being research can be beneficial; perhaps even resulting in an all-inclusive 
increase in well-being. Limitations are also raised and future research directions suggested. 
The author concludes that both sustainability and well-being research can benefit from the 
synergy toward sustainable well-being. 
Notes: Argues that well-being research has focused too much on the disconnected, 
individualised experiences of people rather than emphasising their interconnectedness with 
each other and with nature and the environment more generally. Calls for synergy between 
sustainability and well-being research so that an understanding of ‘sustainable well-being’ 
can be developed. Relates to well-being and personhood. 
186. Klemm, W. R.   (2011). Neural representations of the sense of self. 
Advances in cognitive psychology / University of Finance and 
Management in Warsaw, 7, 16-30. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://MEDLINE:21826192 
Abstract: The brain constructs representations of what is sensed and thought about in the 
form of nerve impulses that propagate in circuits and network assemblies (Circuit Impulse 
Patterns, CIPs). CIP representations of which humans are consciously aware occur in the 
context of a sense of self. Thus, research on mechanisms of consciousness might benefit 
from a focus on how a conscious sense of self is represented in brain. Like all senses, the 
sense of self must be contained in patterns of nerve impulses. Unlike the traditional senses 
that are registered by impulse flow in relatively simple, pauci-synaptic projection pathways, 
the sense of self is a system- level phenomenon that may be generated by impulse patterns 
in widely distributed complex and interacting circuits. The problem for researchers then is to 
identify the CIPs that are unique to conscious experience. Also likely to be of great relevance 
to constructing the representation of self are the coherence shifts in activity timing relations 
among the circuits. Consider that an embodied sense of self is generated and contained as 
unique combinatorial temporal patterns across multiple neurons in each circuit that 
contributes to constructing the sense of self. As with other kinds of CIPs, those representing 
the sense of self can be learned from experience, stored in memory, modified by subsequent 
experiences, and expressed in the form of decisions, choices, and commands. These CIPs are 
proposed here to be the actual physical basis for conscious thought and the sense of self. 
When active in wakefulness or dream states, the CIP representations of self act as an agent 
of the brain, metaphorically as an avatar. Because the selfhood CIP patterns may only have 
to represent the self and not directly represent the inner and outer worlds of embodied 
brain, the self representation should have more degrees of freedom than subconscious mind 
and may therefore have some capacity for a free-will mind of its own. Several lines of 
evidence for this theory are reviewed. Suggested new research includes identifying distinct 
combinatorially coded impulse patterns and their temporal coherence shifts in defined 
circuitry, such as neocortical microcolumns. This task might be facilitated by identifying the 
micro-topography of field-potential oscillatory coherences among various regions and 
between different frequencies associated with specific conscious mentation. Other 
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approaches can include identifying the changes in discrete conscious operations produced 
by focal trans-cranial magnetic stimulation. 
Notes: A conceptual investigation of how the neurology underpinning a conscious sense of 
self might be studied. Relates to selfhood/ personhood. 
187. Knoblich, G.  ; Elsner, B.  ; Aschersleben, G.   & Metzinger, T.   (2003). 
Grounding the self in action. Consciousness and Cognition, 12(4), 487-
494. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1053810003000990. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2003.08.009 
No Abstract. 
Notes (from introduction):  This special issue aims at providing a state-of-the-art account of a 
new multidisciplinary perspective on the self. "Some controversial issues are discussed in 
commentaries and the author's responses. The contributions are arranged according to five 
broad research areas, all of which have explored the significance of action for being a self 
and becoming a self. The first section addresses different conceptual frameworks that aim at 
grounding the self in action. (Proust; Prinz; Newen & Vogeley; Metzinger & Gallese). The 
second section addresses the cognitive and neural systems that underlie action 
identification, including the ability to distinguish between self-produced and other-produced 
actions (Decety & Chaminade; Leube et al.; Farrer et al.; Knoblich & Flach; Jordan). The third 
section is concerned with the role of action for explaining disorders of the self (Blakemore, 
Daprati et al., Kircher & Leube). The fourth section explores the role of volition and intention 
in shaping the experience of oneself, and the awareness of one's own actions (Wegner & 
Erskine; Haggard & Clark; Wohlschl€ager et al.). Finally, the fifth section addresses the role 
of action in self-development (Rochat; Elsner & Aschersleben; Kiraly et al.; Sodian et al.), 
which is an important issue in developmental psychology." 
Notes: Overview of a special issue of the journal Consciousness and Cognition on action and 
the self. The special issue is a comprehensive update (in 2003) of work on the centrality of 
action to notions of selfhood/ personhood. It ranges broadly over the consequences for our 
understandings of the self from adopting an action-oriented perspective, including the 
nature of agency and the development of the self. Relates to personhood. 
188. Kockelman, P.   (2006). Agent, person, subject, self. Semiotica, 162(1-4), 
1-18. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000242336700001. 
doi:10.1515/sem.2006.072 
Abstract: Building on ideas developed in 'The semiotic stance' (2005), this essay outlines a 
social and semiotic theory of four seemingly human-specific and individual-centric capacities 
that, while essential for understanding modern social processes, are often confused and 
conflated. Loosely speaking, agency is a causal capacity: say, the relatively flexible wielding 
of means towards ends. Subjectivity is a representational capacity: say, the holding of 
intentional states such as belief and desire. Selfhood is a reflexive capacity: say, being the 
means and ends of one's own actions, or being the object of one's own beliefs and desires. 
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And personhood is a sociopolitical capacity: say, rights and responsibilities attendant on 
being an agent, subject or self. 
Notes: A very useful conceptual clarification of the various meanings of concepts associated 
with selfhood/ personhood including agency and subjectivity. It places the ‘person’ as a 
sociopolitical capacity. Relates to selfhood/ personhood. 
189. Kogler, H. H.   (2012). Agency and the other: On the intersubjective roots 
of self-identity. New Ideas in Psychology, 30(1), 47-64. Article. Retrieved 
from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000297874700004. 
doi:10.1016/j.newideapsych.2010.03.010 
Abstract: The essay argues that a systematic reconstruction of the intersubjective grounds of 
self-consciousness and self-identity will yield a complex non-reductive notion of agency. 
Core features of human agency include intentional causality, conscious understanding 
thereof, as well as the capacity to distinguish self-caused from externally caused 
phenomena. By analyzing how self-consciousness emerges from intersubjective perspective-
taking and dialogue, a socially embedded and symbolically mediated notion of self-identity-
one which is able to preserve the core features of human agency-becomes viable. G.H. 
Mead's work serves as heuristic framework to articulate the extent to which the Other's 
irreducible agency is constitutive of the self’s capacity to establish an identity, now 
understood as a socially situated narrative self-interpreting process. Self-identity reveals to 
be an essential open yet not fragmented dynamic, a socially situated yet agent-driven 
phenomenon, and ethically indebted to the Other as providing the essential gift of selfhood.  
Notes: Presents an account of agency that is claimed to avoid reduction and to situate the 
self in relation to the Other through a Meadian analysis. Relates to selfhood/ personhood.  
190. Kontos, P. C.   & Naglie, G.   (2009). Tacit knowledge of caring and 
embodied selfhood. Sociology of Health & Illness, 31(5), 688-704. Article. 
Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000268535400005. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9566.2009.01158.x 
Abstract: The tacit knowledge paradigm is gaining recognition as an important source of 
knowledge that informs clinical decision-making. It is, however, limited by an exclusive focus 
on knowledge acquired through clinical practice, and a consequent neglect of the primordial 
and socio-cultural significance of embodied selfhood, precisely what provides the 
foundational structure of tacit knowledge of caring and facilitates its manifestation. Drawing 
on findings from a qualitative study of 43 dementia care practitioners in Ontario, Canada 
that utilised research-based drama and focus group methodology, we argue that embodied 
selfhood is fundamental to tacit knowledge of caring. Results are analysed drawing upon the 
theoretical precepts of embodied selfhood that are rooted in Merleau-Ponty's (1962) 
reconceptualisation of perception and Bourdieu's (1977, 1990) notion of habitus. We 
conclude with a call for further exploration of the body as a site of the production of tacit 
knowledge. 
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Notes: Links the role of tacit knowledge gained from embodied personhood to insights of 
Merleau-Ponty and Bourdieux in the care setting. Relates to personhood and caring/ well-
being. 
191. Kovach, J.   (2002). The body as the ground of religion, science, and self. 
Zygon, 37(4), 941-961. Article. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://WOS:000179816100011. doi:10.1111/1467-9744.00466 
Abstract: The human body is both religious subject and scientific object, the manifest locus 
of both religious gnosis and secular cognition. Embodiment provides the basis for a rich 
cross-fertilization between cognitive science and comparative religion, but cognitive studies 
must return to their empiricist scientific roots by reembodying subjectivity, thus spanning 
the natural bridge between the two fields. Referencing the ritual centrality and cognitive 
content of the body, I suggest a materialist but nonreductionist construct of the self as a 
substantial cognitive embodiment that embraces not just perception and cognition, mind 
and spirit, but the forceful physicality of the moving body. Proprioception of the body's 
moving mass constitutes a mode of knowing that resonates strongly with the experience of 
self, not only across religious traditions but also within the physical sciences. By way of 
illustration, two directions are suggested in which a construct of the self as a substantial 
cognitive embodiment might lead us: first, a body-based interpretation of the Islamic myth 
of Adam and Iblis that reveals an internal substantiality as constitutive of the divinely imaged 
Self, and second, a new, religious direction for human evolutionary theory based on the 
implications of an embodied intentionality. 
Notes: An analysis of self experience that strongly emphasises the moving body as central to 
that experience and important in bridging from the cognitive sciences to religious traditions’ 
understandings of self. Relates to selfhood/ personhood. 
192. Kringelbach, M. L.   & Berridge, K. C.   (2010). The neuroscience of 
happiness and pleasure. Social Research, 77(2), 659-678,772. Retrieved 
from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/742657519?accountid=27890. 
doi:10.371/journal.pone.0001664. 
No abstract. 
Notes: “[...] as positive affect contributes to happiness, then considerable progress has been 
made in understanding the neurobiology of pleasure in ways that might be relevant. [...] 
happiness of course springs not from any single component but from the interplay of higher 
pleasures, positive appraisals of life meaning and social connectedness, all combined and 
merged by interaction between the brain's default networks and pleasure networks.” 
A generic treatment of the relationship between evolved neurology and well-being. Relates 
to evolutionary psychology and well-being. 
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193. Kristjansson, K.   (2012). Selfhood, morality, and the five-factor model of 
personality. Theory & Psychology, 22(5), 591-606. Article. Retrieved from 
<Go to ISI>://WOS:000309936300004. doi:10.1177/0959354311431193 
Abstract: We often say that persons need to change themselves. But what is this "self" that 
needs to change, and why do "selves" seem to be so resistant to change? I have argued 
elsewhere that who I really am, in an everyday practical sense, is who I really am with 
respect to the moral evaluation of me. In other words, the everyday self that (often) needs 
changing is a moral self. In this article, I am offering further indirect evidence for this thesis 
by exploring an alternative possibility-that who I really am is my personality in the 
fashionable "Big Five" or "Five-Factor Model" sense-and showing that this suggestion does 
not bear scrutiny. I argue that although Big-Five theory has identified relatively stable within-
person patterns, it has not shown these patterns to be psychologically meaningful, except to 
the extent that they are morally salient. I argue further that the nature of our diachronic 
moral selves suggests that moral philosophy needs to take a developmental and educational 
turn: a turn for which it may, however, not be well equipped. 
Notes: A well-argued analysis of the inadequacy of a ‘personality’-based account of what 
needs to be changed in relation to personhood. The point is emphasised that the everyday, 
moral self – as opposed to one’s personality – is the subject of requirements or suggestions 
to ‘change oneself’. Relates to personhood. 
194. Kronqvist, C.   (2012). Lost and found: Selfhood and subjectivity in love. 
Philosophical Investigations, 35(3-4), 205-223. Article. Retrieved from 
<Go to ISI>://WOS:000309071700003. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
9205.2011.01468.x 
Abstract: Sartre's conception of bad faith suggests that every desire to be someone in love is 
self-deceptive in the attempt to define my factual being. Departing from Ilham Dilman's 
discussion of personal identity, I argue that this view on selfhood is inattentive to the kind of 
personal and moral reflection inherent in asking who I am. There is a temptation in love to 
deceive myself and you by renouncing responsibility. Yet the concept also embodies 
demands that allow me to continuously shape myself into a loving subject by scrutinising my 
responses and by asking whether they are expressive of love or not. 
Notes: A philosophical discussion about how the self-understanding of being in love acts to 
direct responses and shape the self through moral reflection on one’s enactment of being 
loving. Relates to personhood. 
195. Le, T. N.   (2011). Life satisfaction, openness value, self-transcendence, 
and wisdom. Journal of Happiness Studies, 12(2), 171-182. Retrieved 
from http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10902-010-9182-1. 
doi:10.1007/s10902-010-9182-1 
 Abstract: Prior studies suggest a positive association between life satisfaction and wisdom. 
In a sample with 123 European American community-dwelling adults, the results suggest 
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that wisdom and life satisfaction are positively intertwined, and that openness value is an 
important factor for life satisfaction, a self-transcendence orientation, and wisdom. 
Notes: An empirical study of the relationship between life satisfaction and measures of 
wisdom. It found that there is a positive relation between the two. Relates to personhood 
and well-being. 
196. Le, T. N.   & Levenson, M. R.   (2005). Wisdom as self-transcendence: 
What’s love (& individualism) got to do with it? Journal of Research in 
Personality, 39(4), 443-457. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0092656604000406. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2004.05.003 
Abstract: Certain spiritual and contemplative traditions (e.g., Mahayana Buddhism, and 
Sufism) suggest that love or compassion may be one path toward wisdom. Fromm (1956) 
argued that certain cultures, particularly capitalistic ones, hinder productive and mature 
forms of love, and thus perhaps wisdom. In the first study, 90 Southeast Asian, 
Russian/Slavic, and Tibetan community participants completed a survey containing measures 
of cultural syndromes, immature love, and self-transcendence, an aspect of wisdom. The 
second study collected similar data on 164 undergraduate students. The results of these two 
studies revealed that one cultural syndrome, vertical individualism, was negatively 
associated with self-transcendence and positively with immature love. An egalitarian cultural 
stance was also related to self-transcendence among college students. The results did not 
support a mediating role for immature love between vertical individualism and self-
transcendence. Future studies, particularly longitudinal ones, are needed to establish the 
causal or reciprocal relationships among culture, love, and self-transcendence. 
Notes: Empirical study of the relationships between culture, wisdom, immature love and 
self-transcendence. Relates to personhood and well-being 
197. Learmonth, M.   (2009). The evolution of theory, the theory of evolution: 
Towards new rationales for art therapy. International Journal of Art 
Therapy, 14(1), 2-10. Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17454830903006075. 
doi:10.1080/17454830903006075 
Abstract: This paper is an attempt to locate art psychotherapy theory in the context of 
evolutionary psychology. Art psychotherapists have often touched upon an argument for art 
making, and healing through art making, as having deep roots in the human past, but have 
seldom expanded this into specific constructs relevant to everyday practice. Recent work in 
related fields such as archaeology, anthropology and evolutionary psychology is yielding 
specific formulations that enable this development. The paper looks both at earlier and 
current thinking about art making as an adaptive process, in both the evolutionary and 
personal senses. Drawing particularly on the work of Ellen Dissanayake and Steven Mithen, it 
relates their concepts of 'making special' and 'cognitive fluidity' to an endeavour to outline a 
rationale for art psychotherapy rooted in human 'natural history' ?. 
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Notes: An attempt to conceptualise the therapeutic aspects of art-making from an 
evolutionary perspective. The adaptive functions, personally and evolutionarily, of art are 
considered. Relates to evolutionary psychology and well-being. 
198. Leary, M. R.   (2007). Motivational and emotional aspects of the self. In 
Annual Review of Psychology (Vol. 58, pp. 317-344). Palo Alto: Annual 
Reviews. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000243900200013. 
doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.58.110405.085658 
Abstract: Recent theory and research are reviewed regarding self-related motives (self-
enhancement, self-verification, and self-expansion) and self-conscious emotions (guilt, 
shame, pride, social anxiety, and embarrassment), with an emphasis on how these 
motivational and emotional aspects of the self might be related. Specifically, these motives 
and emotions appear to function to protect people's social well-being. The motives to self-
enhance, self-verify, and self-expand are partly rooted in people's concerns with social 
approval and acceptance, and self-conscious emotions arise in response to events that have 
real or imagined implications for others' judgments of the individual. Thus, these motives 
and emotions do not operate to maintain certain states of the self, as some have suggested, 
but rather to facilitate people's social interactions and relationships. 
Notes: Reviews the literature on self-related motives and emotions and concludes that they 
function as a means to regulate social interactions. An important review of the social aspects 
of self that emphasises the significance of sociality to self and personhood. Relates to 
personhood. 
199. Leary, M. R.   & Buttermore, N R.   (2003). The evolution of the human 
self: Tracing the natural history of self-awareness. Journal for the Theory 
of Social Behaviour, 33(4), 365-404. Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1046/j.1468-5914.2003.00223.x. 
doi:10.1046/j.1468-5914.2003.00223.x 
 Abstract: Previous discussions of the evolution of the self have diverged greatly in their 
estimates of the date at which the capacity for self-thought emerged, the factors that led 
self-reflection to evolve, and the nature of the evidence offered to support these disparate 
conclusions. Beginning with the assumption that human self-awareness involves a set of 
distinct cognitive abilities that evolved at different times to solve different adaptive 
problems, we trace the evolution of self-awareness from the common ancestor of humans 
and apes to the beginnings of culture, drawing upon paleontological, anthropological, 
biological, and psychological evidence. These data converge to suggest that that modern 
self-thought appeared just prior to the Middle-Upper Paleolithic transition, approximately 
60,000 years ago. Recto running head: Evolution of the Self. 
Notes: Provides an account of the evolution of various aspects and components of the self in 
relation to awareness of the self. Engages with the palaeoanthropological literature to infer 
a period of around 60,000 years ago as the time at which modern versions of self-thought 
emerged. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood 
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200. Leary, M. R.  ; Gallagher, B.  ; Fors, E.  ; Buttermore, N.  ; Baldwin, E.  ; 
Kennedy, K.  ; et al. (2003). The invalidity of disclaimers about the effects 
of social feedback on self-esteem. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 29(5), 623-636. Retrieved from 
http://psp.sagepub.com/content/29/5/623.abstract. 
doi:10.1177/0146167203029005007 
Abstract: Despite the fact that several theories suggest that people's self-esteem is affected 
by social approval and disapproval, many individuals steadfastly maintain that how other 
people regard them has no effect on how they feel about themselves. To examine the 
validity of these beliefs, two experiments compared the effects of social approval and 
disapproval on participants who had indicated either that their self-esteem is affected by 
how other people evaluate them or that their self-esteem is unaffected by interpersonal 
evaluation. Results of both studies converged to show that approval and disapproval clearly 
affected the self-esteem of even those individuals who denied that social evaluations 
affected their feelings about themselves. 
Notes: Reports empirical studies that evidence the deep-seated psychological responses to 
others’ evaluations of oneself. Even claims to be unaffected by such evaluations do not 
indicate indifference to them. Relates to the social aspects of selfhood/ personhood and 
implies a realtionship with well-being. 
201. Lebow, R. N.   (2005). Reason, emotion and cooperation. International 
Politics, 42(3), 283-313. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/203113600?accountid=27890 
Abstract: The realist, liberal institutionalist, social capital, 'tit-for-tat' and 'thin' constructivist 
explanations for cooperation rely on the same explanatory mechanisms imported from 
micro-economics. They further assume that international cooperation should be studied 
from the perspective of egoistic, individual actors responding primarily to external stimuli. 
These several explanations assume much of the cooperation they purport to explain. They 
also rest on questionable ontological assumptions, as their unit of analysis, the autonomous, 
egoistic individual is a fiction of the Enlightenment. Most actors, states included, have social 
commitments that lead them to frame their identities and interests at least in part in 
collective terms. Collective identities lead to a general propensity to cooperate with another 
group of actors. They explain why actors may cooperate in instances that may not appear to 
be in their interest if cooperation is studied on a case-by-case basis - as it is by the 
approaches I critique. To understand how a propensity to cooperate develops, we must look 
at the ways in which reason and emotions interact to create and sustain common identities. 
Notes: Analyses, at the political level, the accounts of cooperation proffered to explain 
international cooperation. These are criticised for being individualistic and egoistic and 
imported from economics. Provides an insight into explanations of cooperative behaviours 
that emphasise collective identities rather than individual/personal identities. Relates to 
personhood and the evolution of cooperation. 
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202. Levin, B. W.   & Browner, C. H.   (2005). The social production of health: 
Critical contributions from evolutionary, biological, and cultural 
anthropology. Social Science and Medicine, 61(4), 745-750. Retrieved 
from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0277953604004599. 
doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2004.08.048 
Abstract: In 1946, the newly formed World Health Organization boldly sought to 
conceptualize “health” as well-being in the positive sense, “not merely the absence of 
disease or infirmity.” Yet nearly six decades later, researchers are still principally concerned 
with pathology and its characteristics and consequences. This special issue is the result of an 
effort to broaden the focus. Anthropologists working from evolutionary, biological and 
sociocultural perspectives and in diverse geographic regions were asked to examine 
meanings associated with health and/or to identify social conditions and practices that have 
contributed to positive physiological and psychological states in particular cultures, times, or 
across time. Most notable, perhaps, was discovering how difficult it is for Western social 
scientists to move beyond pathology-based thinking; most authors represented here regard 
health primarily as the absence of disease. Still, these papers articulate and address 
questions key to understanding health in and of itself, including: How is health 
conceptualized? What kinds of social conditions lead to health? And, how do social 
inequalities affect health? This introduction critically discusses previous work on the subject 
to contextualize the original research papers offered here. 
Notes: The article is a discussion of efforts to broaden the focus of the way health is 
conceptualised into the more positive concept of well-being. Relates to well-being. 
203. Lewis, C. A.   (1995). Human health and well-being: The psychological, 
physiological, and sociological effects of plants on people. In E. Matsuo & 
P. D. Relf (Eds.), Horticulture in Human Life, Culture, and Environment 
(pp. 31-39). Leuven 1: International Society Horticultural Science. 
Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000071637300002 
Abstract: Evolutionary origins are suggested for the affinity of people with plants. Plants 
enter the human psyche through observation and/or participation. Given a choice, people 
prefer settings with vegetation over those lacking vegetation. Research indicates such 
settings reduce stress, promote peace, tranquility, enhanced self-esteem, and sense of 
mastery of the environment. Horticultural therapy is cited for its history of using plants as a 
treatment modality. Settings of vegetation reduce blood pressure and heart rate, speed 
recovery from surgery and other forms of stress, and enhance sense of well-being. They 
ameliorate the institutional effects of geriatric centers. Community gardening and tree 
planting lead urban residents to social and physical actions for improving neighborhoods. 
Gardening also positively affects self-image and social relationships of prison inmates. 
Notes: A collation of evidence for the positive effect of plants and natural settings on human 
well-being. Relates to well-being. 
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204. Lewis, K.   & Barton, R.   (2004). Playing for keeps. Human Nature, 15(1), 
5-21. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12110-004-1001-0. 
doi:10.1007/s12110-004-1001-0 
Abstract: The hypothesis that play behavior is more prevalent in larger-brained animals has 
recently been challenged. It may be, for example, that only certain brain structures are 
related to play. Here, we analyze social play behavior with regards to the cerebellum: a 
structure strongly implicated in motor-development, and possibly also in cognitive skills. We 
present an evolutionary analysis of social play and the cerebellum, using a phylogenetic 
comparative method. Social play frequency and relative cerebellum size are positively 
correlated. Hence, there appears to be a link between the evolutionary elaboration of social 
play and the cerebellum. 
Notes: A study of the relationship between social play and cerebellum size, that finds a 
positive relationship. Given the role of play in both personhood development and well-
being, an interesting finding that connects it to motor development and cognitive skill 
development. Relates to personhood and well-being. 
205. Little, B. R.   (2005). Personality science and personal projects: Six 
impossible things before breakfast. Journal of Research in Personality, 
39(1), 4-21. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0092656604000789. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2004.09.003 
Abstract: Personality science pursues the paradoxical project of specializing in 
comprehensiveness, a pursuit that some may see as an inherently impossible undertaking. 
Accompanied by one such contrarian, a hypothetical “Reviewer C,” I explore six possible 
“impossibilities” in personality science. Together we examine our epistemological 
assumptions, conceptual units of analysis, assessment methodologies, psychometric 
techniques, social impact, and organizational viability. I focus on “personal projects” (Little, 
1972, 1983) as core integrative units of analysis that provide linkages with other integrative 
units. I propose that personality science will assume increasing importance at the very 
center of university curricula, as a hub of scientific progress and as a stimulant for a diversity 
of applied fields. Its paradoxes and perplexities notwithstanding, personality science is an 
audacious project that is already advancing our understanding of the depth and subtleties of 
human natures and nurturing attempts to enhance the quality of lives. 
Notes: An insightful commentary on how personality science characterises the complexity of 
human beings and its potential for helping to enhance lives. Relates to personhood and well-
being. 
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206. Locke, J. L.   & Bogin, B.   (2006). Language and life history: A new 
perspective on the development and evolution of human language. 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 29(03), 259-280. Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X0600906X. 
doi:doi:10.1017/S0140525X0600906X 
Abstract: It has long been claimed that Homo sapiens is the only species that has language, 
but only recently has it been recognized that humans also have an unusual pattern of growth 
and development. Social mammals have two stages of pre-adult development: infancy and 
juvenility. Humans have two additional prolonged and pronounced life history stages: 
childhood, an interval of four years extending between infancy and the juvenile period that 
follows, and adolescence, a stage of about eight years that stretches from juvenility to 
adulthood. We begin by reviewing the primary biological and linguistic changes occurring in 
each of the four pre-adult ontogenetic stages in human life history. Then we attempt to 
trace the evolution of childhood and juvenility in our hominin ancestors. We propose that 
several different forms of selection applied in infancy and childhood; and that, in 
adolescence, elaborated vocal behaviors played a role in courtship and intrasexual 
competition, enhancing fitness and ultimately integrating performative and pragmatic skills 
with linguistic knowledge in a broad faculty of language. A theoretical consequence of our 
proposal is that fossil evidence of the uniquely human stages may be used, with other 
findings, to date the emergence of language. If important aspects of language cannot appear 
until sexual maturity, as we propose, then a second consequence is that the development of 
language requires the whole of modern human ontogeny. Our life history model thus offers 
new ways of investigating, and thinking about, the evolution, development, and ultimately 
the nature of human language. 
Notes: A developmental, evolutionary approach to understanding life stages in relation to 
linguistic competencies and adaptations. Relates to evolutionary psychology and 
personhood. 
207. Lu, L.   (2008). Culture, self, and subjective well-being: Cultural, 
psychological and social change perspectives. Psychologia, 54(4), 290-
303. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000266470000006 
Abstract: Culture serves as a major force shaping the way people conceptualize the self, 
think about happiness, and cope with difficulties and upheavals in life. The present paper 
starts with a conceptual analysis of traditional Chinese and modem Western views of the 
self, to contrast the social-oriented versus individual-oriented nature of the self embedded 
in the two cultural traditions. These culture-specific modes of self construction can then 
shed light on the diverse meanings people hold for happiness and well-being in different 
societies. Building on the social-oriented view of the self, which emphasizes relatedness, 
fluidity, morality, self-constraint, harmony, and sensitivity to others, subjective well-being 
for the Chinese is construed around fulfilling one's obligations and maintaining homeostasis 
(dialectical balance). In contrast, emanating from an individual-oriented view of the self, 
which emphasizes independence, self-determination, consistency, and personal striving, 
happiness is a prize to be fought over, and entirely one's responsibility to accomplish this 
ultimate goal of life. Similarly, culture-specific preferences in individual-society and/or 
interpersonal alignment mirror the two contrasting views of the self, and link up with the 
collaborative project of pursuing happiness. 
The Well-Evolved Life: Well-being, Evolution and Personhood 
103 
Notes: Explores the intricate relationships between culture, understandings of self 
(collectivist and individualistic) and their implications for happiness and well-being. Relates 
to selfhood/ personhood and well-being. 
208. Lutz, M. A.   (2008). The ‘dismal science’ – Still? economics and human 
flourishing. Review of Political Economy, 20(2), 163-180. Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09538250701819594. 
doi:10.1080/09538250701819594 
Abstract: This paper is an attempt to evaluate critically standard economic theory from the 
point of view of self-realization ethics and psychology. In doing so, there is considerable 
reliance on Abraham Maslow's well-known theory of personality development. According to 
his penetrating insight, it is insecurity that keeps a person trapped in a world of materialism - 
be it a desperate survival mentality, a preoccupation with excessive sexuality, or an 
unabashed and omnipresent consumerism. Feeling secure, on the other hand, opens the 
gates to psychological health and real personal autonomy. Over time there has accumulated 
a considerable amount of empirical evidence supporting such a Maslowian insecurity-
materialism link. The present paper surveys the problem of economic insecurity, especially 
the anxiety of job loss. Since there is ample evidence that, in today's globalized world, this 
problem is quite serious and increasingly widespread, it would follow that Maslowian 
personality theory predicts a large part of the population finding it increasingly hard to 
embark on a life of personal flourishing. Economic theory, with its traditional emphasis on 
competitive markets for both output and input, its unflagging support of unregulated 
international trade and outsourcing, its tacit consent for the new lean, mean, and flexible 
corporation, and its purely instrumental treatment of work and workers, for all these 
reasons, must share much of the blame for what appears to be a massive stunting of 
personality development. In this regard, the dismal science of the nineteenth century may 
still warrant the same designation today. 
Notes: Argues that well-being has been adversely affected by the promotion of an economic 
environment that increases insecurity – in a Maslowian sense – and so reduces flourishing. 
Relates to well-being. 
209. Lyon, P.   (2007). From quorum to cooperation: lessons from bacterial 
sociality for evolutionary theory. Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and 
Biomedical Sciences, 38(4), 820-833. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1369848607000520. 
doi:10.1016/j.shpsc.2007.09.008 
Abstract: The study of cooperation and altruism, almost since its inception, has been carried 
out without reference to the most numerous, diverse and very possibly most cooperative 
domain of life on the planet: bacteria. This is starting to change, for good reason. Far from 
being clonal loners, bacteria are highly social creatures capable of astonishingly complex 
collective behaviour that is mediated, as it is in colonial insects, by chemical communication. 
The article discusses recent experiments that explore different facets of current theories of 
the evolution and maintenance of cooperation using bacterial models. Not only do bacteria 
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hold great promise as experimentally tractable, rapidly evolving systems for testing 
hypotheses, bacterial experiments have already raised interesting questions about the 
assumptions on which our current understanding of cooperation and altruism rests. 
Notes: "Collectively, the experiments show that cooperation is far more robust and the 
mechanisms for maintaining it more varied than previously thought............ If cooperative 
behaviour is indeed common in the microbial world, then the conditions that give rise to 
cooperation— including extreme forms of self-sacrifice—are not rare. If fossil stromatolites 
were indeed formed by ancient microbes acting together, as recently suggested, 
cooperation may also be an evolutionarily ancient strategy. If cooperation is widespread and 
ancient, then it cannot be puzzling. Accordingly, some of the assumptions about how natural 
selection works, which have led to the ‘enduring paradox of collateral altruistic behaviour’, 
require modification. Recent experience suggests that bacterial models will help provide the 
means for testing those assumptions and provide some, perhaps many, of the insights 
necessary for shaping the evolutionary theory of the future."  
A fascinating argument that cooperativity might be a fairly simple phenomenon that does 
not require extensive evolutionary explanation. Far from being an oddity, it may be integral 
to the evolutionary process. Relates to evolutionary psychology and, potentially, social 
aspects of personhood and well-being. 
210. Lyubomirsky, S.   & Boehm, J. K.   (2010). Human motives, happiness, and 
the puzzle of parenthood: commentary on Kenrick et al. (2010). 
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 5(3), 327-334. Editorial Material. 
Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000278367000011. 
doi:10.1177/1745691610369473 
Abstract: It is presumed that happiness, and its associated positive emotions, signal to the 
individual that an adaptive problem has been solved, thus allowing her to shift attention to 
other concerns, perhaps those "higher'' on the revised motivational hierarchy proposed by 
Kenrick et al (2010, this issue). In this commentary, we present a sampling of longitudinal 
and experimental evidence supporting two predictions: (a) that people will feel happy after 
realizing fundamental human motives, and (b) that in turn, the experience of happiness will 
galvanize people to fulfill these very motives. However, one conspicuous exception to our 
argument that happiness is both a consequence and a stimulus of human motives is 
parenthood, which paradoxically is associated with decrements in well-being. Two broad 
sets of explanations to account for this puzzle are discussed. The first involves evolutionary 
accounts: that children interfere with lower level needs, that short-term costs of having 
children are outweighed by long-term benefits, and that the modern-day context of raising 
children is at odds with our ancestors' environments. The second possibility involves 
measurement: namely, problems with study designs and the difficulty of capturing on paper 
or computer screen what is precisely so wonderful and elusive that children grant their 
parents. 
Notes: An interesting evolutionary analysis of the conflicting feelings associated with 
parenthood. While lower well-being is correlated with having children there are clearly 
evolutionary benefits in terms of fitness. The puzzle is why something so adaptively 
beneficial should result in lower well-being given that happiness is usually understood as a 
means by which evolution reinforces adaptive behaviours. Relates to evolutionary 
psychology and well-being. 
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211. Machery, E.   (2008). Origins of the social mind: evolutionary psychology 
and child development. Edited by Bruce J. Ellis and David F. Bjorklund. 
Guilford Press, New York, London, 2005. . Infant and Child Development, 
17(5), 553-556. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/icd.567. 
doi:10.1002/icd.567 
No abstract. 
Notes: Book Review of Origins of the social mind: evolutionary psychology and child 
development. Edited by Bruce J. Ellis and David F. Bjorklund. Guilford Press, New York, 
London, 2005. pp. 540. Price: £49.95; $65.00. ISBN 1593851030. [Links to Ellis and Bjorklund 
(2005), above]. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood development. 
212. Maclaren, K.   (2008). Embodied perceptions of others as a condition of 
selfhood? Empirical and phenomenological considerations. Journal of 
Consciousness Studies, 15(8), 63-93. Article. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://WOS:000258162800003 
Abstract: Against recent claims that infants begin with a sense of themselves as distinct 
selves, I propose that the infant's initial sense of self is still indeterminate and ambiguous, 
and is only progressively consolidated, beginning with embodied perceptions of others. 
Drawing upon Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception and Hegel's notion of mutual 
recognition, and with reference to empirical studies in developmental psychology, I argue 
that perceiving other persons is significantly different from perceiving inanimate things. Until 
sufficient motor capacities have developed for exploring and perceptually disambiguating 
inanimate things, it is only in perceiving others who recognize her that the infant is able to 
realize herself as a self. As the physiological and behavioural evidence suggests, whereas 
inanimate things initially captivate and dispossess the young infant, other people return her 
to herself. This paper lends support to the ideas that humans are ontologically social beings, 
and that selfhood is socially conditioned rather than given with consciousness. 
Notes: Argues that the developmental evidence is in favour of the development of a sense of 
self only through social interaction, rather than as a developmental given. It depends 
fundamentally upon the ability to recognise others as others which then allows 
establishment of a sense of self. Relates to the developmental origins of selfhood/ 
personhood. 
213. Mageo, J. M.   (2002). Toward a multidimensional model of the self. 
Journal of Anthropological Research, 58(3), 339-365. Article; Proceedings 
Paper. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000178379100002 
Abstract: This article presents a multidimensional model of the self that recognizes cultural 
variety while providing a comparative framework-giving translatability to difference. In this 
model, cultures of self can be mapped on an array of continua that represent modes of 
variation in a multidimensional field. These continua enable us to figure the position of one 
culture relative to others, while allowing for the possibility that dimensions of self do not co-
vary among cultures. Continua also make it possible to plot variance in styles of selfhood 
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within a single culture that could occur between contexts, through historical time, or among 
subgroups of class, caste, gender, or ethnicity. In the process of delineating this model, I 
interrogate theories, both venerable and contemporary, concerning experience and 
embodiment, ranking and gender, morality, emotion and cognition, attachment and need, 
asking how these elements of self articulate with one another and in what sense their 
cultural divergence is meaningful. 
Notes: Explores and attempts to explain the cultural diversity of selfhood through 
consideration of continua associated with aspects of self present in cultures and between 
cultures. Relates to selfhood/ personhood. 
214. Mahfouz, A. Y.  ; Philaretou, A. G.   & Theocharous, A.   (2008). Virtual 
social interactions: Evolutionary, social psychological and technological 
perspectives. Computers in Human Behavior, 24(6), 3014-3026. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0747563208001052. 
doi:10.1016/j.chb.2008.05.008 
Abstract: This paper represents an exploratory and quantitative investigation into online 
dating from evolutionary, psychological, and technological points of view. In the past 
decade, the relatively inexpensive availability of user-friendly, fast, and reliable Internet 
technology has appealed to millions of consumers who suddenly found themselves 
engrossed by this sensational medium of communication, information, consumerism, and 
service. The majority of Internet users tend to be either recreational or utilitarian oriented, 
using such medium for a wide variety of tasks ranging from corresponding with friends and 
significant others, information gathering, purchasing goods and services, and, increasingly 
so, seeking and securing suitable dating and marital partners. The following research 
questions constitute the driving force for the current investigation: What are the 
evolutionary and social psychological intricacies of online dating? What are the technological 
variants or dimensions that render the consumption of online dating services appealing to 
users? An online survey was administered to 247 subjects to explore these questions and 
determine the technological dimensions of virtual social interaction. Exploratory factor 
analysis was then conducted to analyse the data. Eight technological dimensions emerged as 
a result of the analysis and served as the basis for the study’s technological perspectives 
model of virtual social interactions. 
Notes: Discusses online dating/courtship partly from an evolutionary perspective. It also has 
implications for experiences of personhood in a information technology infused world. 
Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood. 
215. Maitland, I.   (2002). The human face of self-interest. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 38(1/2), 3-17. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/197995848?accountid=27890 
Abstract: Moralists tend to have a low opinion of self-interest. It is seen as force that has to 
be controlled or transcended. This essay tries to get beyond the bifurcation of human 
motivations into self-interest (which is seen as vicious or non-moral) and concern for others 
(which is virtuous). It is argued that there are some surprising affinities between self-interest 
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and morality. Notably the principal force that checks self-interest is self-interest itself. 
Consequently, self-interest often coincides with and reinforces the commands of morality 
and promotes civility and consideration for others. Therefore it provides one with resources 
for constructing a more humane and civil society. 
Notes: Explores the moral dimensions of self-interest, relying on an evolutionary, utilitarian 
and economic logic concerning the relationship between self-interest and demands for civil 
and moral behaviour. Relates to personhood. 
216. Malafouris, L.   (2008). Between brains, bodies and things: tectonoetic 
awareness and the extended self. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society B-Biological Sciences, 363(1499), 1993-2002. Article; Proceedings 
Paper. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000255442700007. 
doi:10.1098/rstb.2008.0014 
Abstract: This paper presents the possible outline of a framework that will enable the 
incorporation of material culture into the study of the human self. To this end, I introduce 
the notions of extended self and tectonoetic awareness. Focusing on the complex 
interactions between brains, bodies and things and drawing a number of different and 
usually unconnected threads of evidence from archaeology, philosophy and neuroscience 
together, I present a view of selfhood as an extended and distributed phenomenon that is 
enacted across the skin barrier and which thus comprises both neural and extra-neural 
resources. Finally, I use the example of a gold Mycenaean signet ring to explore how a piece 
of inanimate matter can be seen (sometimes) as a constitutive and efficacious part of the 
human self-system. 
Notes: Investigates the possible role of material culture in the study of the self. It relies on 
the notion of a self extended into the world and arising out of interactions with and uses of 
that world. Relates to selfhood/ personhood. 
217. Manner, M.   & Gowdy, J.   (2010). The evolution of social and moral 
behavior: Evolutionary insights for public policy. Ecological Economics, 
69(4), 753-761. Article. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://WOS:000275003800010. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2008.04.021 
Abstract: This paper explores the evolution of humans as social beings and the implications 
of this for economic theory and policy. A major flaw in Walrasian economics is the 
assumption of "self-regarding" agents-economic actors make decisions independently of 
social context and without regard to the behavior of other consumers and firms. Truly other-
regarding behavior, such as altruism and altruistic punishment, cannot be fully captured in 
the standard economic model. Standard economic assumptions about human behavior 
make pure altruism an irrational "anomaly" that cannot survive the evolutionary selection 
process. However, recent findings from neuroscience, behavioral economics, evolutionary 
game theory and animal behavior have paved the way for a realistic, science-based, and 
policy-relevant foundation for economic theory. Other-regarding emotions such as altruism, 
love, and envy are an essential part of the human experience. We use the Price equation, 
showing the feasibility of the evolution of group selection of altruistic preferences, to 
explore some of the implications of this phenomenon for economic theory and policy. We 
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explore evidence that the human capacity for empathy evolved from primates and suggest 
that this was the precursor for human morality. We suggest that if we drop the assumption 
that fitness is equated with the consumption of market goods, pure altruism is no longer 
fitness reducing, particularly in western societies. We also examine individual preferences 
for altruism in terms of their effect on well being.  
Notes: A critical analysis of the economic view of persons as ‘self-regarding’ and of ‘fitness’ 
as equated with consumption of market goods. It argues for an evolutionary understanding 
of how altruistic behaviour might emerge through group selection processes and explores 
the consequences of the inclusion of such an account of altruism into economic theory. 
Relates to selfhood/ personhood and well-being. 
218. Markowitsch, H. J.   & Staniloiu, A.   (2011). Memory, autonoetic 
consciousness, and the self. Consciousness and Cognition, 20(1), 16-39. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1053810010001716. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2010.09.005 
Abstract: Memory is a general attribute of living species, whose diversification reflects both 
evolutionary and developmental processes. Episodic-autobiographical memory (EAM) is 
regarded as the highest human ontogenetic achievement and as probably being uniquely 
human. EAM, autonoetic consciousness and the self are intimately linked, grounding, 
supporting and enriching each other’s development and cohesiveness. Their development is 
influenced by the socio-cultural–linguistic environment in which an individual grows up or 
lives. On the other hand, through language, textualization and social exchange, all three 
elements leak into the world and participate to the dynamic shaping and re-shaping of the 
cultural scaffolding of the self, mental time traveling and EAM formation. Deficits in self-
related processing, autonetic consciousness, emotional processing and mental time traveling 
can all lead to or co-occur with EAM disturbances, as we illustrate by findings from EAM 
impairments associated with neurological or psychiatric disorders. 
Notes: Explores the links between episodic-autobiographical memory, self and ‘autonoetic 
consciousness’, their reliance on evolutionary and developmental settings and their 
interactions with the world through linguistic and social interaction. Relates to evolutionary 
psychology and selfhood/ personhood. 
219. Martin, J.   (2003). Emergent persons. New Ideas in Psychology, 21(2), 
85-99. 
Abstract: Recent psychological theorizing about the emergence of persons makes a number 
of ontological claims that are not always explicit. A critical consideration of such claims 
reveals both considerable convergence and some points of disagreement across different 
psychological theories of emergent personhood. What is clear is that all such theories resist 
the reduction of persons to biophysical or sociocultural properties, conditions, and 
processes. In various ways, they each call for a nonreductionistic recognition of the 
sociocultural constitution of important aspects of personhood, without denying the 
necessity of biophysical requirements of personhood. Because standard emergentist 
positions in physical science and the philosophy of physical science mostly ignore the 
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sociocultural level of reality, psychological theorizing about the emergence of persons 
requires an alternative ontological framework. It is proposed that an ontology of levels of 
reality that includes the physical, chemical, biological, sociocultural, and 
personal/psychological is appropriate for understanding how persons are both substantively 
and relationally emergent within the biophysical, sociocultural world. With such an 
ontological framework in place, it is possible to understand human activity in the world as 
the primary vehicle for both the phylogenetic evolution and ontogenetic development of 
persons. 
Notes: People both influence and are influenced by the biophysical and sociocultural world 
they inhabit. Martin concludes that understanding of recent theories on the emergence of 
persons requires the recognition of human activity/agency in the biophysical and biocultural 
world. Relates to personhood. 
220. Martin, J.   (2004). The educational inadequacy of conceptions of self in 
educational psychology. Interchange, 35(2), 185-208. Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02698849. doi:10.1007/bf02698849 
Abstract: Disciplinary and professional psychology have exercised considerable influence 
over the ways in which Western individuals and societies understand what it is to be a 
person. During the last half of the 20th century, educational psychologists advanced 
scientific and humanistic conceptions of the self that removed personhood from the 
historical, socio-cultural traditions and related moral and political practices within which the 
self develops. In consequence, the theoretical and practical models of self-enhancement and 
self-management offered by educational psychologists are inadequate with respect to the 
education of persons who, if they are to function as effective citizens, must participate in 
complex, contested socio-cultural, moral, and political contexts with others. 
Notes: Argues that accounts of personhood provided by scientific and professional 
psychologists are abstracted from the nature of persons as historically, politically, morally 
and socially situated actors. These influential accounts undermine the prospects of 
producing persons who are capable of dealing effectively with the realities of the contexts of 
being a person. Relates to personhood. 
221. Martin, J.   (2005). Real perspectival selves. Theory & Psychology, 15(2), 
207-224. Retrieved from 
http://tap.sagepub.com/content/15/2/207.abstract. 
doi:10.1177/0959354305051364 
Abstract: The psychological self has been dismissed by some scientific naturalists and social 
constructionists as either illusory or fictitious. Arguments against strong forms of naturalism 
and constructionism that would deny the reality of the self are presented. More positively, 
the self is conceptualized as an embodied first-person perspective (an ‘I’) and understanding 
(a ‘me’), and a theory of its development during ontogenesis is presented. Following further 
discussion about the ‘reality status’ of the self thus understood, it is concluded that such a 
self is a legitimate target for expanded forms of psychological inquiry. 
Notes: Provides an ontogenetic account of the self that counters naturalistic and social 
constructionist denials of the reality of the self. Relates to personhood. 
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222. Martin, J.   (2006). Reinterpreting internalization and agency through 
G.H. Mead's perspectival realism. Human Development, 49(2), 65-86. 
Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/224017550?accountid=27890 
Abstract: Toward the end of his life, George Herbert Mead developed a theory of 
perspectives that may be used to reinterpret his social, developmental psychology. This 
paper attempts such a reinterpretation, leading to the emergence of a theory of perspective 
taking in early childhood that looks quite different from that which is assumed in most 
extant work in developmental psychology. Theoretical and empirical implications of Mead's 
perspectivism and perspective taking are also explored, with particular focus on questions of 
internalization and agency. In addition, important distinctions are drawn between Mead's 
view of human development and most contemporary theories.  
Notes: Provides an account of the role of perspective taking in development of the self and 
contrasts this account with standard developmental theories. Relates to personhood. 
223. Martin, J.   (2006). Positions, perspectives, and persons. Human 
Development, 49(2), 93-95. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/224017403?accountid=27890 
Abstract: Gillespie's commentary is helpful to Martin for at least two reasons. First, he 
provides a very clear discussion of how repetitive positional exchange might drive the 
differentiation, integration, and coordination of perspectives during ontogenesis. Secondly, 
his discussion of hide-and-seek, together with its developmentally more basic and advanced 
forms, provides an excellent illustration of positional exchange and perspective taking as 
envisioned by Mead. In his response, Martin discusses one significant difference between his 
and Gillespie's neo-Meadian theoretical treatment of relations between social positions and 
perspectives. 
Notes: A response to a commentary on a previous article by Martin (see above). Relates to 
personhood and its development. 
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224. Martin, J.   (2006). Self research in educational psychology: A cautionary 
tale of positive psychology in action. The Journal of Psychology, 140(4), 
307-316. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/213832759?accountid=27890 
http://bb5xk7cw9v.search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF8&rfr_id=info:sid/ProQ%3Aabiglobal&rft
_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=The+J
ournal+of+Psychology&rft.atitle=Self+Research+in+Educational+Psychol
ogy%3A+A+Cautionary+Tale+of+Positive+Psychology+in+Action&rft.au=
Martin%2C+Jack&rft.aulast=Martin&rft.aufirst=Jack&rft.date=2006-07-
01&rft.volume=140&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=307&rft.isbn=&rft.btitle=&rft
.title=The+Journal+of+Psychology&rft.issn=00223980 
Abstract: Recent calls for a positive psychology that would deemphasize human pathology 
and dysfunction in favor of building an understanding of positive features of human life and 
human flourishing make two assumptions that the author questions in this article. First, he 
challenges the assumption that disciplinary psychology has been fixated on pathology and 
dysfunction by considering work in educational psychology that, both historically and 
currently, espouses the characteristics of positive psychology as articulated by its major 
advocates. Second, through a brief, critical consideration of research on the self in 
educational psychology, he contests the assumption that psychology has sufficient resources 
to develop into the positive psychology envisioned by its promoters. He argues that 
psychology's emphasis on the individual, whose core self resides in a deep, internal psyche, 
radically strips psychology of the historical and sociocultural resources that enable self-
development, constrain self-understanding, and constitute the self.  
Notes: Criticises positive psychology on two fronts: its claim that psychology has focused on 
dysfunction at the expense of flourishing; the project of positive psychology itself, given a 
claimed inadequate understanding of the self that underpins work in the area. That latter 
inadequacy, he argues, stems from the individualistic and internalist assumptions about the 
nature of the self and, consequently, a lack of consideration of the sociocultural and 
historical contexts needed to make sense of the self. Relates to personhood and well-being. 
225. Martin, J.   (2007). Educating communal agents: Building on the 
perspectivism of G.H. Mead. Educational Theory, 57(4), 435-452. 
Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-5446.2007.00267.x. 
doi:10.1111/j.1741-5446.2007.00267.x 
Abstract: In their search for more communal forms of agency that might guide education, 
contemporary educational psychologists have mostly neglected the theorizing of George 
Herbert Mead. In this essay, Jack Martin aims to remedy such oversight by interpreting 
Mead’s social-psychological and educational theorizing of selfhood and agency through the 
lenses of the perspectival realism Mead developed in the last decade of his life. This 
interpretation understands education as concerned with the cultivation and coordination of 
cultural, societal, interpersonal, and personal perspectives. Within this framework, 
communal agency is understood as a self-interpreting, self-determining capability of 
persons. This agentive capability derives from immersion and participation with others 
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within sociocultural practices and perspectives, but also includes reactivity to those same 
practices and perspectives. The education of communal agents as envisioned here 
emphasizes the social nature of education, students’ experience and development, and the 
critical role of the teacher as a mediator between student development and social process. 
Such an education is grounded in the immediate experiences and perspectives of learners, 
but increasingly assists learners to move beyond their own experiences through engaged 
interaction with others and with resources for acquiring broader, more organized 
perspectives on themselves, others, and the world. 
Notes: Applies a Meadian account of perspective taking to understand the educational 
process as a social, interactive process performed by ‘communal agents’. Education is 
understood as an acquisition of various other perspectives, including those well-organised 
perspectives on themselves and the rest of the world. Relates to personhood and its 
educational development. 
226. Martin, J.   (2007). Interpreting and extending G. H. Mead's 
"Metaphysics'' of selfhood and agency. Philosophical Psychology, 20(4), 
441-456. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000247761500002. 
doi:10.1080/09515080701385826 
Abstract: G. H. Mead developed an alternative "metaphysics'' of selfhood and agency that 
underlies, but is seldom made explicit in discussions of, his social developmental psychology. 
This is an alternative metaphysics that rejects any pregiven, fixed foundations for being and 
knowing. It assumes the emergence of social psychological phenomena such as mind, self, 
and deliberative agency through the activity of human actors and interactors within their 
biophysical and sociocultural world. Of central importance to the emergence of self-
consciousness and deliberative forms of human agency is the ability of developing 
individuals to take the perspectives of others within their own conduct. However, precisely 
what is involved in this process, and whether or not it assumes the preexistence of exactly 
those forms of selfhood and agency, the emergence of which it seeks to explain, have been 
much disputed. In this essay, recent reinterpretations of Mead's "metaphysics'' are used to 
argue that his overall theoretical program contains resources necessary to overcome charges 
of ontological and epistemological circularity. In particular, once his interactionism, 
perspectivism, emergentism, and compatibilism are explicated, it is possible to see that 
Mead's "taking the perspective of the other'' is not primarily a process of internalization that 
requires a preexisting "internalizer,'' but a process of participation with others within 
conventionalized sequences of interactivity. This participatory process enables the 
development of prereflective forms of perspective taking and self-other differentiation that 
serve as necessary conditions for the further emergence of more reflective forms of 
perspective taking, self-consciousness, and deliberative agency. Compatibilist interpretations 
of deliberative agency, thus understood, also are discussed. 
Notes: Advances a reinterpretation of Mead’s notion of taking a perspective and defends it 
against charges of presuming what it hopes to explain. This is done by arguing that 
perspectives are initially prereflective and emerge in interaction with others. Only at that 
point does a ‘perspective taker’ emerge. Relates to personhood. 
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227. Martin, J.   (2007). The selves of educational psychology: Conceptions, 
contexts, and critical considerations. Educational Psychologist, 42(2), 79-
89. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000247391800001 
Abstract: This article begins with an interpretation and description of conceptions of 
selfhood that are assumed in educational psychologists' programs of theory, research, and 
practice in the area of student self-development. Three underlying conceptions of the self 
are considered: (a) the expressive self (found mostly in research and theory on self-esteem 
and self-concept), (b) the managerial self (found mostly in research and theory on self-
regulation and self-efficacy), and (c) the communal self (found to some extent in 
sociocultural research and theory in educational psychology, but not typically emphasized or 
evident in studies of self-esteem, self-concept, self-regulation, and self-efficacy). This 
overview is followed by an interpretation of the sociocultural context (in Western societies 
and schools) within which these conceptions of selfhood have flourished. Three dimensions 
are especially helpful in interpreting the sociocultural and school contexts within which self-
related studies in educational psychology are positioned: (a) a psychological dimension of 
self-control versus self-fulfillment, (b) a social political dimension of individual freedom 
versus civic responsibility, and (c) an educational dimension of personal development versus 
institutional socialization. A critical assessment of the current state of self-related studies in 
educational psychology is then undertaken that focuses on the relative absence of, and need 
for, more communal conceptions of selfhood in these areas of inquiry. Finally, possibilities 
for the development of viable conceptions of communal selfhood and agency are considered 
briefly. 
Notes: Argues that the educational setting has focused on three basic views of self which can 
be conceptually related to three dimensions of selves. In this framework it becomes clear 
that a ‘communal selfhood’ has been relatively neglected. Relates to personhood and its 
educational development. 
228. Martin, J.   (2010). The psychology of personhood: Conditions for a 
viable, neo-meadian pluralism. New Ideas in Psychology, 28(2), 219-226. 
Abstract: Two conditions for a potentially viable pluralism, based on recent interpretations 
of the work of George Herbert Mead, are discussed: (1) a shared conception of the 
psychological person acting in the biophysical and sociocultural world, and (2) a willingness 
to engage across differing sub-disciplinary perspectives. Even with these conditions in place, 
any such pluralism still faces significant challenges in avoiding ever-present challenges of 
creeping imperialism and interdisciplinary gloss. 
Notes: A suggestion that theoretical pluralism could be based upon a shared view of a broad 
notion of the psychological person acting within various biological and social contexts. 
Relates to personhood. 
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229. Martin, J.   (2011). The interactivist social ontology of persons: A 
descriptive and evaluative synthesis, with two suggestions. Axiomathes, 
21(1), 173-183. Article. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://WOS:000288022700007. doi:10.1007/s10516-009-9095-y 
Abstract: Within the interactivist, process approach to metaphysics, Bickhard (Social life and 
social knowledge: toward a process account of development. Lawrence Erlbaum, New York, 
2008a; Topoi 27: 139-149, 2008b; New Ideas Psychol, in press) has developed a social 
ontology of persons that avoids many well-known philosophical difficulties concerning the 
genesis, development, and application of the rational and moral capabilities and 
responsibilities that characterize persons. Interactivism positions developing persons inside 
sets of social conventions within which they participate in their own constitution as rational 
and moral agents who constantly transform themselves and their world. Following a 
description of Bickhard's social ontology and an evaluation of its philosophical merits, two 
suggestions are offered with the intention of extending the explanatory reach of an 
interactivist ontology of persons. One of these suggestions concerns a recommended shift 
from processes of interaction and constructivism to processes of coordination and 
constitutionism. A second, related recommendation concerns the need for a more precise 
detailing of processes of coordinated constitution that explain the developing person's 
embodied and enactive transformation from a social to a psychological being. 
Notes: Combines a social ontology of persons (i.e., persons are entities in a social world) 
with an interactivist approach to produce a modified interactionism that emphasises 
coordination and constitution which, in turn, provides an explanation for the movement 
from a social being to a psychological one. Relates to personhood. 
230. Martin, J.   (2012). Coordinating with others: Outlining a pragmatic, 
perspectival psychology of personhood. New Ideas in Psychology, 30(1), 
131-143. 
Abstract: In contrast to individualistic, cognitive-biological, and reductive psychologies, a 
pragmatic psychology of personhood takes the worldly activity of persons as its core subject 
matter. The pragmatic, perspectival psychology of personhood outlined herein offers 
theoretical frameworks for understanding the development and evolution of persons 
through their embodied coordination with objects and others in a world that is 
simultaneously biophysical and sociocultural. In both phylogenesis and ontogenesis, it is 
their active participation within coordinated, multi-perspectival sequences of interactive 
practices that constitutes human beings as psychological selves and communal agents who 
constantly transform the world and themselves. The constitution, emergence, and 
transformation of persons are accompanied and enabled by a holistic neurophysiological 
functioning that interacts constantly with, and owes much to, our history of interactivity 
within the world, especially our social participation with others and their actions and 
perspectives. A viable pragmatic, perspectival psychology of personhood demands the close 
study of our coordinated interactivity within sociocultural practices central to the life of 
communities and the communal agents who populate them. 
Notes: Elaborates a theory of coordinated interactivity that is claimed to express both 
phylogenetically and ontogenetically the social interactive processes that lead to the 
development of personhood. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood. 
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231. Martin, J.  , & Bickhard, M. H.   (2012). An introduction to the special 
issue on “The New Psychology of Personhood”. New Ideas in Psychology, 
30(1), 86-88. 
No abstract. 
Notes: An editorial: "Disciplinary psychology claims the actions and experiences (albeit more 
typically rendered as the behaviors, cognitions, and emotions) of persons as its subject 
matter. It is surprising, therefore, how little attention most psychologists have given to 
conceptualizing and theorizing persons............ Given the centrality of personhood to 
psychological theory and inquiry, and the possibility that psychological theories, research, 
and practices are themselves strongly implicated in the personhood of many contemporary 
Westerners, a special issue of New Ideas devoted to current work in the psychology of 
personhood is both timely and important." A significant special issue that reintroduces the 
person – as a theoretical target - into psychology. Relates to evolutionary psychology and 
personhood. 
232. Martin, J.  , & Gillespie, A.   (2010). A neo-meadian approach to human 
agency: Relating the social and the psychological in the ontogenesis of 
perspective-coordinating persons. Integrative Psychological and 
Behavioral Science, 44(3), 252-272. Article. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://WOS:000280088400008. doi:10.1007/s12124-010-9126-7 
Abstract: How can human agency be reconciled with bio-physical determinism? Starting with 
a discussion of the long standing debate between determinism and agency, we argue that 
the seeds of a reconciliation can be found in George Herbert Mead's ideas concerning social 
acts, perspectives, differentiation, self-other interactivity, and conscious understanding. 
Drawing on more recent reformulations of Mead's ideas, we present an integrated account 
of the ontogenesis of human agency. Human agency, we argue, should be conceptualized in 
terms of distanciation from immediate experience, and we show how social interactions, 
institutions and symbolic resources foster the development of agency in increasingly 
complex ways. We conclude by situating our work in relation to other developmental 
accounts and the larger project of theorizing and empirically supporting a compatibilist 
rendering of human agency as the "determined" self-determination of persons. 
Notes: Attempts to reconcile determinism with personal agency through a Meadian 
approach to perspective-taking and the availability of social and symbolic processes and 
institutions. An interesting contribution to the central question of the nature of personal 
agency. Relates to personhood. 
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233. Martin, J. , Sokol, B. W.   & Elfers, T.   (2008). Taking and coordinating 
perspectives: From prereflective interactivity, through reflective 
intersubjectivity, to metareflective sociality. Human Development, 51(5-
6), 294-317. Article. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://WOS:000261830800002. doi:10.1159/000170892 
Abstract: Despite being eclipsed in recent years by simulation theory, theory of mind and 
accounts of executive functioning, social-relational approaches to perspective taking and 
coordination based on the ideas of Jean Piaget and George Herbert Mead have never 
completely disappeared from the literature of developmental psychology. According to the 
social-relational view presented here, perspectives are holistic orientations to situations, 
within which individuals coordinate their actions and interactions with objects and others. 
The developmental processes by which perspectives are occupied, differentiated, and 
coordinated move from  
(1) prereflective interactivity ( i.e., positioning within routine, repetitive interactive 
sequences during infancy and early childhood), to ( 2) reflective intersubjectivity ( i.e., the 
simultaneous consideration and use of multiple perspectives within the intersubjective 
transactions of later childhood and early adolescence - processes that are accelerated and 
extended through increasingly sophisticated uses of language), and finally to ( 3) 
metareflective sociality ( i.e., the abstracted and generalized social engagement across a 
diversity of personal, interpersonal, and sociocultural perspectives witnessed in mature 
adult negotiations and problem solving). These social-relational processes are used to 
reinterpret, revise, and extend Robert Selman's theory of the development of perspective 
taking and coordination. The result is a developmental process of occupying, experiencing, 
coordinating, and engaging across a diversity of perspectives within interactive, 
intersubjective, and psychological-sociocultural transactions that spans the course of 
individuals' lives and captures some facets of the complex, transformative, and ongoing 
interplay between societies and persons.  
Notes: An outline of a proposed developmental process of increasingly sophisticated 
perspective taking and its relationship to developing personhood in a complex social context. 
Relates to personhood. 
234. Martin, J.   & Sugarman, J.   (1996). Bridging social constructionism and 
cognitive constructivism: A psychology of human possibility and 
constraint. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 17(4), 291-319. Article; 
Proceedings Paper. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://WOS:A1996WL28400001 
Abstract: A theory intended to bridge social constructionist and cognitive constructivist 
thought is presented, and some of its implications for psychotherapy and education are 
considered. The theory is mostly concerned with understanding the emergence and 
development of the psychological (mind, selfhood, intentionality, agency) from its biological 
and sociocultural origins. It is argued that the psychological is underdetermined by the 
biological and sociocultural, and possesses a shifting, dynamic ontology that emerges within 
a developmental context. Increasingly sophisticated capabilities of memory and imagination 
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mediate and support the emergence of genuinely agentic psychological phenomena from 
appropriated sociocultural forms and practices. 
Notes: Discusses the origins of psychological processes from the interaction of biological and 
sociocultural processes. The psychological processes, however, gain agentic independence 
from the other processes. Relates to personhood. 
235. Martin, J.  , Sugarman, J.  , & Hickinbottom, S.   (2010). Persons: 
Understanding psychological selfhood and agency. Springer: New York. 
No abstract.  
Notes: A recent and significant conceptual treatment of persons. Relates to personhood. 
236. Martin, J.  , Sugarman, J.  , & Hickinbottom, S.   (2010). The psychology of 
persons: An idea whose time has come (again). In Persons: 
Understanding Psychological Selfhood and Agency (pp. 155-173): 
Springer New York. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-
4419-1065-3_10. doi:10.1007/978-1-4419-1065-3_10 
Abstract: A recurrent theme in the history of psychology has been the failure of 
psychologists to focus their inquiries on the activity of persons in worldly context. In 
introspective, cognitive, and biological psychologies, thoughts, cognitive processes and 
structures, and/or patterns of neurophysiological activation have commanded the attention 
of investigators. In functional and behavioral psychologies, the “stripped-down” behaviors 
and reactions of research subjects in highly structured, narrowly construed, and mostly 
acultural, ahistorical contexts have prevailed as focal phenomena of interest. Much 
psychoanalytic, humanistic, phenomenological, and existentialist work in psychology has 
tended to elevate the inner experiences, struggles, and tensions of persons over their 
activity in the everyday contexts and circumstances of their lives. Even evolutionary 
psychologists, who might be expected to place considerable emphasis on the worldly activity 
of persons, tend mostly to retreat to a combination of narrative speculation and 
mathematical modeling. In short, psychological inquiry and practice mostly have been 
dominated by some combination of interior focus and/or environmental restriction and 
simplification. Of equal significance is a strongly dualistic tendency evident in most 
psychological theory and research that treats persons as separate from, and more or less 
over and against, the world in which they reside and act. 
Notes: Emphasises the importance of the lived context of action for understanding the 
psychological nature of human beings as persons. In contrast, it is pointed out that much 
psychology assumes an ‘abstracted’ individual whose psychology is relatively independent of 
context. Relates to personhood. 
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237. Mason, W. A.   & Mendoza, S. P.   (1998). Generic aspects of primate 
attachments: Parents, offspring and mates. Psychoneuroendocrinology, 
23(8), 765-778. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306453098000547. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0306-4530(98)00054-7 
Abstract: We examine behavioral and physiological aspects of primate emotional 
attachments in the context of four relationships: infant-to-parent, parent-to-infant, and 
adult male-to-female and adult female-to-male in a monogamous New World species. 
Emotional attachments in each of these relationships show striking similarities at a basic 
functional level. The nature of these similarities suggests that they are produced by the same 
psychoneuroendocrine core, which appears to be present in all mammals. We also consider 
the development of each of kind of attachment. In contrast to fundamental similarities in the 
expression of attachment, their development in each case appears to be based on distinct, 
species-typical dispositions and constraints.  
Notes: An examination of the biological underpinnings of emotional attachment in a range 
of primate species, revealing continuity of the behavioural and physiological bases of these 
processes. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood. 
238. Massey, D. S.   (2002). A brief history of human society: The origin and 
role of emotion in social life. American Sociological Review, 67(1), 1-29. 
Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/218827279?accountid=27890 
Abstract: Human society emerged over 6 million years of hominid evolution. During this 
time, group size steadily increased, and to maintain group cohesion human beings gradually 
evolved a well-developed social intelligence based on the differentiation and refinement of 
emotions. The neurological structures for emotional expression are part of the primitive 
brain and developed long before the cognitive equipment for rational intelligence evolved. 
Indeed, full rationality came rather late in human evolution, and it has only been within the 
last 100 years that the social conditions emerged for a mass culture based on rationality. A 
review of the evolution of human society and human cognition illustrates the creation and 
workings of the human emotional brain and show how it operates independently of and 
strongly influences the rational brain. If sociology is to advance, research and theory must 
grapple with both rational and emotional intelligence and focus particularly on the interplay 
between them. 
Notes: Argues that sociology is not well prepared to understand the nature and meaning of 
two important transitions; these being a) the bulk of the global population living in urban 
areas, and b) the demise of the last of the hunter-gathers. This, it is argued, is because of the 
following "three inter-related conceits", 1) "the elevation of the social over the biological"; 2) 
"our focus on the 'modern' rather than the 'traditional' " and 3) elevation of the 'rational' 
over the 'emotional', when the focus needs to be on the interplay between the rational and 
the emotional when attempting to explain and understand human behaviour. Reviews 
human society from its origins to the present. Examines the relationship between the 
evolution of individual cognitive capacities and emotions and the development of larger 
social groups and societies. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood. 
The Well-Evolved Life: Well-being, Evolution and Personhood 
119 
239. Matsumoto, D.   & Wilson, J.   (2008). Chapter 23 - Culture, Emotion, and 
Motivation. In Handbook of Motivation and Cognition Across Cultures 
(pp. 541-563). San Diego: Academic Press. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780123736949000
234. doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-373694-9.00023-4 
No abstract. 
Notes: Publisher Summary: This chapter describes a theory of how emotions serve as one 
important source of motivation by priming individuals to behave in certain ways. Culture, as 
a meaning and information system, influences emotion–behavior linkages. The function of 
culture is to prevent social chaos, maintain social order, and ensure group efficiency, given 
the ecological environment and the resources available in it to survive. It does this by 
identifying social roles, normative behaviors, expectations, value and belief systems related 
to interpersonal relationships and the environment, and with regard to emotion itself. It also 
creates a belief system involving worldviews and self-construals to help to reinforce, 
maintain, and achieve this purpose. When emotions are elicited, culture calibrates the 
primed individual to the behavioral repertoires available and necessary in that culture as 
identified by the social roles, norms, and expectations in order to serve as motivators for 
desired behaviors. Behaviors are viewed as occurring in specific situational contexts as role 
performances, and individuals as actors playing roles defined by culture. The functions of 
culture as a meaning and information system are to prevent social chaos, maintain social 
order, and ensure group efficiency, given the ecological environment and the resources 
available in it to survive. When emotions are elicited, culture calibrates the primed individual 
to the behavioral repertoires available and necessary in that culture as identified by the 
social roles, norms, and expectations in order to serve as motivators for desired behaviors. 
Culture also calibrates the behaviors of the perceivers of emotion, thereby ensuring the 
regulation of social interaction. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood. 
Notes: Highlights the role of culture in priming particular behaviours that fit people to the 
ecological setting, especially through the calibration of emotional and motivational 
responses. Relates to personhood and evolutionary psychology. 
240. Mayer, F. S.   & Frantz, C. M.   (2004). The connectedness to nature scale: 
A measure of individuals’ feeling in community with nature. Journal of 
Environmental Psychology, 24(4), 503-515. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0272494404000696. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvp.2004.10.001 
Abstract: Five studies assessed the validity and reliability of the connectedness to nature 
scale (CNS), a new measure of individuals’ trait levels of feeling emotionally connected to the 
natural world. Data from two community and three college samples demonstrated that the 
CNS has good psychometric properties, correlates with related variables (the new 
environmental paradigm scale, identity as an environmentalist), and is uncorrelated with 
potential confounds (verbal ability, social desirability). This paper supports ecopsychologists’ 
contention that connection to nature is an important predictor of ecological behavior and 
subjective well-being. It also extends social psychological research on self–other overlap, 
perspective taking, and altruistic behavior to the overlap between self and nature. The CNS 
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promises to be a useful empirical tool for research on the relationship between humans and 
the natural world. 
Notes: A test of the connectedness to nature scale that supports the role of nature in 
fostering subjective-wellbeing. Relates to well-being. 
241. McCabe, M.   & Fabri, A.   (2012). Vitamin practices and ideologies of 
health and the body. International Journal of Business Anthropology, 
3(1), 39-61. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1018556113?accountid=27890 
Abstract: This article addresses people in the United States by examining beliefs and 
practices among people who take vitamins and supplements. The continuing rise of vitamin 
consumption calls for explanation given the lack of scientific consensus about the efficacy of 
vitamin pills in preventing disease and improving health. Taking vitamins contests 
biomedicine professionals and represents the choice for an alternative health practice that 
involves magical thinking, the emotions and sensory knowledge. Vitamins are self-
medicating devices that lead to a culturally constituted experience of the self as a productive 
and whole person in a capitalist society. We pursue the notion of tactics to articulate the 
relationship between agency and structure. Vitamin practices reflect a nuanced concept of 
agency that shows how people navigate broader processes converging in the marketplace. 
Operating within this wider field, practices are transformative and lead to social change.  
Notes: Why do so many people take vitamins when there is a lack of scientific concensus of 
their effectiveness in disease prevention and health improvement? This article attempts to 
understand the cultural beliefs and values motivating their increasing use. Why is magical 
thinking involved in something as important as health? "Vitamins embody capitalism by 
evoking ideas of energy, productivity and self-creation in the definition of personhood … 
People speak of their vitamin rituals in terms of connecting mind and body … Vitamin 
practices highlight re-conceptualization of personhood in Western society as a combination 
of individuality and sociality … Current expansion of the vitamin and supplement market 
occurs with the rise of what Giddens calls the reflexive modern self where ‘the self, like the 
broader institutional contexts in which it exists, has to be reflexively made.’ " An interesting 
article that considers how a particular practice (taking vitamin supplements) connects to the 
formation of personhood and self in today’s society. Relates to evolution, personhood and 
well-being. 
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242. McConnell, A. R.  ; Shoda, T. M.   & Skulborstad, H. M.   (2012). The self 
as a collection of multiple self-aspects: Structure, development, 
operation, and implications. Social Cognition, 30(4), 380-395. Retrieved 
from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1030252936?accountid=27890. 
doi:10.1037/0033-2909.132.5.692 
10.1037/0003-066x.54.7.493 
10.1037/0033-295x.94.3.319 
10.111/j.1467-8624.2004.00819.x 
10.1037/0033-295x.98.2.224 
10.1037/0022-3514.46.5.961 
Abstract: What is the self? This age-old question is one that, surprisingly, receives little 
attention even among researchers who study it. In our view, addressing this important 
question begins with acknowledging that the self is composed of multiple, context-
dependent self-aspects represented in an interrelated memory network. These self-aspects 
develop in the service of pursuing important self-relevant goals (e.g., reproduction, 
achievement, belongingness) and reflect one's important qualities exhibited in these 
domains. Because context activates a goal-relevant self-aspect, discrete subregions of self-
knowledge are activated at any given time, which limits the impact of core personality 
attributes and shapes the experience of current affect. This approach has broader 
implications for explaining how the self can be both stable yet variable, for the conditions 
under which self-concepts develop and change, for distinguishing between the self as the 
known and the knower, and for goal pursuit and self-regulatory activities.  
Notes: Considers how different cognitive processes get recruited to perform the self in 
various contexts. In doing so, the claim is made that this provides insights into the fluidity of 
the self and its goal related orientations in those contexts. Relates to slefhood/ personhood 
243. McCubbin, M.   (2001). Pathways to health, illness and well-being: From 
the perspective of power and control. Journal of Community & Applied 
Social Psychology, 11(2), 75-81. Editorial Material. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://WOS:000168607000001. doi:10.1002/casp.622 
Abstract: This article introduces the special issue entitled 'Power, Control and Health'. The 
five articles in this issue, using qualitative observation and theory-building, deconstruct 
individualistic explanations of the roles of power, empowerment, control, self-efficacy, etc. 
in producing health and well-being outcomes, and reconstruct models and pathways to 
population health and well-being that are profoundly anchored in the social, economic and 
political dimensions of human life which create, structure, and reinforce power and 
powerlessness at individual and collective levels. The theory developed here contributes to 
the understanding of how population health and well-being are intimately related to and are 
consequences of power and powerlessness. This is the first published collection addressing 
the etiology of population health from the perspective of power and powerlessness; as such 
it not only advances knowledge about the determinants of population health, but provides a 
more scientific basis for interventions aimed at 'empowering' marginalized persons and 
classes of persons. The topics dealt with include a deconstruction of self-efficacy theory and 
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the 'socialization' of that concept, a model concerned with work and work stress for 
pathways to health and illness emphasizing class and gender, reflections on the meaning of 
empowerment in the prevention of unsafe sex practices, a study of empowerment and 
recovery in the context of changes in a community mental health system, and a systemic 
model based on the lifecourse perspective for child wellness and resilience centred around 
power and control. Those articles are followed by a commentary which stresses the need to 
'depsychologize' community psychology, noting that even the articles in this special issue 
retain notable vestiges of reductionism to the individual level. This introduction describes 
the evolution of the public health field into the 'population health field' and the pertinence 
of a focus on power for understanding pathways to health, illness and well-being.  
Notes: Concerns the power relationships underpinning health and well-being - and their 
neglect - in a literature which has emphasised individualistic assumptions and orientations. 
Connects notions of personhood to the processes that generate health and well-being. 
Relates to personhood and well-being. 
244. McKay, R. T.   & Dennett, D. C.   (2009). The evolution of misbelief. 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 32(06), 493-510. Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X09990975. 
doi:doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990975 
Abstract: From an evolutionary standpoint, a default presumption is that true beliefs are 
adaptive and misbeliefs maladaptive. But if humans are biologically engineered to appraise 
the world accurately and to form true beliefs, how are we to explain the routine exceptions 
to this rule? How can we account for mistaken beliefs, bizarre delusions, and instances of 
self-deception? We explore this question in some detail. We begin by articulating a 
distinction between two general types of misbelief: those resulting from a breakdown in the 
normal functioning of the belief formation system (e.g., delusions) and those arising in the 
normal course of that system's operations (e.g., beliefs based on incomplete or inaccurate 
information). The former are instances of biological dysfunction or pathology, reflecting 
“culpable” limitations of evolutionary design. Although the latter category includes 
undesirable (but tolerable) by-products of “forgivably” limited design, our quarry is a 
contentious subclass of this category: misbeliefs best conceived as design features. Such 
misbeliefs, unlike occasional lucky falsehoods, would have been systematically adaptive in 
the evolutionary past. Such misbeliefs, furthermore, would not be reducible to judicious – 
but doxastically noncommittal – action policies. Finally, such misbeliefs would have been 
adaptive in themselves, constituting more than mere by-products of adaptively biased 
misbelief-producing systems. We explore a range of potential candidates for evolved 
misbelief, and conclude that, of those surveyed, only positive illusions meet our criteria. 
Notes: Assumes that belief systems have evolved which then raises the question of why 
some ‘misbeliefs’ survive and whether or not some sub-class of those misbeliefs (e.g., 
‘positive illusions’) might be adaptive and, hence, be ‘design features’ of the mind. Relates to 
evolutionary psychology and personhood. 
245. Meadows, S.   (2010). The child as a social person Routledge. 
No abstract. 
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Publisher’s Notes: Questions about how children grow up in their social worlds are of 
enormous significance for parents, teachers, and society at large, as well as for children 
themselves. Clearly children are shaped by the social world that surrounds them but they 
also shape the social worlds that they, and those significant to them, encounter. But exactly 
how does this happen, and what can we do to ensure that it produces happy outcomes? This 
book provides a critical review of the psychological literature on the development of 
personality, social cognition, social skills, social relations and social outcomes from birth to 
early adulthood. It uses Bronfenbrenner's model of the development of the person and up-
to-date evidence to analyse normal and abnormal social development, prosocial and 
antisocial behaviour, within and across cultures. As well as outlining the theory, the book 
addresses applied issues such as delinquency, school failure, and social exclusion. Using a 
coherent theoretical structure, The Child as Social Person examines material from across the 
biological and social sciences to present an integrated account of what we do and do not 
know about the development of the child as a social actor. 
Notes: A presentation of the literature on the social psychology of development. Relates to 
personhood. 
246. Mehu, M.  ; Grammer, K.   & Dunbar, R. I. M.   (2007). Smiles when 
sharing. Evolution and Human Behavior, 28(6), 415-422. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090513807000645. 
doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.05.010 
Abstract: One of the proposed functions of human smiling is to advertise cooperative 
dispositions and thereby increase the likelihood that a social partner would invest resources 
in a relationship. In particular, smiles involving an emotional component would be honest 
signals of altruistic dispositions because they are not easy to produce voluntarily. In this 
study, 60 people were covertly filmed while interacting with a friend in two conditions: 
control and sharing. Smiles were classified into Duchenne (spontaneous) and non-Duchenne 
smiles. Participants also completed a series of questionnaires, including the Altruism Scale 
and a self-report questionnaire of emotional state. Interestingly, Duchenne smiles were 
displayed at higher rates in the sharing situation as opposed to the control situation, 
whereas non-Duchenne smiles were unaffected by the type of interaction. Furthermore, 
Duchenne smiles in the sharing interaction were positively affected by a measure of 
altruism. Self-reported emotional states did not vary between conditions and were poorly 
related to smiling. This study shows that the Duchenne smile is relevant to situations that 
involve the sharing of material resources because it would reliably advertise altruistic 
intentions. The Duchenne smile could therefore be an important signal in the formation and 
maintenance of cooperative relationships. 
Notes: An empirical study of the important relationship between cooperative use of 
resources (sharing) and the signalling of positive affect. It also assumes an evolutionary 
understanding of the adaptive nature of smiling. Relates to evolutionary psychology and 
well-being. 
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247. Meijsing, M.   (2006). Being ourselves and knowing ourselves: An 
adverbial account of mental representations. Consciousness and 
Cognition, 15(3), 605-619. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1053810005001492. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2005.11.003 
Abstract: This paper takes an evolutionary approach to what we are, namely autopoietic 
systems with a first person perspective on our surroundings and ourselves. This in contrast 
with Thomas Metzinger’s views in his Being No One. Though perception does involve 
internal processing and representations, it is argued that perception is direct. We track real 
features of the world, but fallibly, in a certain way. Moreover, it is claimed that mental 
representations are quite different from internal neural representations. They are best 
construed in an adverbial way. What we perceive, the object of perception, is the real world. 
Internal neural representations are the means by which we perceive the world. And mental 
representations are the way in which we experience the world, the adverbial content of 
perception. Finally, what goes for the world goes for ourselves as well: in self-consciousness 
we track real features of ourselves, but fallibly, in a certain way. 
Notes: An interesting discussion of how self-perceptions reveal real aspects of ourselves (as 
mental representations) which are distinct from the neural representations which allow us 
to perceive in this way. This is based on a more general view of perception as direct 
perception combined with an ‘adverbial’ mental relationship to those perceptions. Neural 
representations, so to speak, correspond with aspects of the world while mental 
representations connect meaningfully with the world.Relates to personhood and our 
biological nature. 
248. Meisenberg, G.   (2004). Talent, character, and the dimensions of 
national culture. Mankind Quarterly, 45(2), 123-168. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/222487212?accountid=27890 
http://bb5xk7cw9v.search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-
8&rfr_id=info:sid/ProQ%3Asocscijournals&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:
mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Mankind+Quarterly&rft.atitle=T
alent%2C+Character%2C+and+the+Dimensions+of+National+Culture&rft
.au=Meisenberg%2C+Gerhard&rft.aulast=Meisenberg&rft.aufirst=Gerha
rd&rft.date=2004-12-
01&rft.volume=45&rft.issue=2&rft.spage=123&rft.isbn=&rft.btitle=&rft.t
itle=Mankind+Quarterly&rft.issn=00252344. doi:10.1016/0191-
8869(84)90110-7.1985-28060-00110.1016/0191-8869(84)90110-7 
10.1037/0033-2909.116.1.21 
Abstract: This study investigates the dimensions of cultural variation in the modern world as 
assessed by the World Values Survey. It confirms the previously reported existence of two 
major dimensions of cultural variation that can be described as modern and "postmodern," 
respectively. Modern values are characterized by skepticism and critical thinking, with a 
rejection of religion and traditional authority along with an interest in politics. In multiple 
The Well-Evolved Life: Well-being, Evolution and Personhood 
125 
regression models, modern values are directly related to the IQ of the population. 
Postmodern values are characterized by trust, tolerance, and self-realization. In multiple 
regression models, they are inversely related to corruption. Subjective well-being is 
positively related to postmodern values and negatively to modern values. Modern values are 
interpreted as the emancipation of reason from the constraints of traditional custom and 
religion, and postmodern values as the emancipation of pleasure-seeking and social 
emotions from the constraints of dysfunctional social systems. The historical context and the 
roles of these value orientations in the evolution of contemporary societies are discussed.  
Notes: The author suggests that two dimensions of values – modern and postmodern – are 
linked in various ways to subjective well-being and to the emergence of contemporary 
societies. Relates to well-being and has implications for the development of 
personhood/selfhood. 
249. Mérida, J. A. M.   & Jorge, M. L. M.   (2009). The psychology of reasoning 
and human rationality:From standard logic to an ecological approach. 
Studia Psychologica, 51(4), 279-291. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/226906846?accountid=27890. 
doi:10.1016/0010-0285(85)90014-3 
10.1016/j.tics.2003.10.005 
10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00085-8 
Abstract: The psychological study of human reasoning is responsible for the conceptual 
evolution of this notion. Initially linked to the solution of standard logic tasks, later 
developments associated it with performance in the social environment, where individuals 
face problems with personal relevance. Along with the empirical results and theories 
proposed about reasoning, certain considerations have arisen around the topic of human 
rationality. As a part of the previous philosophical tradition the concept of rationality has 
specific implications for the conception of both human being and nature. The revision of 
some of the psychological approaches that appeared during the 20th century enables us to 
clarify the reformulation of the concept of reasoning, and gives us some clues about its 
relationship with the notion of rationality.  
Notes: Examines how the psychological study of reasoning has affected how rationality is 
understood. Given the centrality of notions of ‘reason’ and ‘rationality’ are to various 
formulations of personhood in today’s society, this is an interesting discussion of how views 
of rationality have changed as a result of psychological study. Relates to personhood. 
250. Merrigan, T.   (2012). Conscience and selfhood: Thomas More, John 
Henry Newman, and the crisis of the postmodern subject. Theological 
Studies, 73(4), 841-869. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1223341865?accountid=27890 
Abstract: Both Thomas More and John Henry Newman understood the human subject as a 
historically situated, responsible, and dynamic being that realizes itself through 
conscientious moral action amid the ambiguities of history. Both men were also obliged to 
come to terms with the tensile relationship between loyalty to conscience and loyalty to 
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tradition. Their lives and their work would seem to resonate with, and constitute a challenge 
to, the contemporary postmodern debate about the nature of selfhood.  
Notes: Consideration of Thomas More and John Henry Newman’s of human subjects 
(persons) juxtaposed with postmdoern accounts of personhood. Relates to personhood. 
251. Moller, L.   (2000). Have dual survival systems created the human mind? 
Psychiatry, 63(2), 178-201. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/220694554?accountid=27890 
Abstract: This article reviews pertinent psychological theory to argue for two discrete human 
motivational tracts. These dual systems appear to draw from disparate constellations of 
emotional energies that normatively become interactive across development. The article 
stipulates eight premises from the accepted tenets of psychology, development and 
pathology along with corroborating evidence from laterality studies, neuropsychology and 
the neurosciences. These premises lead to a verifiable hypothesis reflecting Richard Leakey's 
proposal that H.sapiens emerged from an interpersonal shaping of adaptation across several 
million years of group living. The totality of the supportive evidence suggest that the 
flexibility, agility and creativity of the human mind was abetted by tensions and 
reconciliations between two disparate hemispheric perspectives, which express as a 
Personal Self and a Social Self, focused by a lens molded by survival pressures. 
Notes: An interesting discussion of a range of evidence in support of the notion that the 
human mind evolved primarily in response to a ‘creative social tension’ that have given rise 
to both a personal and a social self. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood. 
252. Narvaez, D.   (in press). Development and socialization within an 
evolutionary context: Growing up to become “a good and useful human 
being.”. In D. Fry (Ed.), War, Peace and Human Nature: The convergence 
of Evolutionary and Cultural Views. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Abbreviated Abstract: From birth, the social environment of small-band gatherer-hunters 
(SBGH) is vastly different from that of Western societies like the USA, creating distinctive 
social and moral personalities. SBGH have a companionship culture that is simultaneously 
deeply individualistic and collectivistic, highly pleasurable and cooperative, fostering natural 
virtue. Contrastingly, in Western societies like the USA, natural virtue is hard to develop 
because children are raised with a great deal of coercion and a minimalist approach to 
meeting their needs. Modern practices like these foster a self-protective brain and 
personalities far different from humanity’s moral potential.  
In comparison to our pre-agriculture foraging cousins we are far from virtuous and might 
even be considered to have lost our minds, if not our humanity (Sahlins, 2008). In fact, we 
are we are quite immoral, wicked and stupid if we use anthropological reports of those who 
live like our presumed nomadic foraging, gatherer-hunters1 ancestors as a baseline. How did 
this come to be? How do modern Westerners differ socially and morally from those who live 
like our distant ancestors and what might account for the differences? In this chapter, I 
compare the ancestral social environment, as known from extant small-band gatherer-
hunter cultures from around the world, with the contemporary Western social environment 
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(focused mostly on the USA which continues to export its views and lifestyle to the rest of 
the world). 
Apprehending an appropriate baseline for judging social functioning is critical for 
understanding how cultural practices influence human nature and personality. 
Unfortunately, many popularized evolutionary theorists today ignore or keep shifting the 
baseline used for comparison. Most commonly, they assume that today’s human behavior is 
normal and normative and then try to explain it as adaptive. There is a lack of awareness of 
how different the social environment was for our ancestors and how this forms a different 
human nature. Because the small-band gatherer-hunter context encompassed 99% of 
human genus existence, I take it as the baseline range for human society and human 
development with their corresponding influences on human nature. 
 Notes: Adopting a comparative perspective, the differences between the social worlds of 
human hunter-gatherer ancestors and the modern, western world are highlighted in relation 
to the moral actions of persons and ‘natural virtue’. Relates to personhood and well-being. 
253. Narvaez, D.   & Lapsley, D. K.   (2009). Chapter 8. Moral identity, moral 
functioning, and the development of moral character. In H. R. Brian (Ed.), 
Psychology of Learning and Motivation (Vol. Volume 50, pp. 237-274): 
Academic Press. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0079742108004088. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0079-7421(08)00408-8 
Abstract: We review how the construct of the moral self has arisen within moral 
development theory and discuss the search for integrative linkages with other domains of 
psychology, including personality. Next, we describe moral personality and then programs 
and approaches to developing moral identity in children. Moral schema development and 
moral information - processing research is outlined, including mapping expert - novice 
differences. Finally, we conclude with two emerging integrative theories, one on educational 
intervention for moral skill development and the other a neurobiological model of moral 
functioning which draws on evolutionary themes in the development of a moral brain. 
Notes: Investigates the literature on moral development and proposes a neurobiological 
model of moral action in the context of an evolutionary explanation of the development of a 
‘moral brain’. Relates to personhood. 
254. Naue, U.   (2008). 'Self-care without a self': Alzheimer's disease and the 
concept of personal responsibility for health. Medicine Health Care and 
Philosophy, 11(3), 315-324. Article. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://WOS:000272269900007. doi:10.1007/s11019-008-9125-3 
Abstract: The article focuses on the impact of the concept of self-care on persons who are 
understood as incapable of self-care due to their physical and/or mental 'incapacity'. The 
article challenges the idea of this health care concept as empowerment and highlights the 
difficulties for persons who do not fit into this concept. To exemplify this, the self-care 
concept is discussed with regard to persons with Alzheimer's disease (AD). In the case of 
persons with AD, self-care is interpreted in many different ways-depending on the point of 
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view, for instance as an affected person or a carer. To prevent a marginalisation of the 
growing group of elderly persons with dementia, the article argues that concepts such as 
those of personhood, well-being, autonomy, rationality and normality have to be re-thought 
with regard to an increasingly ageing population. Taking into account that AD as a socio-
medical construct has to be understood in the context of power relations, the article focuses 
on the mutual influence between the concepts of self-care and of AD and its possible impact 
on governing dementia and AD in particular. Michel Foucault's considerations on 
'technologies of the self' provide the basis for the discussion of the self-care concept within 
existing societal power relations. 
Notes: The author argues the need to rethink concepts such as those of personhood, well-
being, autonomy, rationality and normality because of an increasingly ageing population. 
Highlights the relationship between understandings of personhood and the social and 
political contexts in which these understandings influence the marginalisation of some 
people – e.g., those with Alzheimer’s Disease. Argues that a self understood as grounded in 
intersubjectivity, as opposed to individualised to particular persons, would alter the 
perceptions of people with dementia, an increasingly significant proportion of the 
population given demographic trends. An interesting example of how understandings of 
selves and persons has direct implications for people.  
Relates to personhood and well-being. 
255. Nelson, R.   (2006). Evolutionary social science and Universal Darwinism. 
Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 16(5), 491-510. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/229561698?accountid=27890 
Abstract: How should social scientists, inclined to an evolutionary theory of aspects of 
human culture like science, technology, business organization and practice, react to 
proposals that they embrace a Universal Darwinism? The most prominent variety of 
Universal Darwinism argues for close counterparts between the variables and mechanisms 
of cultural evolution and biological evolution, for example proposing the concept of memes 
as units of culture. Other Universal Darwinists propose, more flexibly, that human culture 
and biological species both change over time through a process that involves variation and 
selection, but that the details of the processes may be very different. This essay argues that 
the narrower form of Universal Darwinism should not be acceptable to social scientists. The 
differences in the details of cultural evolution and biological evolution are considerable. On 
the other hand, if Universal Darwinism provides a roomy intellectual tent welcoming 
scholars studying a variety of topics, with the unifying element being a dynamic theory 
involving variation and selection, but with the key variables and mechanisms being 
recognized as perhaps differing greatly between biology and human culture, we can be 
happy in that camp. Evolutionary Social Science and Universal Darwinism.  
Notes: Considers the scope of a Darwinian approach to cultural processes and argues that, 
while a broad claim of a process of variation and selection can be useful, the analogy 
between biological and cultural evolutionary processes needs considerable caution. Relates 
to evolutionary psychology. 
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256. Nesse, R. M.   (1999). The evolution of hope and despair. Social 
Research, 66(2), 429-469. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/209667252?accountid=27890 
No abstract. 
Notes: An argument against common intuitions about the desirability of hope and the 
condemnation of despair. Noting that evolution simply favours behaviours – including 
emotional responses – in terms of the benefits that accrue to them, it is argued that despair 
and hope are intricately interwoven and their resultant effects on happiness and well-being 
are therefore complex and particular. Most cultures have norms that specify the correct 
attitude towards hope and despair. This analysis describes ways to think about hope and 
despair outside of these norms. It suggests that hope at the individual level is fundamentally 
conservative, but hope at the social level deeply threatens those at the top. Relates to 
evolutionary psychology, personhood and well-being. 
257. Nesse, R. M.   (2004). Natural selection and the elusiveness of happiness. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London Series B-
Biological Sciences, 359(1449), 1333-1347. Article. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://WOS:000224059600002. doi:10.1098/rstb.2004.1511 
Abstract: The quest for happiness has expanded from a focus on relieving suffering to also 
considering how to promote happiness. However, both approaches have yet to be 
conducted in an evolutionary framework based on the situations that shaped the capacities 
for happiness and sadness. Because of this, the emphasis has almost all been on the 
disadvantages of negative states and the benefits of positive states, to the nearly total 
neglect of 'diagonal psychology', which also considers the dangers of unwarranted positive 
states and the benefits of negative emotions in certain situations. The situations that arise in 
goal pursuit contain adaptive challenges that have shaped domain-general positive and 
negative emotions that were partially differentiated by natural selection to cope with the 
more specific situations that arise in the pursuit of different kinds of goals. In cultures where 
large social groups give rise to specialized and competitive social roles, depression may be 
common because regulation systems are pushed far beyond the bounds for which they were 
designed. Research on the evolutionary origins of the capacities for positive and negative 
emotions is urgently needed to provide a foundation for sensible decisions about the use of 
new mood-manipulating technologies. 
Notes: Emphasises the evolutionary utility of negative emotions as well as positive emotions, 
and the disutility of positive emotions as well as negative emotions. Argues that some 
current societies may well have pushed regulatory systems away from situations in which 
these utilities and disutilities are, on balance, effective. This might help to explain higher 
rates of adverse moods such as depression in such socieiteis. Relates to evolutionary 
psychology, personhood and well-being. 
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258. Newson, L.  ; Postmes, T.  ; Lea, S. E. G.  ; Webley, P.  ; Richerson, P. J.   & 
McElreath, R.   (2007). Influences on communication about 
reproduction: The cultural evolution of low fertility. Evolution and 
Human Behavior, 28(3), 199-210. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090513807000049. 
doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.01.003 
Abstract: The cultural norms of traditional societies encourage behavior that is consistent 
with maximizing reproductive success but those of modern post-demographic transition 
societies do not. Newson et al (2005) proposed that this might be because interaction 
between kin is relatively less frequent in modern social networks. Assuming that people's 
evaluations of reproductive decisions are influenced by a desire to increase their inclusive 
fitness, they will be inclined to prefer their kin to make fitness-enhancing choices. Such a 
preference will encourage the emergence of pronatal cultural norms if social networks are 
dense with kin. Less pronatal norms will emerge if contact between kin makes up a small 
proportion of social interactions. This article reports evidence based on role-play studies that 
supports the assumption of the kin influence hypothesis that evaluations of reproductive 
decisions are influenced by a desire to increase inclusive fitness. It also presents a cultural 
evolutionary model demonstrating the long-term effect of declining kin interaction if people 
are more likely to encourage fitness-enhancing choices when interacting with their kin than 
with nonrelatives. 
Notes: A careful evolutionary analysis of the hypothesis that kin will be more likely to 
encourage reproductive, fitness-enhancing decisions than non-relatives because of the 
evolutionary effect of inclusive fitness. Given that it is proposed that people in modern 
societies interact less frequently with (close) kin than humans did in the past, the study 
examined this hypothesis in a contemporary sample and found support for it. Relates to 
evolutionary psychology and personhood. 
259. Ng, A. K.  ; Ho, D. Y. F.  ; Wong, S. S.   & Smith, I.   (2003). In search of the 
good life: A cultural odyssey in the east and west. Genetic Social and 
General Psychology Monographs, 129(4), 317-363. Review. Retrieved 
from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000223164500001 
Abstract: In the first part of this article, the authors argue that any conception of well-being 
is culturally embedded and depends on how the notions of "well" and "being" are defined 
and practiced in different cultural communities. To support this argument, they conduct a 
comprehensive review of the empirical literature, which shows that members of 
individualistic and collectivistic cultures differ in their emotional experience of well-being. 
This difference has been traced to the indigenous psychology of selfhood in those cultures. 
In the second part of the article, the authors debunk the myth of infinite cultural variability, 
while retaining the basic insight concerning the cultural constitution of well-being. They 
develop a theoretical model of well-being, in which agency and communion are universal 
dimensions of well-being, and people in different cultures require different combinations of 
agency and communion to experience well-being. Following this theoretical development, 
the authors examine cultural impediments to the good life in individualistic and collectivistic 
cultures. The mutual incompatibility of agency and communion is ruled out as a possible 
cause of why it is so difficult to live the good life. Instead, the authors propose a dialectical 
The Well-Evolved Life: Well-being, Evolution and Personhood 
131 
synthesis of agency and communion as a way of dealing with this challenge of living the good 
life. 
Notes: The authors argue for both a culturally embedded experience of well-being and a 
universal set of dimensions concerning agency and ‘communion’ that are central to the 
experience of well-being for humans. Relates to personhood and well-being but also 
suggests an evolutionary basis of the dimensions of well-being. 
260. Nicholson, N.   (1997). Evolutionary psychology: Toward a new view of 
human nature and organizational society. Human Relations, 50(9), 1053-
1078. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/231471046?accountid=27890 
http://bb5xk7cw9v.search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-
8&rfr_id=info:sid/ProQ%3Aabiglobal&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:j
ournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Human+Relations&rft.atitle=Evolutio
nary+psychology%3A+Toward+a+new+view+of+human+nature+and+org
anizational+society&rft.au=Nicholson%2C+Nigel&rft.aulast=Nicholson&r
ft.aufirst=Nigel&rft.date=1997-09-
01&rft.volume=50&rft.issue=9&rft.spage=1053&rft.isbn=&rft.btitle=&rft
.title=Human+Relations&rft.issn=00187267 
This paper argues that evolutionary psychology offers a radical and challenging new 
perspective on human nature and organizational society. Its roots in a convergence of 
insights and scientific discoveries from diverse and natural and human sciences are 
described, as well as how it seeks to avoid common fallacies of earlier biological reasoning 
about human society. Recurrent themes in human nature and their manifestations are 
summarized, including sex and personality differences, cognitive and affective biases, social 
orientations, and preferred modes of social exchange. It is concluded that humans suffer the 
consequences of poor fit between their inherited natures and many of the constructed 
environments in organizational society, but that new emerging forms of organization may 
present opportunities for social relations closer to the ancestral paradigms of human 
psychology. 
Notes: Considers how an evolutionary understanding has implications for how society and 
its sub-sets are organised. It suggests that while there may have been a mismatch between 
evolutionary ‘nature’ and organisational structures, current and emerging organisational 
forms may go some way towards correcting for this mismatch. Relates to evolutionary 
psychology and well-being. 
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261. Nixon, D. J.   (2010). Should UK law reconsider the initial threshold of 
legal personality? A critical analysis. Human Reproduction and Genetic 
Ethics, 16(2), 182-217. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/993188392?accountid=27890 
Abstract: At present UK Law states that the unborn child only becomes a legal person 
invested with legal rights and full protections, like other human persons, at birth. This article 
critiques the present legal position of setting the threshold for legal personality at birth, 
showing its inconsistencies and fundamentally pragmatic basis. Against this background, it is 
argued that a principled approach towards unborn life is necessary, which reflects in law the 
reality that the unborn child is a type of human person deserving protection as it develops 
through the continuum of human personhood--from embryonic personhood, to infant 
personhood and ultimately into adult personhood. Human personhood is defined as a union 
of a material and immaterial self meaning that at every stage of their development they are 
never a "potential person," but rather a "person with potential" even if it is not actualized 
through miscarriage, premature death, or disability. This moral and philosophical reasoning 
is what justifies protecting the sanctity of unborn life in law. The rest of the article explores 
and critiques the alternative static legal threshold for ascribing legal personality, at 
conception, implantation and viability. Having considered the practical moral, legal and 
philosophical problems of these alternatives; the final proposal for law reform combines all 
three of these thresholds in a proposal for a "dynamic" threshold for legal personality 
commencing at conception, which would render birth as an irrelevant threshold for moral 
and legal reasoning about the unborn. 
Notes: A philosophical discussion of the legal definition of a ‘person’ in a developmental, 
pre-natal context. Argues for personhood beginning at conception and involving, from that 
point on, a case of a ‘person with potential’. Relates to personhood. 
262. Panksepp, J.   & Northoff, G. . (2009). The trans-species core SELF: The 
emergence of active cultural and neuro-ecological agents through self-
related processing within subcortical-cortical midline networks. 
Consciousness and Cognition, 18(1), 193-215. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1053810008000330. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2008.03.002 
Abstract: The nature of “the self” has been one of the central problems in philosophy and 
more recently in neuroscience. This raises various questions: (i) Can we attribute a self to 
animals? (ii) Do animals and humans share certain aspects of their core selves, yielding a 
trans-species concept of self? (iii) What are the neural processes that underlie a possible 
trans-species concept of self? (iv) What are the developmental aspects and do they result in 
various levels of self-representation? Drawing on recent literature from both human and 
animal research, we suggest a trans-species concept of self that is based upon what has 
been called a “core-self” which can be described by self-related processing (SRP) as a specific 
mode of interaction between organism and environment. When we refer to specific neural 
networks, we will here refer to the underlying system as the “core-SELF.” The core-SELF 
provides primordial neural coordinates that represent organisms as living creatures—at the 
lowest level this elaborates interoceptive states along with raw emotional feelings (i.e., the 
intentions in action of a primordial core-SELF) while higher medial cortical levels facilitate 
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affective-cognitive integration (yielding a fully-developed nomothetic core-self). 
Developmentally, SRP allows stimuli from the environment to be related and linked to 
organismic needs, signaled and processed within core-self structures within subcorical-
cortical midline structures (SCMS) that provide the foundation for epigenetic emergence of 
ecologically framed, higher idiographic forms of selfhood across different individuals within a 
species. These functions ultimately operate as a coordinated network. We postulate that 
core SRP operates automatically, is deeply affective, and is developmentally and 
epigenetically connected to sensory-motor and higher cognitive abilities. This core-self is 
mediated by SCMS, embedded in visceral and instinctual representations of the body that 
are well integrated with basic attentional, emotional and motivational functions that are 
apparently shared between humans, non-human mammals, and perhaps in a proto-SELF 
form, other vertebrates. Such a trans-species concept of organismic coherence is thoroughly 
biological and affective at the lowest levels of a complex neural network, and culturally and 
ecologically molded at higher levels of neural processing. It allows organisms to selectively 
adapt to and integrate with physical and social environments. Such a psychobiologically 
universal, but environmentally diversified, concept may promote novel trans-species studies 
of the core-self across mammalian species. 
Notes: Outlines a framework to understand the neural manifestation of various forms of 
‘trans-specific’ versions of a ‘self’. The authors differentiate between a ‘core-self’ that is 
primarily affective and more elaborate versions that can be developmentally and 
epigenetically enhanced. They argue that this framework indictes how the self can be 
organised to respond to both physical and social environments. Relates to personhood and 
evolutionary psychology. 
263. Pellegrini, A. D.   (2008). The role of development on evolutionary 
psychology: Tinbergen revisited. Psychological Inquiry, 19(1), 38-40. 
Editorial Material. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000253095500007 
No abstract. 
Notes: The author discusses the choice of play in studying the role of ontogeny as it relates 
to evolutionary theory. Specifically, he argues that play is an arena that allows for a relatively 
low-cost mode of genberating developmental diversity of behaviours which then provides 
alternatives for natural selection to work upon. Relates to evolutionary psychology and 
personhood. 
264. Pellegrini, A. D.   (2009). Research and policy on children's play. Child 
Development Perspectives, 3(2), 131-136. Article. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://WOS:000270262800012 
Abstract: The role of play in human development is a source of controversy. Some view it as 
indispensable to children's healthy development and education, whereas others marginalize 
it as a topic unworthy of study and of questionable functional significance. This article 
suggests that differences in how researchers define play and conceptualize function have led 
to this disagreement. It also makes educational policy and research recommendations about 
the role of play in children's lives. 
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Notes: Considers the role of play in development, including social development. Relates to 
personhood. 
265. Pellegrini, A. D.   & Bjorklund, D. F.   (2004). The ontogeny and phylogeny 
of children’s object and fantasy play. Human Nature, 15(1), 23-43. 
Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12110-004-1002-z. 
doi:10.1007/s12110-004-1002-z 
Abstract: We examine the ontogeny and phylogeny of object and fantasy play from a 
functional perspective. Each form of play is described from an evolutionary perspective in 
terms of its place in the total time and energy budgets of human and nonhuman juveniles. 
As part of discussion of functions of play, we examine sex differences, particularly as they 
relate to life in the environment of evolutionary adaptedness and economic activities of 
human and nonhuman primates. Object play may relate to foraging activities. Although 
fantasy play has been viewed as limited to humans, we speculate that certain types of 
fantasy play may be present in some nonhuman primates. Fantasy play may enable juveniles 
to see situations from different perspectives. We conclude that fantasy play may have 
immediate effects and object play may have deferred effects. 
Notes: Considers the role of play in both development (ontogeny) and evolution (phylogeny) 
and argues that different forms of play have provided different evotionary functions. In 
particular, object play involves practicing of skills that are beneficial in their later, adult 
functions, while fantasy play has immediate advantages in changing perspectives on current 
situations. Relates to personhood and evolutionary psychology. 
266. Pellegrini, A. D.  , Dupuis, D.   & Smith, P. K.   (2007). Play in evolution 
and development. Developmental Review, 27(2), 261-276. Retrieved 
from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0273229706000633. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dr.2006.09.001 
Abstract: In this paper we examine the role of play in human ontogeny and phylogeny, 
following Surplus Resource Theory. We consider how juveniles use play to sample their 
environment in order to develop adaptive behaviors. We speculate about how innovative 
behaviors developed in play in response to environmental novelty may influence subsequent 
evolutionary processes. Play during this period of immaturity is especially important in the 
processes of development and evolution, because in play new strategies and behaviors can 
be developed with minimal costs and these strategies, in turn, can influence evolutionary 
processes. We posit that play influences these processes by supporting the development of 
new strategies in novel environments during the juvenile period. 
Notes: Argues that play provides a low-cost arena for the development of novel behaviours 
that then affect evolutionary processes. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood. 
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267. Pellegrini, A. D.  , & Smith, P. K.   (1998). Physical activity play: The nature 
and function of a neglected aspect of play. Child Development, 69(3), 
577-598. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
8624.1998.tb06226.x. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.1998.tb06226.x 
Abstract: In this review, we consider the nature and possible developmental functions of 
physical activity play, defined as a playful context combined with a dimension of physical 
vigor. We distinguish 3 kinds of physical activity play, with consecutive age peaks: rhythmic 
stereotypies peaking in infancy, exercise play peaking during the preschool years, and rough-
and-tumble play peaking in middle childhood. Gender differences (greater prevalence in 
males) characterize the latter 2 forms. Function is considered in terms of beneficial 
immediate and deferred consequences in physical, cognitive, and social domains. Whereas 
most theories assume that children's play has deferred benefits, we suggest that forms of 
physical activity play serve primarily immediate developmental functions. Rhythmic 
stereotypies in infancy are hypothesized to improve control of specific motor patterns. 
Exercise play is hypothesized to function primarily for strength and endurance training; less 
clear evidence exists for possible benefits for fat reduction and thermoregulation. In 
addition, there may be cognitive benefits of exercise play that we hypothesize to be largely 
incidental to its playful or physical nature. Rough-and-tumble play has a distinctive social 
component; we hypothesize that it serves primarily dominance functions; evidence for 
benefits to fighting skills or to emotional coding are more equivocal. Further research is 
indicated, given the potentially important implications for children's education, health, and 
development. 
Notes: An outline of the role of three different forms of physical play in producing 
developmental benefits (both delayed and immediate). They emphasise that ‘rough and 
tumble’ play provides important social development opportunities in relation to dominance. 
Relates to personhood development. 
268. Perrin, J. L.   & Benassi, V. A.   (2009). The connectedness to nature scale: 
A measure of emotional connection to nature? Journal of Environmental 
Psychology, 29(4), 434-440. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0272494409000243. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvp.2009.03.003 
Abstract: Mayer and Frantz (2004) proposed that their connectedness to nature scale (CNS) 
provides a measure of people's emotional connection to nature. After reanalyzing data from 
their article, collecting and analyzing our own data, and conducting a content analysis of CNS 
scale items, we conclude that the CNS does not measure an emotional connection to nature. 
Although results from our Study 1 and Study 2 support Mayer and Frantz's conclusion that 
the CNS measures one predominant factor, we suggest that factor measures cognitive 
beliefs and not emotional connections. Results from our Studies 3 and 4 suggest that the 
self-referential, less negatively toned wording of CNS items may account for differences in 
correlations, between the CNS and environmentalism (a measure of environmental identity) 
and between the New Ecological Paradigm Scale (a measure of environmental beliefs) and 
environmentalism, reported by Mayer and Frantz. In Study 5, we suggest that correlation 
differences reported by Mayer and Frantz may also be attributable to method variance, as 
opposed to content differences between the CNS and the New Ecological Paradigm scale. 
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We provide recommendations for revising the CNS to focus on beliefs about their 
connection to nature. 
Notes: In the context of concerns about the affect of nature on well-being, this article 
reports five empirical studies that suggests that the Connectedness to Nature Scale 
measures cognitive (i.e., beliefs) rather than emotional connections to nature. Given the 
reliance of Subjective Well-Being (SWB) measures on affect rather than beliefs, this has 
implications for measuring the impact of connectedness to nature on SWB. Relates to well-
being 
269. Pianalto, M.   (2009). Against the intrinsic value of pleasure. Journal of 
Value Inquiry, 43(1), 33-39. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/203911387?accountid=27890 
http://bb5xk7cw9v.search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-
8&rfr_id=info:sid/ProQ%3Aabiglobal&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:j
ournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Journal+of+Value+Inquiry&rft.atitle=
Against+the+Intrinsic+Value+of+Pleasure&rft.au=Pianalto%2C+Matthew
&rft.aulast=Pianalto&rft.aufirst=Matthew&rft.date=2009-01-
01&rft.volume=43&rft.issue=1&rft.spage=33&rft.isbn=&rft.btitle=&rft.ti
tle=Journal+of+Value+Inquiry&rft.issn=00225363 
Abstract: Hedonists hold that pleasure is the only thing of intrinsic value and, thus, that a 
person’s well-being is reducible to the amount of pleasure she experiences. One way to 
challenge hedonism is to contest the claim that only pleasure is intrinsically valuable; a well-
known argument of this form is found in Robert Nozicks experience machine thought 
experiment, which suggests that other things matter to us in addition to how things feel on 
the inside. A plausible reading of the notion of other things mattering to us is to understand 
this as a way of saying that other things besides pleasure, or how things feel, have intrinsic 
value. If this is correct, then hedonism is mistaken. What goes unchallenged with this kind of 
argument is the assumption that pleasure has intrinsic value. However, the view that 
pleasure is intrinsically valuable can be challenged by considering the evolutionary role of 
pleasure as an experiential signal that both tracks individual well-being enhancing activity 
and motivates an individual to pursue things which contribute to his or her well-being. These 
ideas should hold, mutatis mutandis, for pain. Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson have 
argued that evolutionary psychology provides grounds for rejecting psychological hedonism. 
However, the argument we will consider is that reflecting upon an evolutionary account of 
the emergence of the capacity for pleasurable experiences provides a reminder of the 
important relationship pleasures, as a kind, have to other goods, and thus cannot have their 
value intrinsically. This is an argument against normative hedonism. If it is correct, then 
pleasure has value, but not intrinsic value, and thus is not the summum bonum. As a result, 
hedonism, in its normative sense, fails to provide a plausible conception of well-being.  
Notes: A very interesting argument against the view that hedonism has intrinsic value. It 
rests on an evolutionary analysis of the function of ‘pleasures’ and, if correct, undermines 
the dominant, hedonistic orientation of much work on psychological well-being (Subjective 
Well-Being/ SWB). Relates to evolutionary psychology and well-being. 
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270. Post, S. G.   (2005). Altruism, happiness, and health: It's good to be good. 
International Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 12(2), 66-77. Article. 
Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000229598100004. 
doi:10.1207/s15327558ijbm1202_4 
Abstract: Altruistic (other-regarding) emotions and behaviors are associated with greater 
well-being, health, and longevity. This article presents a summary and assessment of existing 
research data on altruism and its relation to mental and physical health. It suggests several 
complementary interpretive frameworks, including evolutionary biology, physiological 
models, and positive psychology. Potential public health implications of this research are 
discussed, as well its directions for future studies. The article concludes, with some caveats, 
that a strong correlation exists between the well-being, happiness, health, and longevity of 
people who are emotionally and behaviorally compassionate, so long as they are not 
overwhelmed by helping tasks. 
Notes: A review of empirical literature on the relationship between altruistic behaviour and 
well-being. It suggests that, in general, altruistic activity enhances health and well-being. 
Relates to well-being. 
271. Powell, L. J.  ; Macrae, C. N.  ; Cloutier, J.  ; Metcalfe, J.   & Mitchell, J. P.   
(2010). Dissociable neural substrates for agentic versus conceptual 
representations of self. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 22(10), 2186-
2197. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000279058400004. 
doi:10.1162/jocn.2009.21368 
Abstract: Although humans generally experience a coherent sense of selfhood, we can 
nevertheless articulate different aspects of self. Recent research has demonstrated that one 
such aspect of self-conceptual knowledge of one's own personality traits is subserved by 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vMPFC). Here, we examined whether an alternative aspect 
of "self"-being an agent who acts to achieve one's own goals-relies on cognitive processes 
that overlap with or diverge from conceptual operationalizations of selfhood. While 
undergoing fMRI, participants completed tasks of both conceptual self-reference, in which 
they judged their own or another person's personality traits, and agentic self-reference, in 
which they freely chose an object or watched passively as one was chosen. The agentic task 
failed to modulate vMPFC, despite producing the same memory enhancement frequently 
observed during conceptual self-referential processing (the "self-reference" effect). Instead, 
agentic self-reference was associated with activation of the intraparietal sulcus (IPS), a 
region previously implicated in planning and executing actions. Experiment 2 further 
demonstrated that IPS activity correlated with later memory performance for the agentic, 
but not conceptual, task. These results support views of the "self" as a collection of distinct 
mental operations distributed throughout the brain, rather than a unitary cognitive system. 
Notes: Demonstrates a neurological disjunction between two aspects of the self (self as 
agent and self as known entity). Both neurological events are associated with improved 
memory through self-reference (respectively to the kind of self being referenced – agentic or 
known). While not mentioned by the authors, these results have conceptual connections to 
G.H. Mead’s distinction between the ‘I’ (agent) and the ‘me’ (known). Relates to 
personhood. 
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272. Praetorius, N.   (2009). The phenomenological underpinning of the 
notion of a minimal core self: A psychological perspective. Consciousness 
and Cognition, 18(1), 325-338. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1053810008000366. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2008.03.005 
Abstract: The paper argues that Zahavi’s defence of the self as an experiential dimension, i.e. 
“identified with the first-person givenness of experiential phenomena”, and of the notion of 
a pre-reflective minimal core self relies on an unwarranted assumption. It is assumed that 
awareness of the phenomenal mode of experiences of objects, i.e. what the object “feels” 
like for the experiencer, is comparable with, indeed entails, first-person givenness of 
experience. In consequence both the arguments concerning the foundational role of the pre-
reflective minimal core self and the explanation of the unity and identity of the self through 
time give rise to intractable problems. 
Notes: A conceptual criticism of the account of a minimal, pre-reflective core self that 
underpins phenomenological experience in consciousness. Relates to personhood.  
273. Prinz, W.   (2003). Emerging selves: Representational foundations of 
subjectivity. Consciousness and Cognition, 12(4), 515-528. Retrieved 
from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1053810003000539. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1053-8100(03)00053-9 
Abstract: A hypothetical evolutionary scenario is offered meant to account for the 
emergence of mental selves. According to the scenario, mental selves are constructed to 
solve a source-attribution problem. They emerge when internally generated mental contents 
(e.g., thoughts and goals) are treated like messages arising from external personal sources. 
As a result, mental content becomes attributed to the self as an internal personal source. 
According to this view, subjectivity is construed outward-in, that is, one’s own mental self is 
derived from, and is secondary to, the mental selves perceived in others. The social 
construction of subjectivity and selfhood relies on, and is maintained in, various discourses 
on subjectivity. 
Notes: An interesting hypothesis that combines evolutionary insights with social 
constructionist assumptions to posit that the personal self is a necessary construction used 
to explain the existence of mental content (e.g., thoughts and goals). This hypothesis 
presumably also has an ontogenetic dimension. Relates to a social constructionist/ discursive 
account of personhood. 
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274. Rakoczy, H.   (2006). Pretend play and the development of collective 
intentionality. Cognitive Systems Research, 7(2–3), 113-127. Retrieved 
from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1389041706000052. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogsys.2005.11.008 
Abstract: Young children’s pretend play is considered in the context of the development of 
collective intentionality. It is argued that (i) early pretending is an essentially social and 
culturally acquired form of action, and (ii) early social pretend play can be considered as the 
first form of true collective intentionality in ontogeny – involving shared cooperative 
activities and even some rudimentary form of joint creation of status functions. Recent 
experimental studies are reported that provide evidence for the claims. Finally, philosophical 
implications of these claims and findings are discussed. The most important implication that 
emerges is that existing conceptual analyses of collective intentionality stand in need of 
being supplemented by more fine-grained taxonomies for the description of such early 
forms of collective intentionality. 
Notes: An account of the role of pretend play in the development of collective/cooperative 
intentionality. Its significance concerns the development of a social self through pretence. 
Relates to personhood. 
275. Rapport, N. J.   (2001). Personhood, Anthropology of. In J. S. Editors-in-
Chief:  Neil & B. B. Paul (Eds.), International Encyclopedia of the Social & 
Behavioral Sciences (pp. 11339-11343). Oxford: Pergamon. Retrieved 
from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B0080430767009359. 
doi:10.1016/b0-08-043076-7/00935-9 
Abstract: 'The Anthropology of Personhood’ concerns the exploration of the nature of the 
identity of the individual actor and the relationship between that identity and the symbolic 
forms and material practices of different sociocultural milieux. Beginning with Durkheim, 
and tracing out a line of thought that continues with Mauss, Geertz, and others, the article 
describes work that has dealt with the diversity of sociocultural conceptions of the human 
individual and how these connect with other sociocultural ‘institutions’ (family, law, 
exchange) in such a way as to determine differences in human experience. The individual 
actor of Western society is seen to be the result of a recent and exceptional historico-
cultural development. This line of thought may be contrasted, however, with one associated 
with Leach, MacFarlane, Burridge, and others that denies the priority (ontological, 
developmental, historical) of the societal in its causing and conditioning of individual 
experience. It borrows from Weber appreciation that the particular acts of individual 
persons remain the sole carrier of meaningful conduct. While ‘individualism’ describes a 
particular sociocultural conceptualization of behavior (the pursuit of self-distinguishment), 
the article concludes, ‘individuality’ pertains to experience that is universal; by virtue of a 
unique consciousness, each of us engages with the world as other and is possessed of 
dinstinct perspectives upon it. 
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Notes: An overview of the dominant approaches to understanding the person in 
anthropological theory. These include threads that prioritise the social and the individual in 
the creation of individual persons. Relates to personhood. 
276. Reid, A.   (2004). Gender and sources of subjective well-being. Sex Roles, 
51(11-12), 617-629. Article. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://WOS:000226732500001. doi:10.1007/s11199-004-0714-1 
Abstract: The literature on national differences in sources of well-being (Kwan, Bond, & 
Singelis, 1997) was used to generate predictions about gender differences in sources of well-
being. This linkage was made possible by parallels between national and gender differences 
in individualism, collectivism, and selfhood (Markus & Kitayama, 1994). Respondents 
completed measures of self-construal, self-esteem, relationship harmony, and well-being 
(positive and negative affect). As anticipated, men's well-being was predicted better by self-
esteem than by relationship harmony, whereas women's well-being was predicted similarly 
(though more moderately) by self-esteem and relationship harmony. A mediated pathway 
from independent self-construal to well-being through self-esteem was predicted and 
supported. Conceptual fit of this study with previous cross-national and gender research is 
discussed. 
Notes: An empirical study of the relationship between gender and subjective well-being, 
finding that women’s SWB was best predicted by both self-esteem and relationship harmony 
while men’s was best predicted by self-esteem rather than relationship harmony. Relates to 
well-being. 
277. Reyes-García, V.  ; Godoy, R.  ; Huanca, T.  ; Leonard, W. R.  ; McDade, T.  
; Tanner, S.  ; et al. (2007). The origins of monetary income inequality: 
Patience, human capital, and division of labor. Evolution and Human 
Behavior, 28(1), 37-47. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090513806000638. 
doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2006.07.001 
Abstract: We present an explanation about the origins of monetary income inequality when 
an economically self-sufficient society opens to a market economy. The chain of associations 
runs from patience, to the accumulation of different forms of human capital, to self-
selection into different occupations, and to the division of labor, which contributes to 
monetary income inequality. In a self-sufficient society, patience is exogenously determined 
and people rely on folk knowledge as the only form of human capital. With the 
establishment of schools, patient and impatient people sort themselves out by the type of 
human capital they begin to accumulate. Impatient people do not acquire folk knowledge 
because return to schooling takes many years to bear fruit. Schooling opens opportunities in 
occupations outside the village, whereas folk knowledge enhances employment 
opportunities that draw on farming or foraging. Self-selection into different occupations with 
different earnings potential spawns monetary income inequality. To test the explanation, we 
draw on data from a foraging–farming society in the Bolivian Amazon, the Tsimane'. We 
collected data during four consecutive quarters in 1999–2000 and a follow-up interview 
(2004). Data came from 151 adults (age, 16 years or more) from all households (n=48) in two 
villages with different levels of market exposure. During 1999–2000, impatience was 
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associated with (a) greater folk knowledge and fewer years of schooling, (b) lower likelihood 
of working in wage labor, and (c) greater likelihood of working in rural subsistence 
occupations. People who had been patient in 1999–2000 had greater wage earnings and 
more modern physical assets in 2004. 
Notes: An analysis of data from an empirical study of the development of income 
inequalities in a society in transition from a self-sufficient to a market economy. Provides 
one possible explanation for how income inequalities might develop. Useful analysis given 
the connection between inequality and well-being. Relates to personhood (as it relates to 
personality) and (economic) well-being 
278. Richerson, P. J.   & Boyd, R.   (1989). The role of evolved predispositions 
in cultural evolution: Or, human sociobiology meets Pascal's Wager. 
Ethology and Sociobiology, 10(1–3), 195-219. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0162309589900198. 
doi:10.1016/0162-3095(89)90019-8 
Abstract: Much human behavior affected by culturally transmitted ideas—e.g., religious 
sentiments— does not appear to make adaptive sense. Whether sound sociobiological 
explanations can or cannot be given to such behavior is at the heart of debates between 
human sociobiologists and their critics. We argue that the debate has been miscast as a clash 
between mutually exclusive hypotheses, when in theory and probably in fact there are many 
cases that mix elements of both. When culture, using Darwinian methods, is modeled as a 
system of inheritance that coevolves with genes, it exhibits both adaptive properties and a 
series of processes that give rise to maladaptive variation. On the one hand, there is every 
reason to expect that cultural evolution is substantially shaped by evolved, genetically 
transmitted predispositions and that these predispositions often result in highly adaptive 
behavior. However, some kinds of beliefs are weakly affected by evolved predispositions and 
can have strong effects on behavior. For example, religious sentiments are carefully 
constructed to be difficult to challenge on the basis of empirical experience. Beliefs in 
rewards or punishments in an afterlife can substantially affect the behavior of people with 
quite utilitarian evolved goals. Once beliefs arise that are difficult to judge using evolved 
predispositions, processes such as group selection on cultural variation can be relatively 
strong. Patterns of behavior that could not be predicted without taking account of the 
evolutionary properties of culture can arise as a result of such “nonsociobiological” forces. 
Four coevolutionary scenarios capture much of the rich behavior that is possible when 
genetic and cultural evolution interact: 1) Culture may be kept on a “leash” by evolved 
predispositions, as classical sociobiological arguments would have it; 2) the tables may be 
turned, and genes may be leashed by the evolution of cultural norms that affect mate choice 
(we present a simple model of this process); 3) harmful cultural elements with an ability to 
attract imitators may arise, leading to a host-pathogen type of coevolution between genes 
and culture; and 4) genes and culture may evolve like a system of obligate mutualists. We 
speculate that the last scenario is the most generally important, but that the others are 
common. We view the application of population genetical methodology to cultural evolution 
as a friendly amendment to human sociobiology, but one that is essential to a complete 
Darwinian theory of human behavior. 
Notes: An early and significant account of the links between evolutionary and cultural 
explanations of human behaviour. It forefronts gene-culture co-evolution as part of the 
explanation. Given the centrality of cultural belief systems in identity and personhood 
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formation, this discussion helps conceptualise the relationships between evolution and 
personhood. Relates to personhood and evolutionary psychology/explanations. 
279. Robinson, D. N. . (2012). Personhood: What's in a name? New Ideas in 
Psychology, 30(1), 89-96. 
Abstract: Although there are persistent metaphysical challenges to the notion of “natural 
kinds” of entities that are what they are essentially, all developed and useful taxonomies are 
based on just such notions. “Persons,” if they are to be distinguished from other kinds of 
things, must possess unique properties or the potential for acquiring such properties. 
Reductive strategies, far from locating these properties, ignore them and thus render the 
concept of “person” either ambiguous or unintelligible. The properties that count, it is 
argued here, are those associated with moral and civic forms of life. 
Notes: "Whether or not an entity is granted the status of a person- is taken to have attained 
personhood- has and can have significant consequences", particularly if only the criteria of 
'rational beings' is applied, as robots can be designed to be rational thinkers. Robinson 
briefly discusses some theories of personhood, from Aristotle to current thinking. He argues 
that as well as rationality there also needs to be a moral and ethical component denoted by 
the category ‘person’. He provides an account of why this is important. Relates to 
personhood. 
280. Robson, A. J.   (2002). Evolution and human nature. The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 16(2), 89-106. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/212081032?accountid=27890 
No abstract. 
Notes: "The economist's basic picture of preferences, beliefs and rationality has been 
subject to challenges from a growing number of empirical anomalies". The author offers an 
account of how biological evolution may have affected preferences, beliefs and rationality. 
Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood. 
281. Roca, C. P.   & Helbing, D.   (2011). Emergence of social cohesion in a 
model society of greedy, mobile individuals. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, 108(28), 11370-11374. Retrieved from 
http://www.pnas.org/content/108/28/11370.abstract. 
doi:10.1073/pnas.1101044108 
Abstract: Human well-being in modern societies relies on social cohesion, which can be 
characterized by high levels of cooperation and a large number of social ties. Both features, 
however, are frequently challenged by individual self-interest. In fact, the stability of social 
and economic systems can suddenly break down as the recent financial crisis and outbreaks 
of civil wars illustrate. To understand the conditions for the emergence and robustness of 
social cohesion, we simulate the creation of public goods among mobile agents, assuming 
that behavioral changes are determined by individual satisfaction. Specifically, we study a 
generalized win-stay-lose-shift learning model, which is only based on previous experience 
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and rules out greenbeard effects that would allow individuals to guess future gains. The 
most noteworthy aspect of this model is that it promotes cooperation in social dilemma 
situations despite very low information requirements and without assuming imitation, a 
shadow of the future, reputation effects, signaling, or punishment. We find that moderate 
greediness favors social cohesion by a coevolution between cooperation and spatial 
organization, additionally showing that those cooperation-enforcing levels of greediness can 
be evolutionarily selected. However, a maladaptive trend of increasing greediness, although 
enhancing individuals’ returns in the beginning, eventually causes cooperation and social 
relationships to fall apart. Our model is, therefore, expected to shed light on the long-
standing problem of the emergence and stability of cooperative behavior. 
Notes: A fascinating model of how ‘greediness’, at a moderate level, can produce 
cooperative relations given certain spatial relations. Relates to personhood/self and 
evolution and well-being 
282. Roland, C. E.   & Foxx, R. M.   (2003). Self-respect: A neglected concept. 
Philosophical Psychology, 16(2), 247-288. Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515080307764. 
doi:10.1080/09515080307764 
Abstract: Although neglected by psychology, self-respect has been an integral part of 
philosophical discussion since Aristotle and continues to be a central issue in contemporary 
moral philosophy. Within this tradition, self-respect is considered to be based on one's 
capacity for rationality and leads to behaviors that promote autonomy, such as 
independence, self-control and tenacity. Self-respect elicits behaviors that one should be 
treated with respect and requires the development and pursuit of personal standards and 
life plans that are guided by respect for self and others. In contrast, the psychological 
concept of self-esteem is grounded in the theories of self-concept. As such, self-esteem is a 
self-evaluation of competency ratios and opinions of significant others that results in either a 
positive or negative evaluation of one's worthiness and inclusionary status. The major 
distinction between the two is that while competency ratios and others' opinions are central 
to self-esteem, autonomy is central to self-respect. We submit that not only is self-respect 
important in understanding self-esteem, but that it also uniquely contributes to individual 
functioning. Research is needed to establish the central properties of self-respect and their 
effects on individual functioning, developmental factors, and therapeutic approaches. 
Notes: Argues that the focus on self-esteem in psychology, rather than self-respect, has 
meant that the important links between self-respect and autonomy have been overlooked. 
Given that autonomy is central to many aspects of adaptive functioning it is also likely to be 
of importance in understanding the development of persons and the effectiveness of 
individual functioning. Has significance for understanding the nature of autonomy in 
persons. Relates to personhood. 
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283. Rubinstein, D.   (2004). Language games and natural reactions. Journal 
for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 34(1), 55-71. Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5914.2004.00234.x. 
doi:10.1111/j.1468-5914.2004.00234.x 
Abstract: Ludwig Wittgenstein imagines a variety of eccentric social practices—like a tribe 
trained “to give no expression of feeling of any kind”. But he also speaks of “the common 
behavior of mankind” that is rooted in “natural/primitive reactions”. This emphasis on the 
uniformities of human behavior raises questions about the plausibility of some of his 
imagined language games. Indeed, it suggests the claim of evolutionary psychologists that 
there are biologically based human universals that shape social practices. But in contrast to 
E.O. Wilson's belief that “genes hold culture on a leash”, Wittgenstein sees culture as a 
mediator—rather than a conduit—of “natural reactions”. This suggests that social science 
can incorporate the claims of evolutionary psychology without scanting the centrality of 
culture in action and allows that nature can be overwhelmed by culture. 
Notes: This presentation of a Wittgensteinian analysis of the role of ‘human universals’ in 
social interaction argues that it is possible to sustain a dominant role for culture in 
determining human action that is compatible with acceptance of an evolved nature. Relates 
to evolutionary psychology and personhood. 
284. Ryan, R. M.   & Deci, E. L.   (2001). On happiness and human potentials: A 
review of research on hedonic and eudaimonic well-being. Annual 
Review of Psychology, 52, 141-166. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/205845157?accountid=27890 
Abstract: Well-being is a complex construct that concerns optimal experience and 
functioning. Current research on well-being has been derived from two general perspectives: 
the hedonic approach, which focuses on happiness and defines well-being in terms of 
pleasure attainment and pain avoidance; and the eudaimonic approach, which focuses on 
meaning and self-realization and defines well-being in terms of the degree to which a person 
is fully functioning. These two views have given rise to different research foci and a body of 
knowledge that is in some areas divergent and in others complementary. New 
methodological developments concerning multi-level modeling and construct comparisons 
are also allowing researchers to formulate new questions for the field. This review considers 
research from both perspectives concerning the nature of well-being, its antecedents, and 
its stability across time and culture. 
Notes: A significant overview of the two main approaches to well-being – hedonic and 
eudaimonic.  Of particular interest is the focus, in the eudaimonic approach, on optimal 
functioning at the personal level as an indicator of well-being. Relates to well-being and 
personhood. 
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285. Ryff, C. D.  ; Singer, B.H.   & Dienberg Love, G.   (2004). Positive health: 
connecting well-being with biology. Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society of London B. Biological Sciences., 359(1449  September 29), 
1383–1394. 
Abstract: Two key types of well-being, eudaimonic and hedonic, are reviewed. The first 
addresses ideas of self-development, personal growth and purposeful engagement, while 
the second is concerned with positive feelings such as happiness and contentment. How 
well-being varies by age and socio-economic standing is briefly summarized, followed by 
examination of its biological correlates (neuroendocrine, immune, cardiovascular, rapid eye 
movement (REM) sleep). Preliminary findings on a sample of ageing women showed that 
those with higher levels of eudaimonic well-being had lower levels of daily salivary cortisol, 
pro-inflammatory cytokines, cardiovascular risk, and longer duration REM sleep compared 
with those showing lower levels of eudaimonic well-being. Hedonic well-being, however, 
showed minimal linkage to biomarker assessments. Future research directions building on 
these initial findings are discussed. 
Notes: An interesting empirically-grounded study of the relationship between both 
eudaimonic and hedonic well-being and health risks (stress, cardiovascular risk, etc.) in a 
sample of elderly women. Eudaimonic well-being is related to indicators of better such 
health. Relates to personhood and well-being. 
286. Santor, D. A.   & Walker, J.   (1999). Garnering the interest of others: 
Mediating the effects among physical attractiveness, self-worth and 
dominance. British Journal of Social Psychology, 38, 461-477. Article. 
Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000084426500007. 
doi:10.1348/014466699164275 
Objectives. Evolutionary psychologists emphasize that self-worth and well-being are largely 
determined by the degree to which individuals garner and hold the interest of others. 
Personal attributes, such as physical attractiveness, are viewed as resources which serve as 
signals to others to pay attention to us.  
Design and method. This study examined (a) the degree to which participant appraisals (N = 
75) of self-worth were related to appraisals of how interested others were in them; and (b) 
the extent to which interest ratings account for the relation among self-worth, dominance 
and attractiveness ratings.  
Results. The main findings of the present study showed (a) that the degree to which 
individuals derive self-worth from various attributes was strongly related to the degree to 
which individuals believed others were interested in them; and (b) that the amount of 
interest one believes others show in them mediated the relation between physical 
attractiveness and social self-worth.  
Conclusion. Results have a number of implications concerning the nature of self-worth and 
the utility of psychological theories that emphasize evolutionary principles. 
Notes: This study highlights the connections between the self-worth gained from personal 
attributes and appraisals of others’ interest in oneself. In addition, it adopted an 
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evolutionary analysis to derive the hypotheses. Relates to personhood, well-being and 
evolutionary psychology. 
287. Savage, J.   & Kanazawa, S.   (2004). Social capital and the human psyche: 
Why is social life "capital"? Sociological Theory, 22(3), 504-524. Article. 
Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000223287900009. 
doi:10.1111/j.0735-2751.2004.00231.x 
Abstract: In this article, we propose a revised definition of social capital, premised on the 
principles of evolutionary psychology. We define social capital as any feature of a social 
relationship that, directly or indirectly, confers reproductive benefits to a participant in that 
relationship. This definition grounds the construct of social capital in human nature by 
providing a basis for inferring the underlying motivations that humans may have in common, 
rather than leaving the matter of what humans use capital for unspoken. Discussions and 
empirical reviews are presented on the innateness of human sociability, sex differences in 
sociability, and psychological mechanisms that mediate sociability. 
Notes: Social capital has many definitions, and the authors believe that this is due to the 
failure to specify motivation for human behavior. This perspective is based on evolutionary 
psychology and defines social capital as "any feature of a social relationship that, directly or 
indirectly,confers reproductive benefits to a participant in that relationship", thus providing 
a common motivation. 
Relates to evolutionary psychology. 
288. Schwalbe, M. L.   (1993). Goffman against postmodernism - emotion and 
the reality of the self. Symbolic Interaction, 16(4), 333-350. Article. 
Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:A1993MP10700002. 
doi:10.1525/si.1993.16.4.333 
Abstract: Goffman has been read as arguing that selves are no more than images created in 
conformity with situational expectations. I read Goffman as saying that the reality of 
selfhood is not an image, but a psychobiological process shaped by signs and symbols. Seen 
in this way, the reality of the self is evident, as Goffman suggested, not in conformity but in 
moments of feeling, resistance, and choice. Drawing out what is implicit in Goffman, this 
article proposes that all forms of signifying behavior, including self-presentations, are means 
to sustain the coherence of the self. For this to work, however, people must, as Goffman 
pointed out, trust each other to respect the rules governing signifying behavior and must 
care about the feelings attached to selves. The article argues that the inequalities of so-
called postmodern society are undermining the trust and care on which the interaction 
order and coherent selfhood depend. Goffman's ideas about the self are used to develop an 
optimistic critique of the conditions that have produced these pernicious trends. 
Notes: A sociological account of the self based on an analysis of Goffman’s ideas. Useful as a 
sociological approach that attempts to incorporate the biological and psychological 
underpinnings of being a self. Relates to personhood. 
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289. Sedikides, C.   & Skowronski, J. A.   (1997). The symbolic self in 
evolutionary context. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 1, 80-
102. 
Abstract: We propose that the capacity for a symbolic self (a flexible and multifaceted 
cognitive representation of an organism's own attributes) in humans is a product of 
evolution. In pursuing this argument, we note that some primates possess rudimentary 
elements of a self (an objectified self) and that the symbolic self (a) is a trait that is widely 
shared among humans, (b) serves adaptive functions, and (c) could have evolved in response 
to environmental pressures, with ecological and social pressures being of particular 
relevance. We suggest that these two environmental pressures caused the symbolic self to 
emerge in the Pleistocene epoch as an adaptation for Homo erectus, and we review the 
possible functions served by such an adaptation. 
 Notes: Discusses the relationship between evolutionary adaptation and possession of a 
symbolic self. An important article that produced a series of studies on the same theme. 
Relates to personhood and evolutionary psychology. 
290. Sharma, S.   & Sharma, M.   (2010). Self, social identity and psychological 
well-being. Psychological Studies, 55(2), 118-136. Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12646-010-0011-8. doi:10.1007/s12646-010-
0011-8 
Abstract: Self and social identity are key elements in the understanding of a person’s 
strivings for health and well-being. This review (i) examines the concepts of self, social 
identity, and psychological well-being; (ii) integrates empirical evidence that relates various 
self-aspects or social identities to psychological well-being; (iii) analyzes within a stress and 
coping framework the well-being consequences of socially devalued self or threatened 
identities, perceived discriminations, challenges of acculturation and identity management; 
and (iv) delineates the role of self, social identity and related psycho-social variables as 
moderators and mediators in pathways leading to psychological well-being. Besides listing 
some methodological issues and empirical deficits, major concerns for future research are 
also identified. An explicit self and social identity perspective of this research synthesis 
brings personal and social aspects together, and this interface offers exciting opportunities 
for research advancement. 
Notes: A comprehensive review of the relationships between self, social identity and well-
being. Relates to personhood and well-being. 
291. Sheldon, K. M.   (2004). Optimal human being: An integrated multi-level 
perspective. Mahwah, NJ, US: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers. 
Retrieved from http://psycnet.apa.org/psycinfo/2004-17129-000 
Abstract: This book tackles two large and perennially debated questions: How can research 
scientists best integrate the different levels of analysis within the human sciences to create a 
complete picture? And how can individual persons best integrate the different levels or 
facets of themselves to achieve optimal being? I describe how these two questions 
complement each other and converge in important ways. I attempt to deliver a scientifically 
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supported message, one that is consistent with much that is found in the self-help books, 
but that rests on a strong foundation of empirical research. Thus, although the book is 
intended primarily for research psychologists and other biological and social scientists, I 
believe any educated reader will find it interesting and useful. Indeed, one important goal of 
the book is to provide readers with concrete tools they can use to effect personal growth. In 
addition, the book also serves as a useful supplemental text for graduate or undergraduate 
courses in personality psychology; one aim of the book is to canvass and integrate 
contemporary personality theory (as described next). Finally, the book serves as a text or 
supplement for courses in motivation, positive psychology, well-being, personal growth, or 
positive adaptation. 
Notes: Attempts to provide a major theoretical framework to incorporate understandings of 
human nature and personal flourishing. Relates to personhood and well-being. 
292. Sheldon, K. M.   & Gunz, A.   (2009). Psychological needs as basic 
motives, not just experiential requirements. Journal of Personality, 77(5), 
1467-1492. Article. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://WOS:000269503000009. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.2009.00589.x 
Abstract: Self-determination theory (SDT) posits three evolved psychological needs, for 
autonomy, competence, and relatedness. Considerable research has established that all 
three experiences are important for well-being. However, no SDT research has examined 
whether unmet needs have motivational force, an important criterion for establishing that 
certain experiences are indeed basic needs and motives (R. F. Baumeister & M. R. Leary, 
1995). Three studies, using cross-sectional, experimental, and longitudinal methodologies, 
supply evidence that felt deficits in autonomy, competence, and relatedness arouse 
corresponding desires to acquire the missing experiences. However, a positive surfeit of felt-
need satisfaction did not predict reduced desires for the corresponding needs. Implications 
for homeostatic, evolutionary, and humanistic perspectives upon basic psychological needs 
are discussed. 
Notes: Provides evidence that needs for autonomy, competence and relatedness are 
motivational but that ‘satisfaction’ of those needs does not diminish them. Provides a 
significant link between evolutionary and humanistic accounts of individual persons. Relates 
to personhood and well-being. 
293. Sheldon, K. M.  ; Ryan, R. M.  ; Rawsthorne, L. J.   & Ilardi, B.   (1997). 
Trait self and true self: Cross-role variation in the big-five personality 
traits and its relations with psychological authenticity and subjective 
well-being. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73(6), 1380-
1393. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:A1997YK98900020. 
doi:10.1037//0022-3514.73.6.1380 
Abstract: In two studies, college students evidenced differing levels of the ''Big-Five'' traits in 
different roles, supporting social-contextualist assumptions regarding trait expression. 
Supporting organismic theories of personality within-subject variations in the Big Five were 
predictable from variations in the degree of psychological authenticity felt in different roles. 
In addition, two concepts of self-integration or true selfhood were examined: One based on 
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high consistency of trait profiles across roles (i.e., low-self-concept differentiation; E. M. 
Donahue, R. W. Robins, B. W. Roberts, & O.P. John, 1993) and one based on high mean 
levels of authenticity felt across roles. The two self-integration measures were found to be 
independent predictors of psychological and physical well-being indicating that both self-
consistency and psychological authenticity are vital for organized functioning and health. 
Notes: An interesting study of the relationships between perceived true self and role self in 
which consistency between perceptions of self and expression of the ‘Big Five’ personality 
traits across roles is related to both psychological and physical well-being. Relates to 
personhood and well-being. 
294. Shepher, J.   & Reisman, J.   (1985). Pornography: A sociobiological 
attempt at understanding. Ethology and Sociobiology, 6(2), 103-114. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0162309585900032. 
doi:10.1016/0162-3095(85)90003-2 
Abstract: It is now generally conceded that humans engage in sexually dimorphic mating 
strategies, due largely to the high female versus the low male genetic investment in the 
rearing of offspring. This uneven investment has, arguably, led to: a) female preference for 
monogamously receptive males who are prepared to protect and nurture the female and 
their mutual offspring, and b) male requirements that the chosen female assure the investor 
of his paternity. Pornography is addressed here as media information delivery of a 
physiological arousal experience with roots in male sexual strategy/fantasy. Should 
pornography sufficiently arouse a biologically determined male predisposition for polygamy, 
then its informational system may be contributing to contemporary male frustration and 
even aggressivity toward the female in general and monogamous patterns of sexuality in 
particular. It may be argued that if the visual data of pornography encourages distrust of 
female sexual fidelity and a distorted perception of female personhood, such data could 
encourage disdain and/or animosity toward heterosexual comradeship and the value of such 
comradeship for individual and social solvency. 
Notes: Taking the case of modern forms of pornography, this early article argues that 
through appeal to evolved male sexual goals and predispositions, modern pornography may 
misrepresent female personhood and stimulate doubts over female fidelity for males. This, 
in turn, could lead to more aggressive male views of females. An interesting example of the 
application of evolutionary understandings to social and economic processes that may 
influence ordinary understandings of personhood. Relates to evolutionary psychology and 
personhood. 
295. Sherwood, D. A.   (2009). Hnau what? C. S. Lewis on what it means to be 
a person. Social Work and Christianity, 36(1), 1-13. 
Abstract: The conversation often seems to ignore the fact that different worldviews lead to 
widely divergent answers to the question, "What is a person?" or, "What does it mean to be 
a person?" Most secular modern or post-modern conceptualizations of the nature of 
personhood are not robust enough to support the notions of human rights and civil rights we 
tend to assume. Sociobiology and evolutionary psychology, which require an amazing faith in 
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the ability of genes to stimulate behavior that perpetuates the genes but not necessarily the 
carrier of the genes, do not provide a plausible account of actual human behavior. A robust 
and sustainable understanding of personhood involves rationality, moral order beyond 
personal preference, social construction, or utilitarian power, and, ultimately, trust in and 
obedience to God. 
Notes: Argues that secular accounts of personhood cannot explain or sustain the full range 
of human behaviour and experience. Interesting for its highlighting of supposed 
inadequacies in current evolutionary and scientific accounts of personhood. Relates to 
personhood and evolutionary psychology 
296. Sidtis, D.   & Kreiman, J.   (2012). In the beginning was the familiar voice: 
Personally familiar voices in the evolutionary and contemporary biology 
of communication. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 
46(2), 146-159. Article. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://WOS:000303415100002. doi:10.1007/s12124-011-9177-4 
Abstract: The human voice is described in dialogic linguistics as an embodiment of self in a 
social context, contributing to expression, perception and mutual exchange of self, 
consciousness, inner life, and personhood. While these approaches are subjective and arise 
from phenomenological perspectives, scientific facts about personal vocal identity, and its 
role in biological development, support these views. It is our purpose to review studies of 
the biology of personal vocal identity-the familiar voice pattern-as providing an empirical 
foundation for the view that the human voice is an embodiment of self in the social context. 
Recent developments in the biology and evolution of communication are concordant with 
these notions, revealing that familiar voice recognition (also known as vocal identity 
recognition or individual vocal recognition) has contributed to survival in the earliest 
vocalizing species. Contemporary ethology documents the crucial role of familiar voices 
across animal species in signaling and perceiving internal states and personal identities. 
Neuropsychological studies of voice reveal multimodal cerebral associations arising across 
brain structures involved in memory, emotion, attention, and arousal in vocal perception 
and production, such that the voice represents the whole person. Although its roots are in 
evolutionary biology, human competence for processing layered social and personal 
meanings in the voice, as well as personal identity in a large repertory of familiar voice 
patterns, has achieved an immense sophistication. 
Notes: A fascinating review of the relationships between the biology of vocal identity, 
including its evolutionary basis, and the socially-mediated self or person. Presents the 
neuropsychology of vocal identity and recognition as an evolved feature enabling survival. 
Relates to personhood and evolutionary psychology. 
297. Silvers, S.   (2010). Methodological and moral muddles in evolutionary 
psychology. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 31(1-2), 65-83. Article. 
Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000280876600005 
Abstract: Evolutionary psychology, the self-proclaimed scientific theory of human nature, 
owes much of its controversial notoriety to reports in public media. In part this is because of 
its bold claims that human psychological characteristics are adaptations to the Pleistocene 
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environment in which they evolved and these inherited characteristics we exhibit now 
constitute our human nature. Proponents maintain that evolutionary psychology is a 
scientific account of human nature that explains what this much abused concept means. 
Critics counter that some evolutionary psychological hypotheses threaten to undermine 
other intuitive concepts of human nature and well-being, specifically, by emphasizing 
purported scientific evidence of natural inequalities based on sex, gender, or race. They 
argue that this "gene machine" view entails consequences endorsing or at least seeming to 
give scientific aid and comfort to politically conservative, "right-wing" social agendas. 
Proponents deny that the theory has such unwelcome implications. Such objections, they 
reply, stem from "left-wing" egalitarian ideologies that presuppose the cogency of the 
disputed tabula rasa concept of mind intrinsic to the standard social science model of 
behavior explanations. Philip Kitcher's (1985) initial scathing analysis of sociobiology, now 
called evolutionary psychology, as the science of human nature went basically unchallenged. 
Bioethicist Janet Radcliffe Richards (2000) has given a detailed critique of Kitcher's 
arguments; she finds them to be "leftward-leaning," and wanting. Here I examine her 
arguments and find them wanting though not "rightward-leaning." 
Notes: A useful overview of the politically-charged nature of the public profile of standard 
evolutionary psychology. Relates to evolutionary psychology. 
298. Skowronski, J. J.   & Walker, W. R.   (2012). Autobiographical 
remembering and the self. In V. S. R. Editor-in-Chief (Ed.), Encyclopedia 
of Human Behavior (Second Edition) (pp. 251-256). San Diego: Academic 
Press. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780123750006000
483. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-375000-6.00048-3 
Abstract: As illustrated by the insights and ideas of philosophers such as John Locke, the 
exact relation between autobiographical memory and the self has long been a focus of 
scholarly interest. Recent efforts have explored these insights and ideas using the scientific 
techniques available to modern psychology. This article provides an entrée into this realm, 
highlighting research that explores (a) whether an episodic memory is necessary for a sense 
of self; (b) how the self directs and molds the contents of autobiographical recall; and (c) 
some of the cognitive, social, and developmental processes that are involved in the relation 
between the self and autobiographical recall. 
Notes: Provides an overview of the relation between autobiographical memory and the 
sense of self. Combines developmental perspectives and the reciprocal interaction between 
the sense of the self and autobiographical memory. Relates to personhood. 
299. Slaby, J.   (2010). Steps towards a critical neuroscience. Phenomenology 
and the Cognitive Sciences, 9(3), 397-416. Article. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://WOS:000280598700005. doi:10.1007/s11097-010-9170-2 
Abstract: This paper introduces the motivation and idea behind the recently founded 
interdisciplinary initiative Critical Neuroscience (http://www.critical-neuroscience.org). 
Critical Neuroscience is an approach that strives to understand, explain, contextualize, and, 
where called for, critique developments in and around the social, affective, and cognitive 
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neurosciences with the aim to create the competencies needed to responsibly deal with new 
challenges and concerns emerging in relation to the brain sciences. It addresses scholars in 
the humanities as well as, importantly, neuroscientific practitioners, policy makers, and the 
public at large. Does neuroscience indeed have such wide-ranging effects or are we 
collectively overestimating its impacts at the expense of other important drivers of social 
and cultural change? Via what channels is neuroscience interacting with contemporary 
conceptions of selfhood, identity, and well-being? Importantly, Critical Neuroscience strives 
to make the results of these assessments relevant to scientific practice itself. It aspires to 
motivate neuroscientists to be involved in the analysis of contextual factors, historical 
trajectories, conceptual difficulties, and potential consequences in connection to their 
empirical work. This paper begins to spell out a philosophical foundation for the project by 
outlining examples of the interaction taking place between the neurosciences and the social 
and cultural contexts in which they are embedded and by exposing some of the assumptions 
and argumentative patterns underlying dominant approaches. Recent anthropological work 
will be discussed to convey a sense of the de facto interactions between neuroscientific 
knowledge, its promissory projections, and the self-understandings of laypeople. This can be 
seen as a first step towards a phenomenology of the "seductive allure" that the 
neurosciences are exerting upon both the academic and the popular imagination. The 
concept of "critique" relevant to the project's overall orientation is outlined in the final 
section. 
Notes: An introduction to the new area of ‘critical neuroscience’ which, amongst other 
emphases, considers the effect of neuroscience on current conceptions of selfhood and well-
being. Relates to personhood, well-being and has implied consequences for evolutionary 
psychology. 
300. Smith, A. L., Jr.   (2000). Some recent thinking on personhood. Christian 
bioethics, 6(1), 113-122. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://MEDLINE:12166487. doi:10.1076/1380-3603(200004)6:1;1-c;ft113 
Abstract: This essay surveys four recent theological works on the issue of personhood: John 
F. Crosby's The Selfhood of the Human Person, Stanley Rudman's Concepts of Person and 
Christian Ethics, Metropolitan Hierotheos Vlachos' The Person in the Orthodox Tradition, and 
James Walter's What is a Person? An Ethical Exploration. 
Notes: A christian/theological consideration of personhood. Relates to personhood. 
301. Smith, M. B.   (1994). Selfhood at risk - Postmodern perils and the perils 
of postmodernism. American Psychologist, 49(5), 405-411. Article. 
Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:A1994NL78600002. 
doi:10.1037//0003-066x.49.5.405 
Abstract: Various commentaries on the threats to personal well-being involved in 
contemporary Western middle-class life are examined, especially Gergen's (1991) treatment 
of the ''saturated self.'' The version of postmodernism that Gergen advocated is criticized as 
representing an increasingly fashionable style of metatheory that reflects contemporary 
threats to selfhood but paralyzes endeavors to cope with them. Giddens's (1991) treatment 
of self and society in late modernity is selectively described as better fitted to a stance within 
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which scientific and professional psychology can contribute to realistic hopefulness rather 
than to fin de siecle hopelessness. 
Notes: Argues that Kenneth Gergen’s well-known, postmodern account of the self and its 
threat to well-being undermines attempts to counter such threats. A useful analysis of the 
links between theoretical accounts of personhood and experienced well-being. Relates to 
personhood and well-being. 
302. Sober, E.   & Wilson, D. S.   (2000). Summary of: 'Unto others - The 
evolution and psychology of unselfish behavior'. Journal of 
Consciousness Studies, 7(1-2), 185-206. Article. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://WOS:000090023100026 
Abstract: The hypothesis of group selection fell victim to a seemingly devastating critique in 
1960s evolutionary biology. In Unto Others (1998), we argue to the contrary, that group 
selection is a conceptually coherent and empirically well documented cause of evolution. We 
suggest, in addition that it has been especially important in human evolution. In the second 
part of Unto Others, we consider the issue of psychological egoism and altruism - do human 
beings have ultimate motives concerning the well-being of others? We argue that previous 
psychological and philosophical work on this question has been inconclusive. We propose an 
evolutionary argument for the claim that human beings have altruistic ultimate motives. 
Notes: A significant defence of group selection in the context of a fundamental human 
altruistic motive. Argues that it is possible to have an account of genuine human altruism 
that is consistent with evolutionary theory. Relates to evolutionary psychology and has 
implications for personhood and well-being. 
303. Sointu, E.   & Woodhead, L.   (2008). Spirituality, gender, and expressive 
selfhood. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 47(2), 259-276. 
Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000256123600007. 
doi:10.1111/j.1468-5906.2008.00406.x 
Abstract: This article discusses contemporary spiritualities, focusing in particular on the 
recent growth of practices attending to "mind, body, and sprit" and centered on the goal of 
"holistic well-being." We argue that the growing popularity of such "holistic spirituality" 
since the 1980s can be greatly illuminated by reference to Charles Taylor's account of the 
expressive mode of modern selfhood. Taylor's account is limited, however, by its inability to 
explain why women are disproportionately active within the sphere of holistic spirituality. By 
paying closer attention to gender, we seek to refine Taylor's approach and to advance our 
understanding of contemporary spirituality. Drawing on findings from two qualitative studies 
of holistic spirituality and health carried out in the United Kingdom, this article offers an 
analysis of what the "subjective turn" may mean for women. We argue that holistic 
spiritualities align with traditional spheres and representations of femininity, while 
simultaneously supporting and encouraging a move away from selfless to expressive 
selfhood. By endorsing and sanctioning "living life for others" and "living life for oneself," 
holistic spiritualities offer a way of negotiating dilemmas of selfhood that face many women 
- and some men-in late modern contexts. 
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Notes: A phenomenological analysis of the appeal of ‘holistic spirituality/well-being’ in 
today’s world, especially for women. Argues that it enables women to balance demands for 
caring for both self and others. Relates to personhood and well-being. 
304. Soler, M.   (2012). Costly signaling, ritual and cooperation: evidence from 
Candomblé, an Afro-Brazilian religion. Evolution and Human Behavior, 
33(4), 346-356. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S109051381100119X. 
doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2011.11.004 
Abstract: The apparent wastefulness of religious ritual represents a puzzle for rational choice 
theorists and evolutionary scholars. In recent years, it has been proposed that such rituals 
represent costly signals that promote intragroup cooperation precisely because of the effort 
and resources they require. This hypothesis was tested over the course of a 14-month long 
ethnographic study in the northeast of Brazil. The research focused on adherents of 
Candomblé, an African diasporic religion organized in autonomous congregations primarily 
located in low-income urban areas. Individuals who reported higher levels of religious 
commitment behaved more generously in a public goods economic game and revealed more 
instances of provided and received cooperation within their religious community. This 
suggests that ritual as a costly signaling may effectively predict willingness to cooperate with 
other group members and that the signaler may accrue benefits in the form of received 
cooperation. Socioeconomic variables are also shown to mediate religious signaling. This 
raises the possibility that signalers strategically alter their expressions of commitment as 
their needs and circumstances change. 
Notes: Applies evolutionary signalling theory to religious ritual. Relates to evolutionary 
psychology. 
305. Sousa, D.   (2012). Kierkegaard's anthropology of the self: Ethico-
religious and social dimensions of selfhood. Heythrop Journal-a 
Quarterly Review of Philosophy and Theology, 53(1), 37-50. Article. 
Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000297798000004. 
doi:10.1111/j.1468-2265.2010.00636.x 
Abstract: It is sometimes argued that the concept of the self is the unifying thread that ties 
together the rich diversity of philosophical and theological themes in Kierkegaard's works. In 
his conception of the self he provides us with a coherent and unified view of human 
existence. For Kierkegaard the self is not a static entity but a dynamic and unfolding reality, 
something I must strive to become. One is not a self but becomes a self as an ethico-religious 
task to be actualized. The purpose of this paper is to outline Kierkegaard's anthropology of 
the self with particular emphasis on the ethical and religious dimensions of selfhood. I will 
first elucidate the structure and dynamic character of the self, and then will examine the 
dialectical development of the self in the ethical and religious stages of existence. Finally I 
will address the widespread criticism of Kierkegaard's conception of the self as being 
radically individualistic and asocial. 
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Notes: Provides an account of Kierkegaard’s view of the self as primarily an ethical process. 
Could be seen to connect to an evolutionary account of humans as moral beings by virtue of 
their sociality. Relates to personhood. 
306. Stamatopoulou, D.   (2011). “Symbol formation and the embodied self: A 
microgenetic case-study examination of the transition to symbolic 
communication in scribbling activities from 14 to 31 months of age”. 
New Ideas in Psychology, 29(2), 162-188. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0732118X10000486. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2010.09.001 
Abstract: In this article, a theoretical account for the early formation and production of 
graphic symbols is presented, along with an illustrative microgenetic case study that focuses 
on those key mechanisms related to the progressive formation of complex graphic schemata 
and on the underlying emerging transitions in the signifier–signified relation. This account 
proposes that the development of symbolic graphic functioning follows a series of recursive 
loops between action and production that gradually enable the fundamental distinction 
between instrumental action and perceived intentional production. Scribbling dynamics via 
mirroring processes push the child’s primary reactive space to be converted into the child’s 
interactive experiential space and in turn mapped on and gradually transformed to the 
“secondary-pictorial,” communicative/expressive space, which also controls its 
manifestation. Scribbling, then, may be the underlying basis for the emergence of the first 
“symbolic articulation” of an embodied action representation—“natural-symbol,” of the self 
and the world/other. These first undifferentiated “natural” symbols (i.e., image schemata), 
mostly seen as superfluous or motor devices to drawing, stand as the cornerstones of 
drawing symbolic development, since they function as the “missing” link between action, 
production, perception, visual representation, and symbol formation. In other words, 
scribbling, by its embodied anchor that substitutes the event/object, sustains the ability to 
coordinate action representations so as to become “schematized” reciprocally, initiating in 
turn conscious control and self-referential intentionality. 
Notes: A fascinating thesis concerning the way in which seemingly non-symbolic scribbling 
behaviour may bridge the transition from motor movement to symbolism. Alongside this 
development is the development of the understanding of personal intentionality and 
conscious control of behaviour. Relates to personhood. 
307. Staudinger, U. M.   (2000). Many reasons speak against it, yet many 
people feel good: The paradox of subjective well-being. Psychologische 
Rundschau, 51(4), 185-197. Article. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://WOS:000089827000003. doi:10.1026//0033-3042.51.4.185 
Abstract: It is suggested that the well-being paradox consists of two facets: (i) even under 
adversive circumstances many people are happy, and (ii) the empirical mean of subjective 
well-being seems to be in the positive range. It is demonstrated that the well-being paradox 
is not just a methodological artifact. Subjective well-being can be measured reliably and with 
predictive validity. Also imprecise risk assessment does not completely dissolve the paradox. 
Further, domain-specific, dimensional, and longitudinal measurement of subjective well-
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being contribute some pieces to the puzzle but do not complete it. Central to the regulation 
of subjective well-being, however, are mechanisms and characteristics of self and 
personality such as comparison processes, adjustment of aspirational levels, goal investment 
patterns, and coping styles but also personality dimensions and characteristics of the self 
definition. Biological and cultural evolution may have contributed to the fact that the 
empirical mean of subjective well-being is positive, but also that the regulation of well-being 
has limits. Finally, the developmental model of selective optimization with compensation is 
offered as an integrative framework for the evidence presented. 
Notes: Examines the ‘paradox’ of subjective well-being in which objective negative 
conditions do not prevent it and, overall, subjective well-being is positive. Relates to well-
being. 
308. Sternberg, R. J.   & Grigorenko, E. L.   (2004). Intelligence and culture: 
how culture shapes what intelligence means, and the implications for a 
science of well-being. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of 
London B. Biological Sciences, 359 (1449, September 29), 1427–1434. . 
Abstract: This paper discusses the relationship between culture and intelligence. The main 
message of the paper is that intelligence cannot fully or even meaningfully be understood 
outside its cultural context. Behaviour that is considered intelligent in one culture may be 
considered unintelligent in another culture, and vice versa. Moreover, people in different 
cultures have different implicit (folk) theories of intelligence, so may not even mean the 
same thing by the word. The relationships between different aspects of intelligence can vary 
across cultures, with correlations that are positive in one setting proving to be negative in 
another. The paper opens with a general discussion of issues regarding the relationship 
between the two concepts. It then describes the theory of successful intelligence, which 
motivates our work on the interface between culture and intelligence. Finally, the article 
draws some conclusions. 
Notes: Examines cultural influences on the manifestation of intelligence, arguing that the 
cultural context is central to the understanding of intelligence. Relates to personhood and 
well-being 
309. Stetsenko, A.   (2012). Personhood: An activist project of historical 
becoming through collaborative pursuits of social transformation. New 
Ideas in Psychology, 30(1), 144-153. 
Abstract: The goal of this paper is to contribute to recent scholarship that pursues radical 
revision of prevalent models of personhood mired in outdated notions of human 
development and its foundational principles. To achieve this goal, I revisit and expand 
Vygotsky's project of cultural historical psychology to offer a dialectical framework that 
encompasses but is not limited to relational ontology. Premised on the notion of 
collaborative transformative practice as the grounding for human Being and Becoming (1), 
my proposal is that at the core of human nature and development lies an ineluctably activist 
stance vis-Ã -vis the world; it is the realization of this stance through answerable deeds 
composing one unified life project that forms the path to personhood. The ethical dimension 
appears as foundational to Being and Becoming because it is integral to actions through 
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which we become who we are while changing the world in collaborative pursuits of social 
transformation. From an activist transformative stance persons are agents not only for 
whom "things matter" but who themselves matter in history, culture, and society and, 
moreover, who come into Being as unique individuals through and to the extent that they 
matter in these processes and make a contribution to them. 
Note (1) The interrelated concepts of Being and Becoming are employed in the following 
sense. Being stands for ontological existence (in the sense of ‘‘Being in the world’’) whereas 
Becoming is a type of Being that implies (a) pathways of constant transformations in the 
states of Being (in contradistinction with the concept of development that combines periods 
of change with periods of relative stability), wherein (b) transformations pertain to changes 
in the states of ‘‘Being someone,’’ that is, in the states of Being a certain type of a person vis-
a` -vis one’s social world (in contradistinction with concepts such as change that can refer to 
states at subpersonal levels of existence), and conveying (c) active nature of this process in 
the sense that it stands for what the person does or accomplishes through one’s own 
pursuits (in contradistinction with the concept of growth as a process that an individual 
undergoes or that happens to an individual). Thus, the concept of Becoming conveys the 
sense of ontological existence as a path of a continuous, ceaseless, and dynamic moment-to-
moment transformation in one’s standing and relations vis-a` -vis the social world carried 
through one’s own active pursuits whereby a person is constantly changed yet without 
positing any ontological breaks with the previous states of Being. 
Notes: A very interesting argument to the effect that becoming a person is inherently an 
activist project performed in collaborative contexts. Because of this siting of the emergence 
of personhood, persons intrinsically ‘matter’ in the processes in which they are involved (and 
emerge). In providing this account, Vygotskyan approaches to the social and cultural 
processes of psychological development are enlisted. Relates to personhood and 
evolutionary psychology. 
310. Stevens, P.   (2010). Embedment in the environment: A new paradigm 
for well-being? Perspectives in Public Health, 130(6), 265-269. Retrieved 
from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/849563219?accountid=27890 
Abstract: Dominant models of health view people as essentially separable from their 
environment, affected directly by specific physical events or indirectly through idiosyncratic 
perceptions. Health is therefore a function of the individual, whether they are treated alone 
or in a group of similar individuals. A different (ecopsychological) view is that we are 
embedded within the environment; that notions of self, illness and well-being relate to 
where we are. Health practitioners and policy makers have realized that mind and body 
cannot be seen as being separate when promoting well-being, but 'self' and 'environment' is 
an equally false dichotomy. Although rarely acknowledged, we are continually 
interconnected via two-way physical interactions (electromagnetic, chemical and 
mechanical), and all we can know of the world comes via such interactions. Our concepts of 
self and other, health and disease, and all the relationships between them, are based on 
such interactions. If our environment changes, then these interactions change, yet our 
concepts often remain rigidly fixed. By introducing research into restorative, natural 
environments, the notion of adaptive mental states and the practices of ecotherapy, this 
paper offers an alternative view of well-being, shifting the emphasis away from the 
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individual and his/her illness and instead inviting consideration of the more dynamic 
relationships between people and place.  
Notes: A general perspective on environmental psychology, ecopsychology and well-being. 
Relates to well-being and personhood. 
311. Stone, J. E.  ; Carpendale, J. I. M.  ; Sugarman, J.   & Martin, J.   (2012). A 
Meadian account of social understanding: Taking a non-mentalistic 
approach to infant and verbal false belief understanding. New Ideas in 
Psychology, 30(2), 166-178. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0732118X11000535. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2011.09.002 
Abstract: Performance on false belief tasks has long been considered a key indicator of the 
development of social understanding in young children. We consider the enabling conditions 
for performing non-verbal and verbal false belief tasks as well as a typical developmental 
path toward false belief understanding. We argue that, in early ontogenesis, children 
anticipate the coordination of activity with others rather than read, probe, or reflectively 
engage with the psychological states of others. As linguistically mediated reflective thought 
emerges, children gradually become able to parse and isolate the myriad of incipient 
somatic, affective, and intentional responses that arise in any given moment. With reflective 
thought, children also begin to develop distinct and temporally coherent understandings 
about the minds of self and other. We provide an account of how the reflective thought that 
facilitates false belief understanding emerges. Our account focuses on a gradually 
developing refinement of social coordination and the shared perspectival understandings 
inherent in social coordination. 
Notes: Explains mastery of false belief tasks in terms of an early appreciation and 
anticipation of socially coordinated action rather than as a deduction from personal 
experience or inference about the belief states of others. Provides a socially grounded 
account of what is considered by psychologists to be a fundamental achievement of 
selfhood. Relates to personhood. 
312. Stone, V. E.  ; Cosmides, L.  ; Tooby, J.  ; Kroll, N.   & Knight, R.T.   (2002 ). 
Selective impairment of reasoning about social exchange in a patient 
with bilateral limbic system damage. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences U S A., 99 (17, August 20), 11531–11536. 
Abstract: Social exchange is a pervasive feature of human social life. Models in evolutionary 
biology predict that for social exchange to evolve in a species, individuals must be able to 
detect cheaters (nonreciprocators). Previous research suggests that humans have a cognitive 
mechanism specialized for detecting cheaters. Here we provide neurological evidence 
indicating that social exchange reasoning can be selectively impaired while reasoning about 
other domains is left intact. The patient, R.M., had extensive bilateral limbic system damage, 
affecting orbitofrontal cortex, temporal pole, and amygdala. We compared his performance 
on two types of reasoning problem that were closely matched in form and equally difficult 
for control subjects: social contract rules (of the form, “If you take the benefit, then you 
must satisfy the requirement”) and precaution rules (of the form, “If you engage in 
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hazardous activity X, then you must take precaution Y”). R.M. performed significantly worse 
in social contract reasoning than in precaution reasoning, when compared both with normal 
controls and with other brain-damaged subjects. This dissociation in reasoning performance 
provides evidence that reasoning about social exchange is a specialized and separable 
component of human social intelligence, and is consistent with other research indicating 
that the brain processes information about the social world differently from other types of 
information. 
Notes: A clinical study of social exchange reasoning and its independence of other forms of 
superficially similar reasoning tasks. This supports separate development and evolution of 
social forms of reasoning from other forms. Relates to evolutionary psychology and 
personhood. 
313. Strathern, M.   (2004). The whole person and its artifacts. Annual Review 
of Anthropology, 33, 1-19. Article. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://WOS:000225318000002. 
doi:10.1146/annurev.anthro.33.070203.143928 
Abstract: The joint themes of this volume of the Annual Review of Anthropology, the body 
as a public surface and new technologies of communication, are also woven into the design 
of the new Wellcome Trust Gallery at the British Museum, inspiring the reflections of this 
chapter. In the museum setting, moreover, an interesting question of scale arises: how 
particular objects can point sometimes to very particular values and sometimes to very 
general ones. This museological paradox is explored here. Taking a cue from the Gallery's 
focus on well-being, we find a parallel in the contrast between particular medicines used for 
specific complaints and a more general demand made on medicine as a set of organized 
practices for promoting health. We also find ideas about the whole person. Attending to the 
whole person requires its own technology, its own artifacts. And looking at artifacts from 
different times and places compels us to ask, What kind of "whole" is being imagined? The 
question is posed with materials from early twentieth-century London, mid-century Papua, 
and turn-of-the-century biomedicine. 
Notes: An anthropological discussion of how health and well-being enhancing artefacts may 
provide indications of what kind of whole person is being understood at different times. In 
particular, it examines the specific health interventions that target particular conditions in 
the context of broader notions of improving general health of whole persons. Relates to 
personhood and well-being. 
314. Sugarman, J.   (2005). Persons and moral agency. Theory & Psychology, 
15(6), 793-811. Retrieved from 
http://tap.sagepub.com/content/15/6/793.abstract. 
doi:10.1177/0959354305059333 
Abstract: Charles Taylor’s claim that personhood consists in its relation to moral goods and 
commitments, and that persons are moral agents, is summarized and examined. According 
to this view, persons not only have an understanding of themselves as moral agents, they 
are partially constituted by this understanding. It is argued that as moral agents, persons are 
capable of effecting changes in their lives through enacting understandings of the good. 
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Moreover, they have the capacity not only to adopt and wield social and cultural moral 
practices, but also to revise and transform them. Particular features of human psychology 
and its development are discussed that assist in clarifying the relation between persons and 
moral agency. Further, it is suggested that moral development might be understood as the 
gradual process whereby traditions are interpreted and reinterpreted toward the end of 
fashioning more virtuous persons. 
Notes: Based on Charles Taylor’s understanding of persons as primarily moral beings, this 
account highlights the way that understandings of the good become enlisted in the process 
of developing personhood. Relates to personhood. 
315. Sugarman, J.   & Martin, J.   (2011). Theorizing relational agency. Journal 
of Constructivist Psychology, 24(4), 283-289. Article. Retrieved from <Go 
to ISI>://WOS:000299957900003. doi:10.1080/10720537.2011.593455 
Abstract: Gergen's conception of human agency as a relational phenomenon and its 
adequacy to the tasks of psychological description and explanation are examined. A 
contrasting view is discussed that shows how psychologically capable agency can be 
rendered intelligible only by attending to its developmental emergence in historically 
established sociocultural contexts. It is argued that an elaborated developmental account is 
necessary to comprehend how psychological agency, once it has emerged, is a unique form 
of relational being capable of transcending its biophysical and sociocultural origins. From this 
perspective, agentive personhood is not simply "a social performance," but rather, an active 
structuring of existence. 
Notes: An interesting proposal that claims that a developmental account of the emergence 
of agency provides the basis for understanding agency in a way that is more than a simple 
consequence of biological or sociocultural structuring. Agency, it is argued, develops 
according to its own ‘active structuring’ of its relationality. Relates to personhood. 
316. Sugarman, J.   & Martin, J.   (2011). Theorizing relational agency: 
Reactions to comments. Journal of Constructivist Psychology, 24(4), 321-
323. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10720537.2011.593472. 
doi:10.1080/10720537.2011.593472 
Abstract: Five issues are raised in response to Gergen's comments: (a) agency as a unique 
form of relational being, (b) agency as self-determination, (c) self as first-person experience 
and understanding of particular existence, (d) the mereological fallacy, and (e) the necessity 
of a development perspective for recognizing the emergence of persons as self-determining 
agents. 
Notes: Responses to criticisms of the original article, above. Relates to personhood. 
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317. Sugarman, J.   & Sokol, B.   (2012). Human agency and development: An 
introduction and theoretical sketch. New Ideas in Psychology, 30(1), 1-
14. 
Notes: From this introductory editorial to the Special Issue: "As the editors of this special 
issue of New Ideas in Psychology, it is our pleasure and privilege to introduce this thoughtful 
and provocative collection of papers on the topic of agency and development. In our 
opinion, the cumulative scholarship in this issue lends considerable weight to the 
importance of a developmentally informed, externalist conception of human agency, 
regardless of the authors’ alignment with Piagetian, Vygotskian, or Meadian lines of 
scholarship. It is our hope that the papers herein will further stimulate the efforts of 
psychologists to address the importance of agency in psychological theorizing.” Relates to 
personhood and has implications for evolutionary psychology. 
318. Szolnoki, A.   & Perc, M.   (2012). Evolutionary advantages of adaptive 
rewarding. New Journal of Physics, 14. Article. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://WOS:000308743800004. doi:093016 10.1088/1367-
2630/14/9/093016 
Abstract: Our well-being depends on both our personal success and the success of our 
society. The realization of this fact makes cooperation an essential trait. Experiments have 
shown that rewards can elevate our readiness to cooperate, but since giving a reward 
inevitably entails paying a cost for it, the emergence and stability of such behavior remains 
elusive. Here we show that allowing for the act of rewarding to self-organize in dependence 
on the success of cooperation creates several evolutionary advantages that instill new ways 
through which collaborative efforts are promoted. Ranging from indirect territorial battle to 
the spontaneous emergence and destruction of coexistence, phase diagrams and the 
underlying spatial patterns reveal fascinatingly rich social dynamics that explain why this 
costly behavior has evolved and persevered. Comparisons with adaptive punishment, 
however, uncover an Achilles heel of adaptive rewarding, coming from over-aggression, 
which in turn hinders optimal utilization of network reciprocity. This may explain why, 
despite its success, rewarding is not as firmly embedded into our societal organization as 
punishment. 
Notes: An analysis that accounts for the evolutionary emergence of cooperative and 
collaborative social interactions through the process of rewarding behaviour, despite the 
costliness of providing rewards. Relates to evolutionary psychology and has implications for 
well-being (as derived from sociality). 
319. Tanskanen, A. O.  ; Rotkirch, A.   & Danielsbacka, M.   (2011). Do 
grandparents favor granddaughters? Biased grandparental investment in 
UK. Evolution and Human Behavior, 32(6), 407-415. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090513811000225. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2011.02.001 
Abstract: Differential grandparental investment in grandchildren is often explained with 
paternity uncertainty. The asymmetric inheritance of the sex chromosomes, especially of the 
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X chromosomes, may also bias grandparental investment. Recent studies show that ignoring 
the sex of the grandchild can mask important differences in the investment patterns of the 
same grandparent category, but this has not been tested in contemporary societies with 
nationally representative data. With 17 variables from the Involved Grandparenting and 
Child Well-Being 2007 survey, we tested differential grandparental investment as reported 
by British and Welsh adolescents and compared predictions based on X-chromosomal 
relatedness with predictions based on paternity uncertainty. The theories are expected to 
differ with regard to grandmaternal investment in grandsons and granddaughters. We test 
whether paternal grandmothers invest (H1) more in granddaughters than in grandsons, (H2) 
more in granddaughters than maternal grandmothers do and (H3) less in grandsons than 
maternal grandmothers do. In addition, following the suggestion that paternal grandmothers 
may reduce sibling competition between girls and boys by harming grandsons, we study 
whether (H4) paternal grandmothers channel more noninvestment into grandsons than into 
granddaughters. The results show no convincing support for the type of sex discrimination of 
grandchildren that is predicted by X-chromosomal relatedness theories, but do provide 
support for the paternity uncertainty theory. X-chromosomal relatedness does not appear to 
shape grandparental behavior in developed societies. 
Notes: Research that tests the relative influence of paternal uncertainty theory and X-
chromosomal relatedness theories of grandparental investment. Useful in outlining an 
important developmental example of rival (or at least distinct) evolutionary explanations. 
Relates to evolutionary psychology and has implications for personhood and, potentially, 
well-being. 
320. Tappan, M. B.   (1999). Authoring a moral self: A dialogical perspective. 
Journal of Constructivist Psychology, 12(2), 117-131. Article. Retrieved 
from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000079275900003. 
doi:10.1080/107205399266145 
Abstract: This article argues that the moral self is situated neither psychologically nor 
socially, but dialogically-as a function of the linguistically mediated exchanges between 
persons and the social world that are the hallmark of lived human experience. Primary 
support for this argument is taken from the work of Mikhail Bakhtin, who suggests that the 
"authorship" of the narratives one tells about one's life is always a function of both both self 
and other. This dialogical perspective is illustrated by an autobiographical account written by 
an emigre from Nazi Germany in which the author tells the story of a series of striking 
transformations in her moral self-moral identity, and in which her moral authority-ethical 
responsibility gradually emerge from the multitude of voices that she encounters in the 
social world. This article concludes that autobiographies provide perhaps the clearest 
evidence of the degree to which moral selfhood-identity is, at its core, a function of the 
ongoing dialogical interchange between self and others. 
Notes: An account that argues for understanding the moral self and identity as residing in 
the dialogical encounters between self and other. That is, a sense of a moral self is 
principally a dialogical construction rather than either a biological or social construction. Use 
of autobiographies (‘self stories’) is used to demonstrate this conceptualisation of the basis 
of the moral self. Relates to personhood. 
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321. Tauber, A. I.   (2005). The reflexive project: Reconstructing the moral 
agent. History of the Human Sciences, 18(4), 49-75. Article. Retrieved 
from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000235378800003. 
doi:10.1177/095269510508471 
Abstract: In the 17th century, 'reflexivity' was coined as a new term for introspection and 
self-awareness. It thus was poised to serve the instrumental function of combating 
skepticism by asserting a knowing self. In this Cartesian paradigm, introspection ends in an 
entity of self-identity. An alternate interpretation recognized how an infinite regress of 
reflexivity would render 'the self' elusive, if not unknowable. Reflexivity in this latter mode 
was rediscovered by post-Kantian philosophers, most notably Hegel, who defined the self in 
its self-reflective encounter with an other, and whose full articulation would occur at the 
final culmination of Reason's evolution. In the rising tide of 19th-century individualism, 
Emerson and Kierkegaard formulated constructions both in debt to, and in opposition 
against, Hegelian metaphysics. For each, although employing distinct strategies of self-
consciousness, 'the self' reached its apogee through divine encounter. Characterized by 
personal responsibility and individual choice, their philosophies would later be subsumed by 
secular existentialists committed to defining moral individualism and asserting the 
possibilities for human freedom and self authentication. 
Notes: A very useful overview of the development of the central notion of personal 
reflexivity in philosophical thought since the 17th century. Relates to personhood. 
322. TenHouten, W. D.   (1997). Primordial temporality, the self, and the 
brain. Journal of Social and Evolutionary Systems, 20(3), 253-279. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1061736197900163. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1061-7361(97)90016-3 
Abstract: Human adaptation, in every culture, importantly involves the categories of time 
and space. In addition to the ordinary-linear and patterned-cyclical kinds of time-
consciousness, two kinds of primordial temporality—the immediate-participatory (Dōgen) 
and the episodic-futural (Heidegger)—are proposed. It is argued that these immediate and 
participatory temporalities correspond to the “I” and the “Me,” the two stages of G.H. 
Mead's socially-constructed self, respectively. The proposed two concepts of primordial 
temporality are criterion-validated by showing their bases in the episodic and participatory 
processing that Karl Pribram has associated with the frontolimbic and posterior regions of 
the brain, respectively, which are dynamically connected to produce what Charles Laughlin 
calls the “prefrontosensorial polarity principle.” The concepts of the author's quaternary, 
socio-evolutionary theory of time and temporality are recovered from the concepts that 
Pribram had used to explicate anterior-posterior cortico-cortical interactions. 
Notes: A very interesting attempt to integrate philosophical understandings of the 
experience of time with Mead’s well known account of the ‘I’ and the ‘Me’ and 
neurolopsychological work on the processing of episodic and concurrent memory. Relates to 
personhood and evolutionary/biological psychology. 
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323. Teske, J. A.   (2006). Neuromythology: Brains and stories. Zygon, 41(1), 
169-196. Article; Proceedings Paper. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://WOS:000235520900012. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9744.2006.00732.x 
Abstract: I sketch a synthetic integration of several levels of explanation in addressing how 
myths, narratives, and stories engage human beings, produce their sense of identity and self-
understand and shape their intellectual, emotional, and embodied lives. Ultimately it is our 
engagement with the metanarratives of religious imagination by which we address a set of 
existentially necessary but ontologically unanswerable metaphysical questions that form the 
basis of religious belief. I show how a multileveled understanding of evolutionary biology, 
history, neuroscience, psychology, narrative, and mythology may form a coherent picture of 
the human spirit. Neuropsychological functions involved in constructing and responding to 
the narratives by which we form our identities and build meaningful lives include memory, 
attention, emotional marking, and temporal sequencing. It is the neural substrate, the 
emotional shaping, and the narrative structuring of higher cognitive function that provide 
the sine qua non for the construction of meaning, relationship, morality, and purpose that 
extend beyond our personal boundaries, both spatial and temporal. This includes a neural 
affect system shaped by our developmental dependency, the dynamic narratives of self 
formed in the development of identity and reconstructed over the life span, drawing on 
culturally available mythic and storied forms. Narrative constitutes our movement in moral 
space and may have the potential both for healing and for disruption for us as individuals 
and as a species, providing a contingent solution to the alienation and fragmentation of 
personhood, relationship, and community. 
Notes: Attempts an integration of many layers or levels of analysis from the biological to the 
mythological. Shows the interdependence and relationships between these levels. Relates to 
personhood and evolutionary psychology. 
324. Thiessen, D.   & Gregg, B.   (1980). Human assortative mating and genetic 
equilibrium: An evolutionary perspective. Ethology and Sociobiology, 
1(2), 111-140. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0162309580900035. 
doi:10.1016/0162-3095(80)90003-5 
Abstract: Assortative mating in human and other animal species is reviewed. Assortive 
mating is most often positive (between individuals sharing phenotypic similarity), occurs on 
a variety of normal and abnormal traits, strengthens the mating bond, and increases fertility. 
These results can best be understood if it is assumed that natural selection operates to 
increase genetic homology between mates and between parents and off-spring. The 
outcome of selection for positive assortment is to increase the genetic relatedness among 
family members, thus facilitating communication and altruism and increasing inclusive 
fitness without an additional reproductive effort. The opposing evolutionary vector is to 
restrict excessive homozygosity and consequent inbreeding depression by minimizing 
matings between individuals of greatest similarity (e.g., members of nuclear families). The 
result of these opposing evolutionary vectors is a negative relationship between the degree 
of positive assortative mating and heritability (h2): individuals gravitate toward those of 
similar but not identical phenotypic (and genetic) similarity. Individuals may assess their own 
and their potential mates' homozygosity and mate so as to maximize genetic homogamy and 
still avoid excessive inbreeding. Early imprinting and learning within the family unit act as the 
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proximate mechanisms to establish the criteria for optimal mate selection. Predictions that 
follow from this model are advanced, and several problems are discussed. Laboratory and 
field work with animals will be especially valuable in advancing our understanding of 
assortative mating. 
Notes: An early discussion of assortative mating and how it is balanced against the negative 
effects of homozygosity. Relates to evolutionary psychology. 
325. Thornton, J. E.   (2003). Life-span learning: A developmental perspective. 
International Journal of Aging & Human Development, 57(1), 55-76. 
Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000188883700004 
Abstract: The article discusses learning as embedded processes of development and aging, 
and as social activity over the life course. The concept of life-span learning is proposed and 
outlined to discuss these processes as aspects of and propositions in life-span development 
and aging theory. Life-span learning processes arise and continuously develop in a 
dynamically complex body, brain, and the mind they support as essential features of 
development and aging over the life course. Life-span learning processes are established by 
evolutionary adaptive mechanisms, enriched by challenging environments, and continuously 
developed in supportive social structures. These ideas are derived from evolutionary biology 
and psychology, the cognitive sciences, life-span development and aging research, and adult 
development and learning studies. It is argued that life-span learning activities that challenge 
the body-mind-brain nexus are indispensable to optimize individual development and aging. 
Three global interventions and their strategies are discussed that enhance life-span learning: 
Learning to Learn, Learning for Growth, and Learning for Well-being. 
Notes: Suggests that life-time learning approaches are evolutionarily adaptive processes that 
potentially can enhance well-being. Relates to well-being and personhood. 
326. Tomasello, M.   & Herrmann, E.   (2010). Ape and human cognition: 
What's the difference? Current Directions in Psychological Science, 19(1), 
3-8. Retrieved from http://cdp.sagepub.com/content/19/1/3.abstract. 
doi:10.1177/0963721409359300 
Abstract: Humans share the vast majority of their cognitive skills with other great apes. In 
addition, however, humans have also evolved a unique suite of cognitive skills and 
motivations—collectively referred to as shared intentionality—for living collaboratively, 
learning socially, and exchanging information in cultural groups. 
Notes: A useful overview of research on the cognitive skills associated with shared 
intentionality. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood. 
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327. Tomasello, M.  ; Melis, A. P.  ; Tennie, C.  ; Wyman, E.   & Herrmann, E.   
(2012). Two key steps in the evolution of human cooperation: The 
interdependence hypothesis. Current Anthropology, 53(6), 673-692. 
Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000311721200001. 
doi:10.1086/668207 
Abstract: Modern theories of the evolution of human cooperation focus mainly on altruism. 
In contrast, we propose that humans' species-unique forms of cooperation-as well as their 
species-unique forms of cognition, communication, and social life-all derive from mutualistic 
collaboration (with social selection against cheaters). In a first step, humans became obligate 
collaborative foragers such that individuals were interdependent with one another and so 
had a direct interest in the well-being of their partners. In this context, they evolved new 
skills and motivations for collaboration not possessed by other great apes (joint 
intentionality), and they helped their potential partners (and avoided cheaters). In a second 
step, these new collaborative skills and motivations were scaled up to group life in general, 
as modern humans faced competition from other groups. As part of this new group-
mindedness, they created cultural conventions, norms, and institutions (all characterized by 
collective intentionality), with knowledge of a specific set of these marking individuals as 
members of a particular cultural group. Human cognition and sociality thus became ever 
more collaborative and altruistic as human individuals became ever more interdependent. 
Notes: A significant evolutionary theory of the development of full, collective shared 
intentionality that is not based primarily on altruism but on interdependent collaboration. 
Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood and has implications for well-being. 
328. Tooby, J.   & Cosmides, L.   (1990). The past explains the present: 
Emotional adaptations and the structure of ancestral environments. 
Ethology and Sociobiology, 11(4–5), 375-424. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/016230959090017Z. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0162-3095(90)90017-Z 
Abstract: Present conditions and selection pressures are irrelevant to the present design of 
organisms and do not explain how or why organisms behave adaptively, when they do. To 
whatever non-chance extent organisms are behaving adaptively, it is 1) because of the 
operation of underlying adaptations whose present design is the product of selection in the 
past, and 2) because present conditions resemble past conditions in those specific ways 
made developmentally and functionally important by the design of those adaptations. All 
adaptations evolved in response to the repeating elements of past environments, and their 
structure reflects in detail the recurrent structure of ancestral environments. Even planning 
mechanisms (such as “consciousness”), which supposedly deal with novel situations, depend 
on ancestrally shaped categorization processes and are therefore not free of the past. In 
fact, the categorization of each new situation into evolutionarily repeating classes involves 
another kind of adaptation, the emotions, which match specialized modes of organismic 
operation to evolutionarily recurrent situations. The detailed statistical structure of these 
iterated systems of events is reflected in the detailed structure of the algorithms that govern 
emotional state. For this reason, the system of psychological adaptations that comprises 
each individual meets the present only as a version of the past. 
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Notes: An early presentation by Tooby and Cosmides of an evolutionary psychological 
analysis of how human psychology – in this instance specifically the emotional systems – are 
evolved adaptations to ancestral environments. Interesting, here, as an early example of 
evolutionary psychological analysis and also for targeting a system (the emotions) 
fundamental to most understandings of the experience of well-being and personhood. 
Relates to evolutionary psychology, well-being and personhood. 
329. Tsakiris, M.   & Haggard, P.   (2005). Experimenting with the acting self. 
Cognitive Neuropsychology, 22(3-4), 387-407. Article. Retrieved from 
<Go to ISI>://WOS:000229746500010. doi:10.1080/02643290442000158 
Abstract: Recent neuroscientific research has developed the concept of the embodied agent 
as a scientifically viable approach to the psychological concept of the self. Both the 
awareness of one's own actions and awareness of one's own body are necessary conditions 
for the experience of selfhood. The relative contributions of efferent and afferent 
information in self-awareness are yet to be fully understood. We review experimental 
evidence that highlights the phenomenological and functional differences between the 
"acting self" and the "sensory self." These differences may underlie the ubiquitous 
modulation of perception in voluntary action. We focus on three main research fields: 
somatosensory perception, time-awareness, and self-recognition. A series of experiments, 
designed so as to dissociate afferent from efferent information, are reviewed. As a whole 
the results suggest that intentional action functions as a general context for awareness, 
modulating the perception of one's own body. The "acting self," owner of the efferent 
information, modulates the phenomenal experience of the "sensory self" because of the 
intrinsically agentic nature of voluntary movement. Finally, it is suggested that this sense of 
agency is efferent-driven, originating from pre-action processes. 
Notes: A significant account of how the agentic aspects of selfhood are linked to efferent 
systems which, in turn, are a central aspect of intentional action. Self-awareness is claimed 
to be therefore grounded in these agentic aspects and efferent information thus modulates 
our sensory (afferent) experience of self. Relates to selfhood/personhood. 
330. Tucker, I.   (2012). Deleuze, sense, and life: Marking the parameters of a 
psychology of individuation. Theory & Psychology, 22(6), 771-785. 
Retrieved from http://tap.sagepub.com/content/22/6/771.abstract. 
doi:10.1177/0959354312442787 
Abstract: This paper offers a psychology of individuation, drawing on Gilles Deleuze’s 
concepts of series, event, sense, and individuation to develop a way of thinking human 
experience that is non-reductionist and processual. Deleuze’s writing produces a 
conceptualization of life as multiple, novel, and yet inherently linked to the past. The desire 
for such an undertaking comes from the need to avoid capturing experience according to 
theories that prioritize one factor over others, and in doing so define psychological life as a 
set of intrinsic properties. Understanding individuals as the products of individuating 
processes introduces a philosophy of change that, although not entirely “pure,” can still be 
novel. A psychology of individuation potentially allows for the extraction of a virtual realm of 
sense that is “in between” forms of language and materiality, and which allows novelty to 
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emerge in our social worlds. The paper concludes by discussing the potential moral benefits 
of conceptualizing psychological life as produced through processes of individuation. 
Notes: "What would psychology look like if the notion of the psyche as an essence is 
replaced with a definition of psychological life as individuated events? If applied to 
psychology, Deleuze’s philosophy of individuation offers a mode of thinking that cannot be 
reductionist, as no one element (e.g., neurochemical or discursive) is defined outside of its 
relevance to other features. Defining things as individuated events means that we analyse 
the ways they have been produced, and how they are subject to continuous reworking as 
configurations of multiplicity. Variation is key here. Processes fluctuate and alter course; 
they are fluid. What this means for psychology is thinking rigorously about how things can 
and might vary in the future." 
Notes: Using the work of Deleuze, the psychological self is understood as a series of 
individuated events rather than as a discrete entity. Relates to personhood. 
331. Twenge, J. M.   & King, L. A.   (2005). A good life is a personal life: 
Relationship fulfillment and work fulfillment in judgments of life quality. 
Journal of Research in Personality, 39(3), 336-353. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0092656604000868. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2004.01.004 
Abstract: Three studies examined folk concepts of the good life in samples of college 
students and community adults. An experimental design varied a target’s sex, work 
fulfillment (WF), and relationship fulfillment (RF). RF had the strongest effect on both 
judgments of life desirability and the person’s moral goodness. WF was a significant but 
weaker influence. Targets with high RF were judged as more likely to go to heaven, whereas 
WF had no effect on this judgment. There was no effect for target gender. In Study 3, 
individual differences in intrinsic motivation in the relationship and work domains interacted 
with target fulfillment to predict desirability and moral goodness judgments. Overall, the 
results indicate that a good life must include fulfilling personal relationships; WF is a plus but 
seemingly not essential. 
Notes: Reports a series of studies that demonstrate the centrality of relationship fulfilment 
to notions of the ‘good life’ in terms of both well-being and moral goodness. Relates to well-
being. 
332. Twigg, J.   (2010). Clothing and dementia: A neglected dimension? 
Journal of Aging Studies, 24(4), 223-230. Article. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://WOS:000283970900002. doi:10.1016/j.jaging.2010.05.002 
Abstract: The article explores the neglected subject of clothing and dementia. Addressing 
questions of the body, identity and selfhood, it argues - against the dominant understanding 
- that clothes continue to be significant in the lives and well-being of people with dementia. 
Drawing on new theorising that emphasises the embodied nature of selfhood, the article 
explores the role of clothing in the maintenance of identity; its nature as the 'environment 
closest in'; its significance in social interaction; and its potential character as an agent of 
control and normativity. The article concludes that clothing and dress offer a potentially 
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interesting field in which we can explore the nature of personhood in dementia, and in ways 
that offer insights into forms of response through which individuality and selfhood can be 
recognised, maintained and enhanced.  
Notes: The author argues "that clothing and dress are in fact relevant to the well-being and 
care of people with dementia; that they touch on significant issues in relation to the body, 
identity and self; and that they offer us routes to access being and selfhood as they exist at a 
bodily level." The siting of the analysis in the context of dementia also highlights the 
importance of the external, performative aspects of personhood and individuality even 
when cognitive processes relevant to reproducing personhood are diminishing. Relates to 
personhood and well-being. 
333. Valli, K.  ; Revonsuo, A.  ; Palkas, O.  ; Ismail, K. H.  ; Ali, K. J.   & Punamaki, 
R. L.   (2005). The threat simulation theory of the evolutionary function 
of dreaming: Evidence from dreams of traumatized children. 
Consciousness and Cognition, 14(1), 188-218. Article; Proceedings Paper. 
Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000227897700011. 
doi:10.1016/s1053-8100(03)00019-9 
Abstract: The threat simulation theory of dreaming (TST) (Revonsuo, 2000) states that 
dream consciousness is essentially an ancient biological defence mechanism, evolutionarily 
selected for its capacity to repeatedly simulate threatening events. Threat simulation during 
dreaming rehearses the cognitive mechanisms required for efficient threat perception and 
threat avoidance, leading to increased probability of reproductive success during human 
evolution. One hypothesis drawn from TST is that real threatening events encountered by 
the individual during wakefulness should lead to an increased activation of the system, a 
threat simulation response, and therefore, to an increased frequency and severity of 
threatening events in dreams. Consequently, children who live in an environment in which 
their physical and psychological well-being is constantly threatened should have a highly 
activated dream production and threat simulation system, whereas children living in a safe 
environment that is relatively free of such threat cues should have a weakly activated 
system. We tested this hypothesis by analysing the content of dream reports from severely 
traumatized and less traumatized Kurdish children and ordinary, non-traumatized Finnish 
children. Our results give support for most of the predictions drawn from TST. The severely 
traumatized children reported a significantly greater number of dreams and their dreams 
included a higher number of threatening dream events. The dream threats of traumatized 
children were also more severe in nature than the threats of less traumatized or non-
traumatized children. 
Notes: An empirical study to investigate the theory that dreaming evolved partly to 
simulate/practice cognitive responses to threatening or traumatic events. Support was 
found for the theory in terms of both frequency and severity of threatening dream events. 
The theory is grounded in an evolutionary analysis and concerns processes relevant to 
personal experiences of conscious states (i.e., dreaming). Relates to evolutionary psychology 
and personhood. 
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334. Veenhoven, R.   (2010). Life is getting better: Societal evolution and fit 
with human nature. Social Indicators Research, 97(1), 105-122. Retrieved 
from http://search.proquest.com/docview/89192729?accountid=27890 
http://bb5xk7cw9v.search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-
8&rfr_id=info:sid/ProQ%3Asocscijournals&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:
mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Social+Indicators+Research&rft.
atitle=Life+is+Getting+Better%3A+Societal+Evolution+and+Fit+with+Hu
man+Nature&rft.au=Veenhoven%2C+Ruut&rft.aulast=Veenhoven&rft.a
ufirst=Ruut&rft.date=2010-05-
01&rft.volume=97&rft.issue=1&rft.spage=105&rft.isbn=&rft.btitle=&rft.t
itle=Social+Indicators+Research&rft.issn=03038300 
Abstract: Human society has changed much over the last centuries and this process of 
'modernization' has profoundly affected the lives of individuals; currently we live quite 
different lives from those forefathers lived only five generations ago. There is difference of 
opinion as to whether we live better now than before and consequently there is also 
disagreement as to whether we should continue modernizing or rather try to slow the 
process down. Quality-of-life in a society can be measured by how long and happy its 
inhabitants live. Using these indicators I assess whether societal modernization has made life 
better or worse. Firstly I examine findings of present day survey research. I start with a cross-
sectional analysis of 143 nations in the years 2000-2008 and find that people live longer and 
happier in today's most modern societies. Secondly I examine trends in modern nations over 
the last decade and find that happiness and longevity have increased in most cases. Thirdly I 
consider the long-term and review findings from historical anthropology, which show that 
we lived better in the early hunter-gatherer society than in the later agrarian society. 
Together these data suggest that societal evolution has worked out differently for the 
quality of human life, first negatively, in the change from a hunter-gatherer existence to 
agriculture, and next positively, in the more recent transformation from an agrarian to an 
industrial society. We live now longer and happier than ever before. 
Notes: A well known analysis of shifts in happiness related to modernisation processes. The 
historical span is not on the evolutionary time-scale but it does involve comparison of 
evolutionarily more original hunter-gatherer social arrangements with modern 
arrangements and so has implications for evolutionary analyses. Relates to well-being and 
has implications for evolutionary psychology. 
335. Volk, A. A.   & Atkinson, J. A.   (2013). Infant and child death in the 
human environment of evolutionary adaptation. Evolution and Human 
Behavior. Retrieved from 
http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1090513812001237?showal
l=true 
Abstract: The precise quantitative nature of the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness 
(EEA) is difficult to reconstruct. The EEA represents a multitude of different geographic and 
temporal environments, of which a large number often need to be surveyed in order to draw 
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sound conclusions. We examine a large number of both hunter–gatherer (N=20) and 
historical (N=43) infant and child mortality rates to generate a reliable quantitative estimate 
of their levels in the EEA. Using data drawn from a wide range of geographic locations, 
cultures, and times, we estimate that approximately 27% of infants failed to survive their 
first year of life, while approximately 47.5% of children failed to survive to puberty across in 
the EEA. These rates represent a serious selective pressure faced by humanity that may be 
underappreciated by many evolutionary psychologists. Additionally, a cross-species 
comparison found that human child mortality rates are roughly equivalent to Old World 
monkeys, higher than orangutan or bonobo rates and potentially higher than those of 
chimpanzees and gorillas. These findings are briefly discussed in relation to life history 
theory and evolved adaptations designed to lower high childhood mortality. 
Notes: Discusses an important evolutionary pressure on human evolution. High infant death 
rates in the ‘EEA’ impact upon social and social psychological responses and environments. 
Given the high investment required to raise human children to puberty this is a significant 
selective pressure on human evolution and well-being. Relates to evolutionary psychology 
and well-being. 
336. Walters, G. D.   (1999). Human survival and the self-destruction paradox: 
An integrated theoretical model. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 20(1), 
57-78. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000080223500004 
Abstract: Borrowing from evolutionary biology, existentialism, developmental psychology, 
and social learning theory, an integrated model of human behavior is applied to several 
forms of self-destructive behavior, to include anorexia nervosa, suicide, substance abuse, 
and pathological gambling. It is argued that self-destructive behavior is a function of how the 
individual psychologically construes survival and copes with perceptions of isolation and 
separation from the environment. The paradox of self destructive behavior in organisms 
motivated by self-preservation is resolved by taking note of the fact that self-destruction 
stems from people's efforts to survive psychologically and resolve the subject-object duality, 
even when this places their physical well-being in jeopardy. 
Notes: Presents an argument for how seemingly self-destructive behaviours might arise, in 
evolutionary terms, from the isolation of psychological ‘survival’ and coping from physical 
well-being. That is, evolved psychological protection mechanisms can work against physical 
survival in particular environments. The analysis helpfully reveals the selective tension 
between different forms of evolved mechanisms. Relates to evolutionary psychology, well-
being and personhood. 
337. Wang, X. T.   (2002). Risk as reproductive variance. Evolution and Human 
Behavior, 23(1), 35-57. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090513801000915. 
doi:10.1016/s1090-5138(01)00091-5 
Abstract: In economics, normative utility theories of decision-making under risk use a single 
number (expected value) to index subjective utility at the cost of losing information about 
risk distribution. This paper examines how people make use of risk distributions (that is, 
variations in expected payoffs) to maximize the probability of reaching a goal and to 
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minimize the likelihood of falling below a minimum requirement (MR). The author proposes 
and tests a Bounded Risk Distribution model using both hypothetical life–death problems 
and real reproductive and parental decision problems. Study 1 demonstrated that a given 
degree of increase in expected number of saved lives had a significant effect on the 
respondents' risk preference when the increase was likely to cross the average MR of the 
respondents (in a small group context), but the same increase in expected value had little 
effect when the change was within a range below the average MR (in a kinship context) or 
above the MR (in a large group context). Study 2 examined alternative hypotheses for 
hypothetical risk acceptance with respect to kinship groups and found that whether the 
decision-maker was responsible or not had little effect on the setting of the MR and risk 
preference. The MR setting was mainly determined by the kinship context itself and was 
further fine-tuned by the framing of the choice outcomes. Study 3 was conducted in four 
rural villages in northwest China, and assessed real reproductive decisions. Interbirth 
intervals but not breast-feeding duration varied with a family's wealth, the sex of a child, and 
the perceived resemblance of a child to a parent. These results are interpreted in terms of 
the same Bounded Risk Distribution model that was applied in the hypothetical scenario 
studies. 
Notes: An interesting empirical series of studies exploring evolutionary hypotheses about 
decision making in the context of various risk distributions. Relates to evolutionary 
psychology. 
338. Warneken, F.   & Tomasello, M.   (2006). Altruistic helping in human 
infants and young chimpanzees. Science (New York, N.Y.), 311(5765), 
1301. 
Abstract: Human beings routinely help others to achieve their goals, even when the helper 
receives no immediate benefit and the person helped is a stranger. Such altruistic 
behaviours (toward non-kin) are extremely rare evolutionarily, with some theorists even 
proposing that they are uniquely human. Here we show that human children as young as 18 
months of age (prelinguistic or just-linguistic) quite readily help others to achieve their goals 
in a variety of differernt situations. This requires both an understanding of others' goals and 
an altruistic motivation to help. In addition, we demonstrate similar though less robust skills 
and motivations in three young chimpanzees. 
Notes: Groundbreaking work on the seemingly inherent nature of cooperative and altruistic 
behaviours in humans and, to a lesser degree, chimpanzees. Has important implications for 
both well-being and personhood given the centrality of social relationships to well-being and 
the role of the social environment in developing personhood. Relates to evolutionary 
psychology and has implications for well-being and personhood. 
339. Weiss, C.  ; Herwig, A.   & Schuetz-Bosbach, S.   (2011). The self in action 
effects: Selective attenuation of self-generated sounds. Cognition, 
121(2), 207-218. Article. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://WOS:000296302100004. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2011.06.011 
Abstrct: The immediate experience of self-agency, that is, the experience of generating and 
controlling our actions, is thought to be a key aspect of selfhood. It has been suggested that 
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this experience is intimately linked to internal motor signals associated with the ongoing 
actions. These signals should lead to an attenuation of the sensory consequences of one's 
own actions and thereby allow classifying them as self-generated. The discovery of shared 
representations of actions between self and other, however, challenges this idea and 
suggests similar attenuation of one's own and other's sensory action effects. Here, we tested 
these assumptions by comparing sensory attenuation of self-generated and observed 
sensory effects. More specifically, we compared the loudness perception of sounds that 
were either self-generated, generated by another person or a computer. In two 
experiments, we found a reduced perception of loudness intensity specifically related to self-
generation. Furthermore, the perception of sounds generated by another person and a 
computer did not differ from each other. These findings indicate that one's own agentive 
influence upon the outside world has a special perceptual quality which distinguishes it from 
any sort of external influence, including human and non-human sources. This suggests that a 
real sense of self-agency is not a socially shared but rather a unique and private experience.  
Notes: An important empirical study of the experience of self-agency that concludes that 
self-initiated behaviour is internally identified partly through its role in attenuating the 
sensory experiences that result from that behaviour. Crucially, this means that self-agency – 
as experienced moment by moment – is not a socially shared or experience but a private 
one. Relates to selfhood/ personhood. 
340. Welling, H.   (2003). An evolutionary function of the depressive reaction: 
The cognitive map hypothesis. New Ideas in Psychology, 21(2), 147-156. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0732118X03000175. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0732-118X(03)00017-5 
Abstract: Existing hypotheses for an evolutionary function of depression are insufficient, 
primarily because they fail to show convincingly the advantages that might compensate for 
the high evolutionary costs of its features, such as general passivity, decreased appetite and 
sex drive. In this article, it is shown that depression may have the function of motivating a 
period of reduced activity after a major loss. It thus allows for time out to update the 
cognitive structures for altered circumstances, and avoids dangerous actions based on the 
use of inadequate cognitive maps. This cognitive map hypothesis provides a viable 
evolutionary explanation for the high incidence of depression reaction, in spite of its 
apparently unfavorable characteristics. The article discusses how this hypothesis may also 
shed light on the occurrence of clinical depression, proposing that it is caused by a failure to 
update complex conceptual cognitive structures. Finally, recommendations for the 
treatment of depression that derive from this hypothesis are presented. 
Notes: An original theory of the adaptive role of depressive responses in humans that is used 
to explain their ubiquity and to understand the nature of clinical depression. Relates to 
evolutionary psychology and well-being. 
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341. Welz, C.   (2010). Identity as self-transformation: Emotional conflicts and 
their metamorphosis in memory. Continental Philosophy Review, 43(2), 
267-285. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000280078400006. 
doi:10.1007/s11007-010-9142-9 
Abstract: This paper develops the thesis that personal identity is neither to be taken in terms 
of an unchanging self-sufficient 'substance' nor in terms of selfhood 'without substance,' i.e. 
as fluctuating processes of pure relationality and subject-less activity. Instead, identity is 
taken as self-transformation that is bound to particular embodied individuals and surpasses 
them as individuated entities. The paper is structured in three parts. Part I describes the 
experiential givenness of conflicts that support our sense of self-transformation. While the 
first part develops an inter-subjective topography of emotional movements, the second part 
pays attention to their temporal dimension. We work with conflicts and get transformed by 
them also in the way we remember them. Part II focuses on the process of self-
understanding that accompanies conflicts and their metamorphosis in memory. Part III 
compares and discusses different models of a 'relational ontology' of the person, which 
question the idea that we are defined only by how we define ourselves-just as they question 
the idea that one's identity is independent of how one relates to one's having changed. 
Notes: A philosophical account of personal identity based on the notion of self-
transformation. Central to the account is the experience of and response to conflicts – their 
emotional content in a social setting and the way they provoke varying forms of self-
understanding. Relates to personhood. 
342. Welzel, C.   & Inglehart, R.   (2010). Agency, values, and well-being: A 
human development model. Social Indicators Research, 97(1), 43-63. 
Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/89193947?accountid=27890 
http://bb5xk7cw9v.search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-
8&rfr_id=info:sid/ProQ%3Asocscijournals&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:
mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Social+Indicators+Research&rft.
atitle=Agency%2C+Values%2C+and+Well-
Being%3A+A+Human+Development+Model&rft.au=Welzel%2C+Christia
n%3BInglehart%2C+Ronald&rft.aulast=Welzel&rft.aufirst=Christian&rft.
date=2010-05-
01&rft.volume=97&rft.issue=1&rft.spage=43&rft.isbn=&rft.btitle=&rft.ti
tle=Social+Indicators+Research&rft.issn=03038300 
Abstract: This paper argues that feelings of agency are linked to human well-being through a 
sequence of adaptive mechanisms that promote human development, once existential 
conditions become permissive. In the first part, we elaborate on the evolutionary logic of 
this model and outline why an evolutionary perspective is helpful to understand changes in 
values that give feelings of agency greater weight in shaping human well-being. In the 
second part, we test the key links in this model with data from the World Values Surveys 
using ecological regressions and multi-level models, covering some 80 societies worldwide. 
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Empirically, we demonstrate evidence for the following sequence: (1) in response to 
widening opportunities of life, people place stronger emphasis on emancipative values, (2) in 
response to a stronger emphasis on emancipative values, feelings of agency gain greater 
weight in shaping people's life satisfaction, (3) in response to a greater impact of agency 
feelings on life satisfaction, the level of life satisfaction itself rises. Further analyses show 
that this model is culturally universal because taking into account the strength of a society's 
western tradition does not render insignificant these adaptive linkages. Precisely because of 
its universality, this is indeed a 'human' development model in a most general sense. 
Notes: Proposes a universal model that situates human agency as central to the 
development of improved perceptions of life satisfaction. Agency leads from greater life 
opportunities via ‘emancipatory’ values. This then results in agency being more central to life 
satisfaction with a corresponding rise in perceived life satisfaction. Given its proposed 
universality it also has implications for evolutionary psychology. Relates to well-being, 
personhood and evolutionary psychology. 
343. Wuketits, F. M.   (1993). Moral systems as evolutionary systems: Taking 
evolutionary ethics seriously. Journal of Social and Evolutionary Systems, 
16(3), 251-271. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/106173619390035P. 
doi:10.1016/1061-7361(93)90035-p 
Abstract: In this paper I propose an evolutionary ethics that goes beyond mere description. I 
argue that the fact that human behavior is biologically constrained can give us some ideas 
about how to establish moral norms, so that the fact/value distinction in its strict sense is no 
longer tenable. Taking evolutionary ethics seriously means, after all, looking for possibilities 
of human beings as a biological species. Biological evolution does not entail any values and 
moral norms, but in organizing our social life we are well-advised to consider those factors 
that have channeled our evolution—i.e., not just ask what humans ought to do, but what 
they are able to do. My vantage point is that moral systems are evolutionary systems. 
Notes: A clear, early philosophical account of ethics based upon an evolutionary 
understanding of their role. Relates to evolutionary psychology and has implications for 
personhood. 
344. Yarnal, C. M.  ; Chick, G.   & Kerstetter, D. L.   (2008). "I did not have time 
to play growing up... so this is my play time. It's the best thing I have 
ever done for myself": What is play to older women? Leisure Sciences, 
30(3), 235-252. Article. Retrieved from <Go to 
ISI>://WOS:000256676700004. doi:10.1080/01490400802017456 
Abstract: Little is known about play in older women's leisure lives. An examination of The 
Red Hat Society(R), a leisure-based social group, expanded an understanding of play by 
including older women's viewpoints. Because of the absence of literature about emotion and 
friendship in both play theory and evolutionary theory, our research questions included: 
how do older women define play, and what are the outcomes of older women's play? Three 
themes about women's play emerged from data analysis (a) a context for fun, laughter, and 
feeling good, (b) the chance to be silly and goofy, and (c) positive public reaction to play. 
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Results are discussed by extending current conceptualizations of play theory and 
evolutionary theory and the roles of play in older women's leisure lives and their health and 
well-being. 
Notes: An interesting empirical study of the role of play in older women’s lives and its 
relationship to well-being. What is particularly interesting is the attempt to understand play 
from an evolutionary perspective but not solely as a form of early developmental ‘practice’ 
for children. Argues that play has distinct well-being advantages for adults. Relates to well-
being and evolutionary psychology. 
345. Zahavi, D.   (2009). Is the self a social construct? Inquiry-an 
Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 52(6), 551-573. Article. Retrieved 
from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000272592900001. 
doi:10.1080/00201740903377826 
Abstract: There is a long tradition in philosophy for claiming that selfhood is socially 
constructed and self-experience intersubjectively mediated. On many accounts, we 
consequently have to distinguish between being conscious or sentient and being a self. The 
requirements that must be met in order to qualify for the latter are higher. My aim in the 
following is to challenge this form of social constructivism by arguing that an account of self 
which disregards the fundamental structures and features of our experiential life is a non-
starter, and that a correct description and account of the experiential dimension must do 
justice to the first-person perspective and to the primitive form of self-referentiality, 
mineness or for-me-ness that it entails. I then consider and discuss various objections to this 
account, in particular the view that an endorsement of such a minimal notion of self 
commits one to an outdated form of Cartesianism. In the final part of the paper, I argue that 
the self is so multifaceted a phenomenon that various complementary accounts must be 
integrated if we are to do justice to its complexity. 
Notes: A philosophical counter to the notion that the self is a socially constructed artefact. 
By highlighting the role of the first-person perspective, the author argues that social 
accounts of self neglect this primitive form of self-referentiality. Relates to personhood. 
346. Zahavi, D.   & Roepstorff, A.   (2011). Faces and ascriptions: Mapping 
measures of the self. Consciousness and Cognition, 20(1), 141-148. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1053810010001996. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2010.10.011 
Abstract: The ‘self’ is increasingly used as a variable in cognitive experiments and correlated 
with activity in particular areas in the brain. At first glance, this seems to transform the self 
from an ephemeral theoretical entity to something concrete and measurable. However, the 
transformation is by no means unproblematic. We trace the development of two important 
experimental paradigms in the study of the self, self-face recognition and the adjective self 
ascription task. We show how the experimental instrumentalization has gone hand in hand 
with a simplification of the self-concept, and how more conceptual and theoretical 
reflections on the structure, function and nature of self have either disappeared altogether 
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or receded into the background. We argue that this development impedes and complicates 
the interdisciplinary study of self. 
Notes: Criticises established experimental operationalisations of the self – self-face 
recognition and adjective self-ascription – for narrowing and oversimplifying the 
conceptualisation of the self. The authors argue for re-introduction of omitted aspects of the 
self arising from its multidimensional nature. Relates to personhood. 
347. Zhao, G. P.   (2005). Playing as adaptation? Layered selfhood and self-
regard in cultural contexts. Culture & Psychology, 11(1), 5-27. Article. 
Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000228469900001. 
doi:10.1177/1354067x05050740 
Abstract: The current paradigm shift from realism and humanism to social constructionism 
and postmodernism has tremendous implications for social sciences, especially for 
psychology. The idea that not only our knowledge, but also our self, emotions and cognitions 
are constructed by society and culture is embraced by some cross-cultural and cultural 
psychologists and postmodernists. While this stance attempts to integrate culture and 
psychology, it depreciates the part of the self that can stand apart from culture and society 
and therefore be shared among humankind. This paper proposes a layered model of 
selfhood to incorporate both universal and existential human experience and the influence 
of culture and society. Heine, Lehman, Markus and Kitayama's (1999) cross-cultural study of 
self-regard serves as an exemplar of the constructionist approach and their data are 
reanalyzed using the proposed model of selfhood. The notion of 'play' is introduced to 
understand the dynamics at the interface between cultural regulations and individuals. This 
paper also explores the cultural norms of East Asia and America. 
Notes: A fascinating argument that seeks to go beyond a simple social constructionist 
account of human psychology. Importantly, they argue that the activity of play is the 
dynamic that mediates between what is universal in the human self and cultural and social 
influences on its development. Relates to personhood and has implications for evolutionary 
psychology. 
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